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I. INTRODUCTION

Corporate charter competition among U.S. states has been held
out as a model of welfare-enhancing regulatory competition.
Proponents of this story also rely on it as a basis for promoting
regulatory competition in international securities regulation.'
These "issuer choice" proponents argue that an issuer of securities
should be permitted to choose the securities regulation of any nation
to govern its securities offerings and trading worldwide. 2 This
Article challenges the notion that the claimed success of corporate
charter competition among U.S. states argues in favor of international issuer choice.
Corporate law is obsessed with Delaware. Delaware, Delaware,
Delaware. Most commentators hold Delaware out as the model
competitor in a successful, admirable, welfare-enhancing system of
regulatory competition.3 Yet others decry Delaware as a rogue
state, leading a race to laxity in corporate law.4 And finally, a third
strand of commentary doubts that much if any competition over
corporate law occurs at all.5 Across all three perspectives, despite
their differences, a central task is to explain Delaware-how it came
to be the leading incorporation state for public companies by a wide
margin.
Make no mistake, the "good" competition story dominates
corporate law scholarship, as successive bursts of insight have
refined the model both theoretically and empirically.' Like all
successful models, this model shows a healthy presumption to

1 Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in InternationalSecuritiesRegulation, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L., July 2001, at 387, 387.
2

Id. at 390.

3

See infra note 6 and accompanying text.

' See infra note 46 and accompanying text.

5 See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
6 Robert Daires, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 525
(2001); Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: 'Unhealthy
Competition"Versus FederalRegulation, 53 J. BUS. 259, 259 (1980); Daniel R. Fischel, The
"Raceto the Bottom"Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware'sCorporation
Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 913, 913 (1982); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of
the IncorporationPuzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 225 (1985); Romano, supra note 1, at 387;
Ralph K Winter, Jr., State Law, ShareholderProtection,and the Theory of the Corporation,
6 J. LEGAL STuD. 251, 251 (1977).
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imperialism: What was once merely a small state has become an
act, a verb, a process. "Delawarization"-regulatory competition
based on the U.S. corporate charter competition paradigm-has
been observed, recommended, predicted, and sometimes distinguished in many areas-corporate law in Europe,' U.S. and
international bankruptcy law,8 international financial regulation,9
and environmental law,' ° to name a few. The debate over corporate

See David Charny, Competition Among Jurisdictionsin FormulatingCorporateLaw
Rules: An American Perspective on the "Race to the Bottom" in the European Communities,
32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 423, 424-25 (1991) (contrasting harmonization efforts in European Union
with U.S. charter competition debate in building framework for theory of allocation of
rulemaking authority); Simon Deakin, Regulatory Competition Versus Harmonization in
EuropeanCompany Law, in REGUIATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 190,20309 (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001) (discussing prospects for U.S.-style
corporate charter competition in EU); Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, The
Evolution of Closely Held Business Forms in Europe, 26 J. CORP. L. 855, 872-77 (2001)
(discussing prospects for U.S.-style regulatory competition over smaller business forms within
EU).
' See Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to TransnationalInsolvencies, 19 MICH.
J. INTL L. 1, 1 (1997) (arguing for private choice of insolvency law for transnational
insolvency); Robert K Rasmussen, Resolving TransnationalInsolvencies Through Private
Ordering, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2252, 2252 (2000) (same); Robert K Rasmussen & Randall S.
Thomas, Timing Matters:PromotingForum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations,94 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1357, 1382-406 (2000) (relying on corporate law race-to-the-top to suggest reforms of
bankruptcy venue rules); David A. Skeel, Jr., Lockups andDelaware Venue in CorporateLaw
and Bankruptcy, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1270-79 (2000) (arguing that liberal bankruptcy
venue rules allowing firms to file in Delaware produces benefits similar to state charter
competition); see also Barry E. Adler & Henry N. Butler, On the "Delawarization of
Bankruptcy"Debate, 52 EMORY L.J. 1309, 1309 (2003) (downplaying importance of observed
Delawarization in U.S. bankruptcy); Marcus Cole, 'Delaware is Not a State": Are We
Witnessing JurisdictionalCompetition in Bankruptcy?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1845, 1845 (2002)
(analyzing Delawarization of corporate reorganization in U.S.); Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D.
Kalin, The Failureof Public Company Bankruptcies in Delawareand New York: Empirical
Evidence ofa "Race to the Bottom", 54 VAND. L. REV. 231, 232-37 (2001) (contrasting charter
competition with firms' choice ofbankruptcy venue and presenting empirical evidence to show
that rush to Delaware bankruptcy courts has been race to the bottom).
" See Howell E. Jackson, Centralization, Competition, and Privatizationin Financial
Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L., July 2001, at 649, 654 (noting emergence ofjurisdictional
competition arguments in international financial regulation).
1 Compare Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson:
Commerce Clause Jurisprudenceand the Limits of FederalWetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL.
L. 1, 44 (1999) (relying on claimed success of U.S. corporate charter competition to attack
race-to-the-bottom arguments against environmental federalism), with Daniel C. Esty,
Revitalizing EnvironmentalFederalism,95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 633-34 (1996) (distinguishing
corporate charter market from market influences on environmental regulation).
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charter competition has even influenced debate in areas 12as seem1
ingly far removed as campaign finance and legal ethics.
It is not surprising that this imperialism has reached the
neighboring turf of securities law. Roberta Romano, long an ardent
and articulate Delaware booster, has called for regulatory competition in securities law both within the U.S. and internationally.
Domestically, she has proposed that states be allowed to offer
competing securities regulatory regimes that firms may choose in
lieu of federal law when engaging in securities activities in the
United States. 3 Internationally, she has argued that firms should
be able to choose any nation's securities law to govern their
securities activities on a global basis.'4 In the name of efficiency,
she and other scholars have called for nations to forswear their
traditional prescriptive jurisdiction over securities activity within
their borders. Instead, each issuer should be free to select any
government's regulatory regime to govern the offering and trading
of the issuer's securities worldwide. 5
Among many U.S. corporate law scholars, this call for issuer
choice seems in the natural order of things. Modeled as it is on the
dominant U.S. corporate charter competition paradigm, 6 issuer
" Robert H. Sitkoff, CorporatePoliticalSpeech, PoliticalExtortion,and the Competition
for CorporateCharters,69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1103 (2002) (suggesting connection between states'
laws against corporate political speech and corporate charter competition).
12 See H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Federalismand Choice ofLaw in the RegulationofLegal
Ethics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 73, 139 (1997) (suggesting usefulness of federal intervention for legal
ethics, in order to avoid race to the bottom as seen in corporate and environmental law).
"s Roberta Romano, EmpoweringInvestors: A MarketApproach to SecuritiesRegulation,
107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2361 (1998).
14 Romano, supra note 1, at 392.
"
Choi & Guzman were perhaps the first to suggest regulatory competition in
international securities regulation. In a 1996 Article, they sketched their "portable
reciprocity" idea. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The DangerousExtraterritoriality
of American Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. INTL L. & Bus. 207, 231 (1996) [hereinafter Choi &
Guzman, DangerousExtraterritoriality].Later, they elaborated their idea the same year that
Romano made her domestic proposal. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable
Reciprocity: Rethinking the InternationalReach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV.
903, 903 (1998) [hereinafter Choi & Guzman, Portable Reciprocity] (proposing that
international issuers be allowed to choose their securities law). Choi and Guzman, however,
do not embrace the U.S. corporate charter competition model as a basis for their international
proposal the way Romano does. Rather than promise a race to the top, Choi and Guzman
posit the heterogeneity of issuers, whose diverse needs may best be met by a diversity of
regulatory regimes from which to choose. Id. at 923.
16 See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962)
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choice seems a logical extension. The debate for the last thirty years
over corporate law's race-to-the-top versus race-to-the-bottom is a
familiar one, 7 and it is fitting that Romano, a leading race-to-thetop exponent, has called for extension of the perceived benefits of
regulatory competition to international securities regulation.
Romano expressly relies on the claimed success of U.S. charter
competition as an exemplar:
[Tihe interests and incentives in the two settings are
similar: the object of protection of both regimes is the
financial interest of investors, and under competition,
investors' preferences will dictate the choice of regulator
because insiders who require investment capital will
bear the higher capital cost of an investor-unfriendly
regime choice.'"
On this view, the same dynamics that have driven the presumed
race to the top in U.S. corporate law can be harnessed to produce
optimal securities regulation internationally.
I challenge the notion that the U.S. corporate charter competition
model lends support for issuer choice in international securities
regulation. Even granting the assumptions of race-to-the-top
advocates and accepting the best story for corporate charter
competition,' 9 that story translates poorly into the context of

(explaining importance of dominant paradigm in structuring scientific research).
17 See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
18 Romano, supra note 1, at 493. Romano's international proposal includes a lengthy
defense of state charter competition in a section entitled, 'The Market for Corporate Law in
the United States as a Paradigm for International Securities Regulation." Id.
19 The charter competition story is in large measure a political economy story. It
characterizes the incentives and motivations of political actors as well as private actors and
the operation of political markets in describing the signature regulatory competition success
story. Similarly for issuer choice, proponents adopt standard public choice assumptions in
making their case, positing that regulatory bureaucracies thrive by expanding their reach.
In the case of securities regulation, the number and size of firms being regulated and the
volume of regulated securities offerings and trading are regulators' maximands. In a world
of private choice of securities law, regulators would be forced to supply optimal regulation to
meet the demands of issuers and investors. Otherwise, regulators risk becoming irrelevant.
See infra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
For purposes of my analysis, I am willing to accept these assumptions. This economic
approach to theorizing about bureaucracy is hardly without controversy. See James Q.
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international securities regulation. Reliance on that story glosses
over important differences in political economy as between U.S.
states in a federal system and independent nations in an anarchic
global environment. These differences make the charter competition model inapposite. I pursue this argument along two major
lines. The first involves choice of law coordination. While U.S.
states have been able to coordinate around the internal affairs
doctrine for choice of corporate law,2 ° no similar rule exists in
international securities regulation, where the basic rule is
territoriality. 2 ' The internal affairs doctrine among U.S. states
emerged from historical conditions and political dynamics that do
not exist among nations. I argue that international choice of law
coordination for issuer choice is unlikely.
Second, even setting aside the choice of law problem, and
assuming that such international coordination were possible, there
is another problem with relying on the Delaware model.2 2 On the
basis of the Delaware success story, few if any nations would seem
to have both sufficient incentive and sufficient capacity to compete
over securities law. Corporate charter competition among states is
said to be driven by legislators' pursuit of revenues from the sale of
corporate charters, and Delaware's peculiar success is said to derive
from its fiscal dependence on its corporate chartering revenues.2 3
This dependence makes Delaware a "hostage" to its success,
enabling it to demonstrate a credible commitment to maintaining
efficient and responsive corporate law. For established capital
market countries in an issuer choice world, regulatory revenues

Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 358 (James

Q.

Wilson ed., 1980) (assessing explanatory power of economic theory of regulation). However,
I allow these basic premises for purposes of discussion. In addition, I leave unchallenged the
demand-side story of regulatory competition advocates-that firm managers are adequately
constrained by market forces such that they will choose law that maximizes firm value and
investor returns. See infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
20 The internal affairs doctrine selects the law of the firm's state of incorporation for
disputes over corporate internal affairs. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
21 Frederick Tung, From Monopolists to Markets: A PoliticalEconomy of Issuer Choice
in InternationalSecuritiesRegulation, 2002 Wisc. L. REv. 1363, 1371 (explaining nations'
territorial application of securities laws).
2 Throughout this Article, I refer to the Delaware model as shorthand for the race-to-thetop story, the story of good regulatory competition for corporate charters among U.S. states.
2' See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
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would likely be too small to attract legislators' interest. In addition,
the small stakes would make it very difficult for such countries to
demonstrate the fiscal dependence on regulatory revenues that is
critical for credible commitment. All but the smallest nations would
have difficulty showing fiscal dependence. The smallest nations, on
the other hand, would not likely possess sufficient legal and
regulatory infrastructure to be able to offer sophisticated, internationally competitive securities law. Given this dearth of competitors
and lack of competition, as well as enforcement problems that may
generate indeterminacy for issuer-selected foreign law, issuers
might just stay home. Even given the choice, few if any issuers
might be willing to opt out of their home country rules.
Part II of the Article provides background. In it, I describe the
dominant race-to-the-top story for U.S. corporate charter competition.2 4 I then recount the adaptation of the race-to-the-top story to
proposals for international issuer choice.
In Parts III and IV, I address the choice of law problem, contrasting the historical conditions leading to the emergence of the internal
affairs doctrine with the current political economy of securities
regulation among nations.2" No less than substantive rules, choice
of law rules are likewise a product of interest group influences and
historical contingency.2 7 A plausible case for issuer choice based on
the claimed success of U.S. corporate charter competition would
have to explain the emergence of consensus over choice of law rules
among competing jurisdictions. It would have to explain why and
how nations would switch from the current choice of law
rule-territoriality-to a rule respecting private choice. I argue that
the requisite choice of law coordination will not emerge.2"

See infra notes 41-63 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 41-63 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 64-188 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 85-115 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 49-63 and accompanying text. I use the term "coordination" in a
nontechnical sense. The emergence of the internal affairs doctrine among U.S. states may
have involved no true coordination or cooperation in the game theoretic sense. Instead,
adoption of the rule may have been a strictly dominant strategy for each state. Before the
existence of interstate firms, state courts would generally have had difficulty enforcing
decrees concerning the internal affairs of foreign corporations. See infra note 90. Concerns
for institutional integrity and respect for courts may therefore have driven state courts to
refrain from meddling in foreign corporations' internal affairs. By contrast, adoption of an
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In Part III, I explain the ideological, political, and economic
origins of the internal affairs doctrine and its historical
contingency.2 9 Corporate law race-to-the-top advocates recognize
the significance of the internal affairs doctrine in enabling jurisdictional competition. Ironically, however, that rule emerged at a time
when U.S. states enjoyed territorial monopolies over corporate law.
All business firms were local firms. Those that incorporated had no
choice but to incorporate locally. In that context, the internal affairs
doctrine merely confirmed the local regulatory monopoly enjoyed by
each state's legislature. Far from enabling competition over
corporate law, the internal affairs doctrine-applying the law of the
state of incorporation-promoted market sharingamong states.
Only later with improved transportation and communication did
firms become more mobile with the emergence of interstate
markets. This put some pressure on states' territorial monopolies.
However, it was not until the end of the nineteenth century during
the great merger movement that New Jersey began to offer
corporate charters to firms with no substantive economic ties to the
state. Economic pressures caused other states to follow suit,
breaking the territorial ties between firms and their incorporating
states. State legislatures forsook attempts to restrict the out-ofstate activity of local corporations or to impose their own local
corporate law on foreign corporations operating locally. Instead,
states respected foreign corporations' chosen corporate law. The
internal affairs doctrine, already part of the existing custom among
states, came under no pressure for revision. It now facilitated
charter competition, though it was never designed for this task.
The political economy of international securities regulation is
different, an issue I take up in Part IV." Forjurisdictional competition over securities law to develop, national policymakers would
have to be willing to forswear their own territorial jurisdiction to
prescribe securities laws. They would have to agree that foreign law
might govern local activity, and they would have to agree on a choice

analogous rule among nations with respect to securities law would seem to require
cooperation. See generally JAMEs D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS
(1994) (using game theory to discuss cooperation and decisionmaking among nations).
2 See infra notes 64-115 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 116-88 and accompanying text.
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of law rule respecting private choice. Romano and other issuer
choice proponents fail to explain how nations might achieve such a
choice of law convention. They merely assume that a global rule
analogous to the internal affairs doctrine could emerge.
But issuers generally have no exit option in terms of where they
issue securities; they cannot avoid issuing securities in their home
markets. Home country investors are generally the most receptive
investors for their local issuers' securities. National regulators are
therefore not forced to compete with one another over securities law
with respect to their domestic issuers. Especially in the most
important national capital markets,3 ' securities regulators enjoy
territorial monopolies with respect to securities law, and they play
a dominant role in setting domestic policy concerning cross-border
securities activity. Following the public choice assumptions of
issuer choice proponents, these regulators will oppose competition
and choice of law rules enabling firms' easy exit from existing
territorial monopolies. Instead, regulators in the most important
capital markets maximize private benefits under their existing
monopolies through a strategy I call regulatoryprice discrimination.32 They augment their regulatory purview by maintaining their
existing monopolies over local issuers while at the same time
offering lower regulatory burdens to attract foreign issuers." Other
important interest groups in major capital markets-lawyers,
accountants, underwriters, stock exchanges, and securities firms,
among others-also have strong and longstanding stakes in
preserving the status quo of territorial monopoly and regulatory
price discrimination. Without international choice of law consen-

31 It makes sense to focus on the most important capital markets since regulators,
issuers, and investors in those markets are likely to have the most significant influence over
the shape of international securities regulation.
32 In other work, I identify important capital markets as regulatory price setting
jurisdictions, whose regulators enjoy market power and pursue this regulatory price
discrimination strategy. Tung, supra note 21, at 1397. At the opposite extreme is the
regulatory price taking jurisdiction, in which regulators may be forced to grant unilateral
recognition to the regulatory regimes of particular price setting jurisdictions that might
otherwise offer attractive alternative markets for the price taker's indigenous issuers. Id. at
1405-06.
3 See infra notes 135-66 and accompanying text.
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sus-that each nation should honor private choice of securities
regulation-jurisdictional competition is not possible.
Setting aside the choice of law issue, Part V addresses the other
important problem with the Delaware model in promoting issuer
choice. Even assuming the choice of law issue could be resolved,
vigorous competitors over securities law might be hard to find. For
important capital market countries, the revenue incentives that are
assumed to motivate U.S. state legislators would be too weak to
draw attention from policymakers in those countries.34 Relative to
the size of their national budgets, the likely amount of regulatory
revenues available in a global market for securities law would be
minuscule. 35 By the same token, it would be difficult for these
prosperous countries to demonstrate the fiscal dependence on
regulatory revenues necessary to show a credible commitment to a
program of responsive regulation.
Under plausible assumptions about the size of the international
market for securities law, only nations with very small budgets
would be able to demonstrate the requisite fiscal dependence.
However, these nations would not likely possess the legal or
financial expertise or administrative capacity to offer desirable
securities law.36 In any case, potential upstarts would have to worry
about strategic behavior of the dominant capital markets in terms
of deterring entry or new investment in regulatory capacity. 7
In Part VI, I briefly discuss enforcement problems that would
plague issuer choice. The transnational mix and match of legal
institutions required to enforce issuer-selected foreign law would be
unlikely to generate predictable rules responsive to the needs of
issuers and investors.38
In the end, impediments to competition might cause issuers to
simply stay home. Even given the choice, they might not be willing
to opt out of home country regulation, a question I discuss in Part
'4 See infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.

31 Perhaps regulators in those nations-seeking to augment the prestige and power of

their bureaucracies-might be motivated to compete. But any ostensible commitment to
maintain responsive regulation would be subject to legislative fiat and changing political
equilibria. See infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
a See infra notes 260-61 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 312-17 and accompanying text.
a See infra notes 318-29 and accompanying text.
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VII. 39 Established capital market countries account for the overwhelming majority of the world's issuers and investors by market
capitalization.4 ° Especially for these issuers, opting out of home
country law would mean transplanting foreign law into a complex
and sophisticated set of home country institutional arrangements
and organizations that have developed in complementary fashion
with home country securities law. Opting out of home country law
would forsake significant learning and coordination benefits that
have accrued with territorial regulation. Investors might react
negatively. Unpredictability from this institutional mixing and
matching might cause investors to apply a heavy discount to the
securities of issuers who abandon home country regulation. With
U.S. corporate charter competition, by contrast, a fairly homogeneous legal and business culture in the United States and the
relative similarity of state court systems obviate any similar
problems.
Corporate charter competition among U.S. states emerged in a
wholly different context from that envisioned in an issuer choice
world. In the United States, a federal system with a unique history,
the dismantling of trade barriers among states, and shared legal
and business cultures all contributed to making corporate law
portable across states and to pressuring states to accept this
portability. These features do not exist for securities regulation
among nations.

II. THE DELAWARE STORY AND ISSUER CHOICE
It is fitting that scholarly discussion of regulatory competition
begins with the story of corporate charter competition among U.S.
states, the most prominent example of arguably successful-i.e.,
welfare enhancing-regulatory competition. Corporate charter
competition has been actively debated among scholars for several
decades. I first describe the dominant race-to-the-top view, which
holds that this jurisdictional competition has produced efficient

3 See infra notes 330-44 and accompanying text.
'0 See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
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corporate law. I then recount the adaptation of the dominant
paradigm for issuer choice.
A. THE DOMINANT PARADIGM

According to the charter competition success story, firm managers' freedom to choose from among the corporation laws of the fifty
states and the District of Columbia enables a well-functioning
market in corporate law. On the demand side, firm managers are
constrained by market forces to seek out corporate law that is best
for investors.4 ' They are constrained by efficient capital and product
markets to faithfully pursue investors' interests in choosing
corporate law. Investors, who price differences in corporate law,
will pay less for shares of firms with inefficient corporate law, so
managers will choose efficient rules-those that investors prefer-in
order to minimize their firms' costs of capital. Managers might be
tempted to benefit themselves at the expense of investors by
choosing lax law, but the resulting higher capital costs would place
such firms at a competitive disadvantage in product, labor, and
capital markets. This might ultimately lead to the demise of such
firms and the ouster of their self-seeking managers.4 2
On the supply side, according to this story, state legislatures
compete to offer corporate law that managers and investors desire.
Legislatures participate in this competition in order to garner
revenues in the form of chartering fees and other fees paid to the
state of incorporation. Lawyers in each state also participate in the
making of attractive law in the hope that their state's corporation
code will garner widespread adoptions, which inures to the lawyers'
financial and professional benefit."3
Delaware has dominated the competition, the story goes, because
of its relatively heavy investment in and dependence on its chartering business. Because of its small size and relative lack of indigenous industry, Delaware depends significantly on chartering
revenues for its state budget. In addition, Delaware offers a

"' See Winter, supra note 6, at 257 (discussing various market influences on managers).
42 Id. at 254-73.
4

ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 37-44 (1993).
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specialized chancery court to hear corporate cases. Not only does
this expert court produce better corporate law decisions than other
states' generalist courts, but this specialized court has no ready
alternative use. Delaware's significant investment in maintaining
the court therefore offers firms some comfort that Delaware is in the
corporate law business for the long term. This function-specific
investment, together with Delaware's budgetary dependence on
chartering revenues, serves as a commitment to firms that Delaware will always be responsive to firms' corporate law needs. It will
continually update its corporate law as firms' needs may change. It
will not behave opportunistically by altering corporate law to extract
rents from consumers-those firms that have already incorporated
under Delaware law."
This dominant story has not gone unchallenged. For thirty-odd
years, corporate scholars have debated whether corporate charter
competition benefits investors' or only self-serving firm managers.46
The latest challenges to the dominant story argue that competitive
pressures on Delaware are very weak or nonexistent and therefore,

" Id. Whether these features of Delaware truly function as commitment devices depends
a great deal on one's perception of the costs of reincorporation and the length of the shadow
of the future. Romano generally believes that reincorporation is expensive and cumbersome,
such that Delaware needs these commitment devices in order to demonstrate to firms that
it will not renege-that it will not be tempted to change its laws opportunistically to the
detriment of firms that have chosen to incorporate in Delaware. Id. at 44.
Others have suggested that the commitment analysis is not convincing, for two
reasons. First, if reincorporation is in fact relatively inexpensive, then Delaware cannot
behave opportunistically because firms will simply leave. So the ostensible commitment
devices are not necessary and therefore cannot explain Delaware's dominance in the market
for corporate charters. See Bernard S. Black, Is CorporateLaw Trivial?: A Political and
Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 586-89 (1990) (arguing transaction costs of
reincorporation are low). And even if reincorporation were expensive, a state that hoped to
remain attractive to firms in the future would still not be able to behave opportunistically
toward firms already incorporated there.
"' Classic race-to-the-top works include FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); Fischel, supranote 6; Romano, supra
note 6; Winter, supra note 6.
" Race-to-the-bottom scholarship includes Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the
Corporation:The DesirableLimits on State Competition in CorporateLaw, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1435 (1992); William L. Cary, Federalismand CorporateLaw: Reflections upon Delaware,83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structureof CorporationLaw, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1461 (1989). See also Michael Klausner, Corporations,CorporateLaw, and Networks
of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995) (suggesting that network effects may impede race to
the top).
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that Delaware has little incentive to offer optimal law to maximize
firm value.4 7 Despite the various challenges, race-to-the-top
continues to be the dominant view among corporate scholars.4 8
B. FROM U.S. CHARTER COMPETITION TO INTERNATIONAL ISSUER
CHOICE

The basic rationale for issuer choice parallels the rationale
behind the corporate law race-to-the-top story. Law is a product;
competition among suppliers results in products that better satisfy
consumer preferences. s The consumers in the case of corporate and
securities laws, of course, are investors and firm managers.
Roberta Romano5 ° and Stephen Choi and Andrew Guzman5 have
called for a competitive, market-based approach to securities
regulation. While distinctive in the details, the central argument in
both proposals is that issuers should be allowed to choose the regime
of securities regulation under which they will be governed. Under
the current territorial approach to securities regulation, issuers and
investors wishing to transact in a given market are unavoidably
bound by the national securities laws of the jurisdiction in which the
market is located. 2 Within each jurisdiction, the national regula-

7 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate,46
J.L. & ECON. 383, 384 (2003) (presenting data showing absence of national market for
corporate chapters); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely
Walk: Reconsidering the Debate on State Competition over CorporateCharters,112 YALE L.J.
553, 557 (2002) (applying industrial organization theory to explain why states do not compete
with Delaware); Robert Daines, The IncorporationChoices oflPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1559, 1559 (2002) (presenting data showing absence of national market for corporate
charters); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in CorporateLaw,
55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 686 (2002) (arguing that states do not compete with Delaware because
ofpolitical considerations); Mark J. Roe, Delaware'sCompetition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 593
(2003) (arguing that federal government is Delaware's main competition, and thus neither
race-to-the-top nor race-to-the-bottom story can explain state corporate law).
" "According to the view that appears to dominate the current thinking of corporate law
academics, state competition produces a'race to the top' that benefits shareholders." Bebchuk
& Cohen, supra note 47, at 384.
49 Romano, supra note 6, at 225 (describing rationale behind race-to-the-top theory).
50 Romano, supra note 13, at 2361; Romano, supra note 1, at 388.
" Choi & Guzman, DangerousExtraterritoriality,supra note 15, at 231; Choi& Guzman,
PortableReciprocity, supra note 15, at 903.
62 Cf Romano, supra note 13, at 2149 ("The SEC's territorial approach to jurisdiction
prevents foreign issuers who are in compliance with their home states' disclosure require-
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tory authority enjoys a monopoly in terms of the regulation it
chooses to supply.5 3 But that regulatory regime may not be optimal
for parties transacting in the particular market.
In addition, regulatory monopolists have insufficient incentive
and insufficient information to offer optimal regulation.
Unbundling capital markets from the national laws of the jurisdictions in which the markets are located breaks the regulatory
monopolies. Issuers and investors left to their own private choices
will force regulators to supply optimal regulation upon peril of
extinction.5 4 Bureaucracies thrive by expanding their reach, the
argument goes, and securities regulators will respond to consumer
demand in order to expand their regulatory purview.55 Regulators
will wish to maximize the number of firms and the volume of
securities offerings and trading they regulate.5" Individual decisions
of issuers in choosing their regulatory regimes also provide market
information to regulators, who can respond to consumers by altering
regulatory products to maximize adoptions.5
Issuer choice proponents are confident that investors will not be
disadvantaged by firm managers' regulatory choices, since efficient
capital markets can price the regulatory regimes selected. Managers choosing regimes that provide insufficient investor
protections-for example, a regime may allow managerial opportunism or require slim or no disclosure-will cause their firms to suffer
in the capital markets. Investors will pay less for the securities of
those issuers than if a more investor-protective regime had been
selected, disadvantaging those issuers relative to their
competitors. 8 Because of firm managers' desire to minimize the
firm's costs of capital and maximize offering proceeds and postoffer

ments... from listing on U.S. stock exchanges.").
5 Id. at 2361.
' See Choi & Guzman, Portable Reciprocity, supra note 15, at 922-24 (detailing
advantages of market-based issuer choice approach).
" Id.
56Id.

" Id. This assumption that regulators will attempt to maximize the number of firms and
transactions under their regulatory purview is crucial to the issuer choice proposal. It
explains why regulators in an issuer choice world would compete to offer popular law. Iffirms
are free to choose their regulation, then the only avenue for regulators to augment the volume
of transactions they regulate is by offering regulation that firms and investors prefer.
' Choi & Guzman, PortableReciprocity, supra note 15, at 922-24.
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trading values, they will, given the choice, select the regulatory
regime that is optimal for the firm's investors.5 9 Efficient capital
markets preclude managers from pursuing their own interests at
the expense of investors.60
The starting point for Romano's proposal is the declared triumph
of U.S. corporate charter competition. Free choice of firms' states of
incorporation and facilitative conflicts rules create a national
market for corporate law in which states are producers competing
for consumers of corporate law. 6 ' According to Romano, this
competition produces corporate law that maximizes firm values and
investor returns. 62 Additionally, the same dynamics that have
driven this race to the top can be harnessed to produce optimal
securities regulation. In Romano's view, competition over securities
regulation will similarly cause regulatory regimes to converge
around the rules that issuers and investors want.63
The remainder of this Article considers the significant features
of the dominant race-to-the-top story for U.S. charter competition
and their applicability to international securities regulation and
issuer choice. I first consider choice of law. I then turn to other
impediments to competition in international securities regulation
that are absent from or glossed over in the translation from the U.S.
corporate charter competition story.

59 Id.

60 Romano, supra note 13, at 2388-95. Romano offers empirical evidence of plausibly
market-driven optimal voluntary disclosure that exceeds the level of mandatory disclosure
in (a) private debt markets; (b) European listings in the United Kingdom, which comply with
U.K. requirements though they could use lower home country standards; and (c) European
international-style private institutional offerings, for which disclosure exceeds even the U.K.
standard, but is in fact closer to U.S. standards. Id. at 2373-80.
61 Id. at 2388-95; Romano, supra note 1, at 390.
62 Romano, supra note 13, at 2362, 2367.
6 Id. at 2395. Choi and Guzman are less convinced about convergence and are agnostic
as to its direction. Instead, they posit the heterogeneity of issuers and investors. Not all
issuers are alike, so a regulatory regime that is suitable for one may not be desirable to
another. In their view, the beauty of competition is that it generates regulatory diversity,
allowing firms to choose from an array of regulatory options and allowing investors a choice
as to the regulatory regimes under which they will invest. In this way, heterogeneous issuers
and investors are more likely to be matched, thereby eliminating the deadweight losses
associated with territorially imposed regulation. Choi & Guzman, PortableReciprocity, supra
note 15, at 914-18.
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III. CHOICE OF LAW FOR U.S. CHARTER COMPETITION:
ORIGINS OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE

Under U.S. corporate charter competition, the internal affairs
doctrine enables the competition that exists. While each state offers
its own corporation law, states generally accept and apply the socalled internal affairs doctrine for their choice of law regarding a
corporation's internal affairs-the relations among a firm's shareholders and managers. Under this doctrine, the firm's chosen
corporation law will govern its internal affairs, regardless of the
location of the firm's headquarters, assets, or personnel, and
regardless of where particular transactions occur or particular
persons reside. 4 Therefore, a firm may incorporate under the
corporation law of any state, and its choice will be respected in other
states. According to the dominant paradigm, this common respect
for firm choice effectively creates a common market for corporate
law.

65

Moving to the international context, it is understandable that
issuer choice proposals might overlook choice of law issues, or
simply assume that nations could coordinate around a rule recognizing private choice of securities law. After all, the internal affairs
doctrine has generally been the dominant rule in the United
States. 6 But no mechanism like the internal affairs doctrine exists
for international securities regulation. That consensus on the
doctrine could emerge among U.S. states does not imply that a
similar choice of law rule and competitive framework could spontaneously develop internationally for securities regulation. The
background conditions are dissimilar. The dynamics behind
emergence of the internal affairs doctrine are not likely to be
replicated in the international context.

' A handful of states-California and New York most notably-impose their own local
requirements on certain foreign corporations as to certain issues. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115
(West 2001); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1317-1320 (McKinney 2002).
65 See ROMANO, supra note 43, at 14-51 (arguing that competition for corporate charters
among U.S. states has resulted in more efficient corporate law overall).
6
See Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for CorporateInternalAffairs,
48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 161 (1985) (examining outreach statutes as alternatives to
traditional internal affairs doctrine); Elvin R. Latty, Pseudo-ForeignCorporations,65 YALE
L.J. 137, 137 (1955) (cataloguing deviations from internal affairs doctrine).

2005]

LOST IN TRANSLATION

543

Unlike corporate law among U.S. states as it currently operates,
securities law has always been territorial among nations. Each
nation asserts jurisdiction to prescribe rules regarding securities
offering and trading within its borders, and no nation allows firms
unfettered choice over the law that will govern their securities
activities. History matters, and it should hardly be surprising that
the different histories for corporate law among U.S. states and for
securities law among nations would produce different choice of law
rules in the two areas, as well as interest groups with differing
stakes in those rules. In nations with important securities markets,
the choice of law rule for securities law will preserve existing
regulatory monopolies. It will not enable competition.
In this Part, I explain the emergence and persistence of the
internal affairs doctrine among U.S. states. In the next Part, I
explain why a similar rule is unlikely to emerge for international
securities regulation.6 7
A. OVERVIEW

Courts first enunciated the internal affairs doctrine in the 1860s.
Courts outside a firm's state of incorporation refused to entertain
disputes over the corporation's internal affairs, instead deferring
jurisdiction in favor of the incorporating state's courts.68 This was
decades before modern law-as-a-product charter competition
emerged at the end of the nineteenth century, however.6 9 The
context in which the doctrine first emerged was quite different from
the environment in which charter competition later developed.
Courts' early articulation of the internal affairs doctrine recognized that a corporation's internal disputes implicated the territorial
sovereignty of the incorporating state. This state sovereignty notion
reflected the historically intimate legal, economic, and geographical
ties between the corporation and its incorporating state. Historically, the corporation was literally-not j ust figuratively-a creation
of the legislature of the incorporating state. Each corporation was

6 See infra notes 116-88 and accompanying text.
68 See infra note 79.
69 See infra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.
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created by a special act of the legislature, and through the early part
of the nineteenth century, corporations were chartered only for
public purposes and were viewed as agencies of the incorporating
state.70 As a creature of the sovereign, the corporation was thought
to exist only within the territorial borders of the incorporating state.
Economically as well, corporations were closely tied to their
Before the mid-nineteenth century, all
incorporating states.
businesses were local businesses. Firms generally had little choice
about where to incorporate. A firm that incorporated did so in its
home state-where its organizers lived and where its operations
were located. Before the mid-nineteenth century, as a practical
matter, each state enjoyed a territorial regulatory monopoly over its
local corporations.
With advances in transportation and communication around the
mid-nineteenth century, interstate firms arose, putting pressure on
states' regulatory monopolies. The Commerce Clause assured that
states could not erect trade barriers to impede the interstate
movement of goods, 7' and with the emerging common market and
technological advances, firms enjoyed some geographical mobility.
They could move. Given firms' mobility, states were forced to
compete to attract businesses to locate in-state. However, they
generally maintained requirements concerning corporations' ties to
their incorporating states.7 2 During this period, courts first
enunciated the internal affairs doctrine, deferring to the territorial
sovereignty of the incorporating state regarding the internal
matters of its corporations.
Only at the end of the nineteenth century did modern law-as-aproduct corporate charter competition emerge, at the time of the
great merger movement. The century's end saw enormous economic
dislocation, as well as corporate law innovations by the New Jersey
legislature that led to the demise of mandatory territorial ties
between corporations and their incorporating states. Economic

See infra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
See Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 276 (1876) (striking down discriminatory tax
burdens on out-of-state goods); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 498
(1887) (striking down Tennessee license tax on drummers for out-of-state manufacturers and
holding explicitly that "[iinterstate commerce cannot be taxed at all").
72 See infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
70

71
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pressures on state legislatures caused them to forsake attempts to
impose their own local corporate law on foreign corporations
operating locally. Instead, states respected foreign corporations'
chosen corporate law. The internal affairs doctrine, already part of
the existing custom among states, came under no pressure for
revision, despite the fact that this new context of nonterritorial
corporate law differed radically from the context in which the
doctrine had first emerged.
That the internal affairs doctrine persisted to play its modern
role in facilitating charter competition can largely be explained by
reference to institutional inertia and interest group pressures. The
doctrine, assuring deference to the incorporating state, carried over
from an earlier period of territorial corporate law. Opportunistic
adaptation by private interests during the merger movement led
New Jersey to offer liberal, nonterritorial corporate law. Economic
conditions caused other states' legislatures to value the participation of foreign corporations in their local economies, regardless of
these corporations' lack of territorial ties to their incorporating
states. Modern corporate charter competition began, and with it,
the internal affairs doctrine took on a facilitative role. That the
earlier emergence of the internal affairs doctrine later facilitated
competition, however, was hardly by design. It was merely the
result of fortuitous historical circumstance.
LOCAL FIRMS AND THE IDEOLOGY OF TERRITORIAL
B. ORIGINS:
SOVEREIGNTY

During the preindustrial period-from the American Revolution
to the middle of the nineteenth century-the animating ideas for
courts' later articulation of the internal affairs doctrine were
formed. Corporations were thought of not only as creatures of their
incorporating states, but-at least through the early part of the
nineteenth century-they were conceived as agencies of the state.
A state's exclusive authority over the internal affairs of its corporations was seen as a matter of state sovereignty.
Before industrialization, businesses were small and predominantly family-run. They transacted primarily in local product,
labor, and capital markets and rarely had operations out-of-state.
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Most were run as partnerships, and those that incorporated did so
in their home states. Foreign corporation questions rarely arose
because firms' activities were typically confined to their home
states. States were generally assumed to enjoy territorial sovereignty over their domestic corporations.
The conception of the corporation was also very different from its
current conception. Incorporation was not generally available to all
who applied; instead, corporate charters were granted only sparingly, one-by-one, through special acts of state legislatures. v3
Corporate size and powers were limited, and privileges were
sparingly granted.7 4 Each act was specifically tailored to the
particular project proposed, with powers and privileges specifically
defined.7" Like the other more popular types of corporations of the
day-municipal, charitable, ecclesiastical, educational-business
corporations were formed to pursue public purposes and were
thought of as auxiliary organs of state government. 76 This view of
the corporation occasioned practices and associations between the
corporation and state government that would be unthinkable today,
when the business corporation is viewed primarily as a private
organization. Business corporations were typically granted special
privileges or delegated government powers thought necessary to the
accomplishment of the particular projects undertaken. For example,
canal companies typically enjoyed eminent domain powers. States
were also often actively involved in the financing or managerial
oversight of their corporations, investing state funds and taking
board seats.7 7
Given the close relations between state governments and the
corporations they created, sovereignty considerations necessitated

73 JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORA-

TIONS v.2 16-20 (1917).
74 EDWIN MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860 196-98 (1954).
75

id.

76 As late as 1892, one treatise writer on statutory law categorized the law of business
and private corporations as public law. Id. at 15 (citing 2 FREDERICK J. STIMSON, AMERICAN
STATUTE LAW 1 (1892)).
77 See LAWRENCEM. FRIEDMAN, AHISTORYOFAMERICANLAW 169 (1973) (describing state
investments in banks, turnpike companies, and other firms with quasi-public projects); LOUIS
HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: PENNSYLVANIA 1776-1860 82-104
(1948) (recounting history of Pennsylvania's investment in its turnpike companies).
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that each state should enjoy exclusive authority over the internal
affairs of its corporations. In the aftermath of the Revolution, each
new statejealously guarded its sovereign prerogatives, and the later
deference to the incorporating state embodied in the internal affairs
doctrine-assuring each state singular control over the internal
governance of its business corporations-followed naturally from
these sovereignty concerns. Writing in 1933, one commentator
noted:
The early corporations trailed the clouds of glory of their
sovereign origin. Thus the East India Company wore
the ermine: late in the eighteenth century English
courts dismissed a dispute over its breach of contract as
a "political question."

. .

. It is not surprising to find

indications, where "internal affairs" were involved, that
a matter of some diplomatic nicety was at stake and
even today, when general incorporation laws and nationwide corporations are of course, courts hasten to add, in
taking jurisdiction, that they are not exercising
"visitorial powers. " "
Indeed, well into the twentieth century, the internal affairs
doctrine was viewed as a jurisdictional bar-precluding courts from
even adjudicating disputes involving foreign corporations' internal
Resting
affairs-and not merely a choice of law rule.79
'

Note, Forum Non Conveniens and the "InternalAffairs" of a ForeignCorporation,33

COLUM. L. REV. 492, 494-95 (1933) (citations omitted). "Visitorial powers" were those powers
"exercised by the founder of a corporation to make and enforce by-laws and to command
faithful performance of duties by officers." Id. at 495 n. 14.
79 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 17 CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 8425 (perm. ed. 1933); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 196,197, 199 (1934); Stanley
A. Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REV. 433, 443
(1969). See generally N. State Copper & Gold Mining Co. v. Field, 20 A. 1039 (Md. 1885);
Wilkins v. Thorne, 60 Md. 253 (1883); Smith v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 96 Mass. 336 (1867);
Williston v. Michigan So. & No. Indiana R.R. Co., 95 Mass. 400 (1866); Erickson v. Nesmith,
86 Mass. 233 (1862); Redmond v. Enfield Mfg. Co., 13 Abb. Pr. (N.S.) 332 (Sup. Ct. NY 1872);
Howell v. Chicago & Nw. Rwy. Co., 51 Barb. 378 (Sup. Ct. NY 1868). This jurisdictional bar
also had certain practical underpinnings. A common rationale for viewing the internal affairs
doctrine as a jurisdictional bar was the recognition that a local court would have difficulty
enforcing a judgment against a foreign corporation. As one court noted, "itis a little difficult
to imagine how a court in [the District of Columbia] could restrain and direct the action of the
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jurisdiction exclusively with the courts of the incorporating state
invariably resulted in application of that state's laws to the internal
affairs dispute, so the choice of law outcome would be consistent
with the modern doctrine.
As a creature of the sovereign, each business corporation was
thought to exist only within the territorial borders of the sovereign.
Since most businesses were local in character, this territorial notion
was unremarkable and caused little controversy before the mid1800s.08 This ideology of territorial sovereignty helps explain how
the internal affairs doctrine could later emerge. 8 Only the incorporating state was deemed to possess authority to decide its corporation's internal affairs disputes. The courts of other states were
unwilling to interfere."
This ideology of sovereignty was also conveniently consistent with
legislators' rent seeking interests. Because each grant of corporate
privileges was effected by special act, legislators were able to exact
tribute from the corporate promoters seeking these special privileges.8 3 The ideology of state sovereignty assured that legislative
bargains would not be revisited by courts outside the incorporating
state.8 4

corporation at its home office in the city of New York." Clark v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life
Ass'n, 14 App. D.C. 154, 178 (1899). See also Kansas E. Constr. Co. v. Topeka, S. & W. R.R.,
135 Mass. 34, 41 (1883) (refusing to enjoin issuance of stock of foreign corporation where
issuance would occur out of state and would be governed by other state's law). Corporate
assets and corporate officers were not generally found outside the incorporation state.
' When businesses eventually began to expand to engage in transactions across state
lines, states commonly imposed territorial restrictions on their domestic corporations and
forbade foreign corporations from certain businesses and from owning real property in-state.
See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
" It is not too surprising that jurisdictional disputes would not have arisen before the
1860s. Given the quasi-public conception of corporations, their close ties with state
legislatures, and the fact that no distinctions were made among municipal, business, and
other corporations, it would have been unthinkable during the preindustrial period for a
state's legislature or court to attempt to interfere in the inner workings of the corporate
creation of a sister state.
2 Judicial opinions articulating the doctrine regularly noted the sovereign interests of
the incorporating state that were at stake. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
s' The graft and logrolling involved with special charters eventually caused popular
resentment of the practice. This was one factor that ultimately led to the demise of the
practice.
" In the early years of the Republic, most states' judges were appointed by the state
legislature and so could be assumed to be sensitive to legislators' interests. See Symposium,
The Case for JudicialAppointments, 33 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 353, 356-57 (2002) ("The idea of
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C. INDUSTRIALIZATION,

INTERSTATE

FIRMS,

549
AND

THE INTERNAL

AFFAIRS DOCTRINE

With industrialization, firms' activities began to cross state lines,
and states were forced to develop policies on treatment of foreign
corporations. Changes in technology and industrial organization
put some competitive pressures on states' regulatory monopolies.
Interstate markets emerged, following dramatic advances in
transportation, communication, and energy. The Supreme Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence also facilitated market integration.
Interstate markets led to the rise of interstate firms and the legal
issues concerning states' treatment of foreign corporations. The
first general foreign corporation statutes appeared in 1852.85 The
emergence of interstate firms led to disputes over corporate internal
affairs that were brought in courts outside the incorporating state.
These suits typically involved shareholders suing in their home
states to enforce rights against foreign corporations in which they
had invested. In response, courts first articulated the internal
affairs doctrine, reflecting preindustrial notions of states' territorial
sovereignty over domestic corporations.
Corporate law was still largely territorial at mid-century. That
is, firms ordinarily incorporated in their home states. Corporations
and legislatures expected-and legislatures sometimes mandated-that corporations would have significant operations in the
incorporating state, that officers and directors would be residents of
that state, and that shareholders' and directors' meetings would be

direct election of judges was still a generation away."). Popular election of state judges
became more common only by the mid-1800s. See James Andrew Wynn, Jr., Judgingthe
Judges, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 753, 764 (2002) (noting "the move away from appointing and to
electing state judges coincided with the rapid growth of the American republic" in mid to late
1800s). With popular elections, of course, judges would feel the same local interest group
pressures as legislators did.
Moreover, at least until the turn of the twentieth century, courts faced with internal
affairs decisions consistently noted that jurisdiction could not exist absent statutory
authority. N. State Copper& Gold MiningCo., 20 A. at 1040; Smith, 96 Mass. at 336; Halsey
v. McLean, 94 Mass. 438, 438 (1866); Erickson, 86 Mass. at 237; Howell, 51 Barb. at 384-85;
Stafford & Co. v. Am. Mills Co., 13 R.I. 310, 310 (1881).
s' William Laurens Walker, Foreign CorporationLaws: The Loss of Reason, 47 N.C. L.
REV. 1, 12 (1968).
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held in the state.8 6 In other words, firms ordinarily maintained
significant tangible identification with their states of incorporation.
Corporate law would remain territorial until the 1890s when
charter competition began in earnest.
Multistate markets, however, meant that firms became geographically more mobile at the margin. Firms therefore enjoyed some
latitude to shop for favorable business conditions, including
attractive corporate law, simply by moving operations to a neighboring state. States felt some pressure to liberalize their corporate
laws, including the relaxation of territorial restrictions, in order to
maintain local employment and the industrial tax base. What were
initially conventional corporate law restrictions-on capitalization,
on permissible business activities and their geographical
scope-became a hindrance on growth and expansion that was
necessary for firms to survive. States had always competed with
one another for economic development."7 Now with the changing
needs of business, states responded by loosening some of these
corporate law constraints. However, they did not abolish all of
them. Instead, they retained the basic idea of limiting corporate
size and scope through corporate law. And they continued to
demand that their corporations maintain economic ties to their
incorporating states. Until the 1890s, the primary focus of these
reforms in most states was on keeping and attracting capital and
labor.88

8 See, e.g., Edward Q. Keasbey, New Jerseyand the Great Corporations,13 HARV. L. REV.
198, 204 (1899) (noting that before 1865, New Jersey's general incorporation law required
that business be carried on in-state and that stockholders' and directors' meeting be
conducted in-state); William C. Kessler, Incorporationin New England: A StatisticalStudy,
1800-1875, 8 J. ECON. HIST. 43, 48-49 (1948) (noting in-state business requirements in
Vermont's general incorporation law of 1851).
817 See Harry N. Scheiber, Federalismand the American Economic Order, 1789-1910, 10
LAw & Soc'k REV. 57, 71-72 (1975) (describing state competition for economic development
as sort of "rivalistic state mercantilism").
88 Raising revenues directly through the sale of corporate charters was an innovation that
occurred only in the 1890s with New Jersey's implementation of its "chartermongering"
strategy. Christopher Grandy, New Jersey CorporateChartermongering,1875-1929, 49 J.
ECON. HIST. 677, 680-81 (1989). Before 1888-1890, even New Jersey's corporate law
liberalization was done primarily with local firms in mind-firms with operations located
primarily in-state. See supra note 86. A special Massachusetts legislative committee report
in 1903 noted that "[u]ntil within the past ten years the practice of foreign incorporation was
not general." MASSACHUSETTS REPORT OF THE COMMrITEE ON CORPORATION LAws 18 (1903).
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Early decisions articulating the internal affairs doctrine echoed
preindustrial notions of states' sovereignty over their domestic
corporations. Sovereignty considerations required deference to the
incorporating state, and courts of other states did not have jurisdiction to address questions of corporate internal affairs. This
jurisdictional bar "does not merely regard the powers of the court,
but rather the extent of the state authority which underlies those
powers. It is in the nature of a question of sovereignty."" Internal
affairs decisions before the merger movement were not many, and
judging from that relative handful of decisions, courts seemed to
find their jurisdictional limitations in this area fairly self-evident.
They consistently noted the special role of the incorporating state,
the state under whose laws the corporation was created and on
which its existence depended.9 ° Though private business corporations were no longer viewed as public agencies, a strong sense
continued to exist that they were territorially and conceptually
bound to their incorporating states-that each corporation depended
for its existence on its state of incorporation and had no legal
existence outside that state except as the comity of other states

89 Smith, 96 Mass. at 336.
90 Id. at 341; Howell v. Chi & N.W. Rwy. Co., 51 Barb. 378 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868). In
addition to state sovereignty considerations, courts also noted the practical wisdom of the
doctrine. Courts recognized the territorial limits of their own authority, and they wished to
avoid adopting decisions that would require enforcement in other states. Takingjurisdiction
"would be assuming a power which the court ought not to exercise, and rendering a judgment
which could not be enforced against the company in the place of its existence." Redmond v.
Enfield Mfg. Co., 13 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 332, 333 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872); see also N. State Copper &
Gold Mining Co. v. Field, 20 A. 1039, 1041 (Md. 1885) (stating that legislature did not give
judiciary powers over internal affairs of foreign corporations). In addition, consistent with
modern functionalist explanations for the doctrine, some courts recognized that the
jurisdictional bar avoided subjecting corporations to conflicting decisions and inconsistent
obligations. This was especially problematic for mutual insurance companies, whose
policyholders were also its shareholders. "[N]o corporation could ever venture to conduct
business beyond the limits of the State of its creation .... It might have a half dozen courts,
in as many different States, requiring discovery, and demanding the production of books, and
directing the statement of accounts, all at the same time." Clark v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life
Ass'n, 14 App. D.C. 154, 179 (1899); see also N. State Copper& Gold MiningCo., 20A. at 1041
(noting prospect of "conflicting decisions," "interminable confusion," and "judgments and
decrees that the courts of Maryland would be unable to enforce"); Taylor v. Mut. Reserve Life
Ass'n, 33 S.E. 385, 389 (Va. 1899) (discussing problems of inability to enforce injunction).
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might allow. With Paul v. Virginia, the Supreme Court in 1868
reaffirmed this territorial view of corporate existence. 91
D. THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT AND CORPORATE LAW

Modern law-as-a-product charter competition began in earnest in
the last decade of the nineteenth century. The story of corporate
charter competition among the states-and the explanation for the
persistence of the internal affairs doctrine-is inextricably bound
with the story of the great merger movement at the end of the
nineteenth century and New Jersey's pioneering strategy of
marketing its corporation law to firms with no economic ties to the
state. Economic pressures forced other states to follow suit. They
stopped insisting that corporations maintain substantive economic
ties to their incorporating states, and they recognized the corporate
status of corporations with no such ties. Now firms could choose
their corporate law.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, industrialization,
urbanization, and the emergence of interstate markets and firms
had led to industrial concentration across important industries.
Driven in part by the new scale economies 92 and in large measure by

9' 75 U.S. 168, 181 (1868)
The corporation being the mere creation of local law, can have no legal
The
existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty where created ....
recognition of its existence even by other States, and the enforcement of
its contracts made therein, depend purely upon the comity of those
States-a comity which is never extended where the existence of the
corporation or the exercise of its powers are prejudicial to their interests
or repugnant to their policy. Having no absolute right of recognition in
other States, . . . it follows, as a matter of course, that such assent may be
granted upon such terms and conditions as those States may think proper
to impose. They may exclude the foreign corporation entirely; they may
restrict its business to particular localities, or they may exact such
security for the performance of its contracts with their citizens as in their
judgment will best promote the public interest. The whole matter rests
in their discretion.
Id. Even after the merger movement and the formation of the great trusts as holding
companies with national reach, courts relied on these same state sovereignty ideas in
articulating the internal affairs doctrine.
92 From 1850 to 1920, the average manufacturing plant for agricultural implements
increased its capital by over 260 times, its number of wage earners by almost twenty-one
times, and the gross value of its output by 114 times. JEREMIAH WHIPPLE JENKS & WALTER
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anticompetitive impulses, entire industries consolidated into one or
a handful of national producers. Numerous industries became
monopolized.9 3 These monopolies were originally organized under
private trust agreements, corporation laws being too restrictive to
be useful in this regard. The trusts provoked public outrage. The
vast majority of corporations were still "relatively small affairs,
financed for the most part through local subscriptions rather than
by resort ... to nationwide systems of security distribution or to
stock exchanges."9 4 Beginning in the 1880s, state officials in
six
95
states attacked the trusts in court in order to break them up.

E. CLARK, THE TRUST PROBLEM 17 (5th ed. 1929). For iron and steel manufacturing plants,
the average capital increased almost 107 times, the average number of wage earners
increased by more than eleven times, and the value of output increased 119 times. Id. Across
all manufacturing plants, average capital increased by thirty-seven times, labor by almost five
times, and the value of output by almost twenty-six times. Id.
" Eastern railroad corporations formed the first significant national monopolies. Eight
railroad corporations together used their control over transportation to acquire ninety-five
percent of the anthracite coal industry by 1893. Railroads monopolized other industries as
well: bituminous coal, kerosene, matches, stoves, furnaces, steam and hot water heaters,
boilers, gas pipelines, and candles. RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION
39 (1976). John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil Trust was the first great industrial monopoly.
By 1880, he controlled ninety-five percent of all refined oil shipments in the United States.
Id. at 42. Other industrial trusts followed in short order. The Cotton-seed Oil Trust was
organized in 1884; the Linseed Trust in 1885. Three great trusts were created in 1887: the
National Lead Trust, the Sugar Trust, and the Whiskey Trust. HENRY R. SEAGER & CHARLES
A. GULICK, JR., TRUST AND CORPORATION PROBLEMS 51 (1929); Harold Underwood Faulkner,
Consolidation of Business, in ROOSEVELT, WILSON, AND THE TRUSTS 7 (1950) (Edwin C.
Rozwenc ed.). For specific discussion of the formation and operation of the Sugar Trust, see
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON GENERAL LAWS RESPECTING ALL MATTERS RELATING TO
"TRUSTS," AND ESPECIALLY "SUGAR TRUSTS," N.Y. SEN. DOC. NO. 79 4-9 (1891). By 1890,
twenty-four trusts had been formed, with total capital of $376 million. NADER ET AL., supra,
at 42.
9 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Statutory Developmentsin Business CorporationLaw, 1886-1936,
50 HARV. L. REV. 27, 30 (1936); see also Thomas R. Navin & Marian V. Sears, The Rise ofa
Market for IndustrialSecurities, 1887-1902, 29 BUS. HIST. REV. 105, 107 (1955) (noting that
industrial firms of late 1880s were "typified by small single-plant companies serving limited
markets").
9 California and New York went after the Sugar Trust. People v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co.,
7 Ry. & Corp. L.J. 83 (Cal. 1895); People v. N. River Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 585-86
(1890). Illinois and Nebraska sued constituents of the Whiskey Trust. Distilling & Cattle
Feeding Co. v. People ex rel. Moloney, 41 N.E. 188, 188-89 (Ill. 1895); State v. Neb. Distilling
Co., 46 N.W. 155, 155-56 (Neb. 1890). Louisiana filed suit against the Cotton-seed Oil Trust.
State v. Am. Cotton Oil Trust, 1 Ry. & Corp. L.J. 509 (La. 1888). Illinois sued the Chicago
Gas Trust, an unauthorized public utility holding company. People ex rel. Peabody v. Chi.
Gas Trust Co., 22 N.E. 798, 798 (Ill. 1889). And Ohio sued Standard Oil. State v. Standard
Oil Co., 30 N.E. 279, 279 (Ohio 1892).
The legal theory relied upon did not directly address questions of monopoly or restraint
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At the same time the trusts came under attack by the states,
New Jersey adopted a new tack in developing its corporation law.
As earlier noted, before the merger movement, states generally
liberalized their corporation laws, not to sell corporate charters for
their own sake, but typically as part of a program to attract and
retain capital and labor in the state.s6 Offering attractive corporate
law was merely part of a general effort to create a favorable climate
for business. Beginning in 1888, New Jersey targeted firms without
any necessary economic connection to the state. It hoped to raise
revenue merely from the sale of corporate charters to firms with all
or most of their operations elsewhere.9 7 Its new pricing strategy-taxing its corporations annually based on their authorized
capital-created the potential for enormous revenues.9 8 Corporate
law became a product, not just a marketing device.
New Jersey's timing was excellent. Critical amendments were
enacted beginning in 1888 that facilitated holding company
structures and consolidations, exactly the legal tools the great trusts
needed that corporate law had not theretofore offered.99
of trade. Instead, the actions were brought as quo warranto suits to revoke the charters of
the corporations that had abdicated control to the trusts. Such a transfer of control was
beyond the powers of the constituent corporations-clearly ultra vires-and the suits
succeeded. "Established principles of corporation law ... provided adequate and effective
weapons for the destruction of corporate combinations." Charles W. McCurdy, The Knight
SugarDecision of 1895 and the Modernization ofAmerican CorporationLaw, 1869-1903, 53
BUS. HIST. REv. 304, 328 (1979).
9 See supra notes 87-88.
CHRISTOPHER GRANDY, NEW JERSEY AND THE FISCAL ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICAN
CORPORATION LAW 43 (1993).
9 Somewhat fortuitously, New Jersey had modified its method of taxing corporations a
few years earlier. In 1884, "[allmost as an afterthought" following passage of a new tax on
railroads, the legislature enacted a corporate tax based on authorized capital. Grandy, supra
note 88, at 680-81. Several years passed before anyone saw the revenue potential in this new
method of taxation.
9 An 1888 act allowed New Jersey corporations to hold stock in other corporations,
thereby enabling holding companies. Keasbey, supra note 86, at 207; Harold W. Stoke,
Economic Influences upon the CorporationsLaws ofNew Jersey, 38 J. POL. ECON. 551, 571
(1930). An 1891 law permitted corporations to purchase stock or other property using their
own stock in payment, with great deference given to the directors' judgment. Stoke, supra,
at 571. This deference was important in allowing acquiring corporations to pay handsomely
for their acquisitions by issuing their own stock as consideration. In 1892, New Jersey
repealed its antitrust statute. Keasbey, supra note 86, at 209. It also made explicit that
corporations could be formed to do all their business outside the state. See Louis I. Liggett
Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 563 & n.44 (1933) (citing N.J. Laws 1892, p. 90). General authority
for mergers was enacted in 1893, along with a broadening of authority for holding companies.
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Corporations, especially the largest ones, flocked to New Jersey. By
1899, all the combinations that had been dissolved through the
actions of the state attorneys general in the preceding decade had
reemerged as New Jersey corporations. °0
Other states faced a crucial choice during this period of industry
consolidation and New Jersey's stunning modifications of its
corporation law. They could either fight New Jersey and its
corporations, or they could succumb. While most other states
condemned New Jersey's charter-selling strategy, and a few
studiously mimicked it, most states reluctantly succumbed. The
legal tools for resistance to New Jersey were available. States could
readily have revoked the charters of domestic corporations that
attempted to merge or consolidate into New Jersey holding company
structures. 01' And they could have excluded foreign corporations
from conducting local business or admitted them with appropriate
conditions. 1 2 But most states followed New Jersey's lead on many
aspects of corporation law. They modified their laws sufficiently to
defend against the possibility of their domestic corporations seeking
new charters from New Jersey. And they did not attempt to exclude
foreign corporations or condition their entry in any meaningful way.
Massive consolidation across important industries, along with the
Panic of 1893, left state economies weak. Their economic condition
made it too risky for most state legislatures to attempt to exclude
foreign corporations or condition their entry. Imposing conditions
might merely drive business to a neighboring state. A foreign

See GRANDY, supra note 97, at 43 (citing Act of Mar. 8, 1893, ch. 67, 1893 N.J. Laws 121; Act
of Mar. 14, 1893, ch. 171, 1893 N.J. Laws 301).
"0 McCurdy, supra note 95, at 322-23 (citing XIX REPORTS OF THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION 598-99).
101 The same quo warranto actions that state attorneys general took against the trusts
would have been viable after those same trusts found homes as holding companies under New
Jersey's corporation law. Operating companies chartered in the various states had no more
power to transfer control to New Jersey holding companies than they had power to transfer
control to the trusts that preceded them.
" See McCurdy, supra note 95, at 336 (noting states' power to forbid foreign corporations
from doing business locally); Alton D. Adams, State Control of Trusts, 18 POL. SCI. Q. 462, 478
(1903) (discussing states' broad powers over foreign corporations). States could not exclude
foreign corporations engaged in interstate commerce, however. HARRY G. HENN, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPISES 17 (1961); GERARD CARL
HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
114(1918).
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corporation's lack of significant economic ties to its state of incorporation now mattered little.
Despite the demise of territorial corporate law, the rhetoric of
courts' internal affairs decisions during and after the merger
movement remained consistent with the earlier justifications. The
sovereignty of the incorporating state remained a concern. Courts
recognized that their disability to interfere in a foreign corporation's
internal affairs resulted from their state's general lack of authority
in the area.'0 3
E. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE

While the basic notion remained consistent that the law of the
state of incorporation should apply to the corporation's internal
affairs, the doctrine's impact would be dramatically different
depending on firms' practical ability to choose their state of
incorporation. When all businesses were local businesses and all
corporations incorporated locally, each state enjoyed something of
'03 Courts continued to conceive of corporations in territorial terms, echoing state
sovereignty considerations from the eighteenth century. Courts referenced the sovereign
powers of the incorporating state in refusingjurisdiction over disputes involving the internal
affairs of foreign corporations. For example, an 1894 Minnesota Supreme Court decision
noted:
The doctrine is well settled that courts will not exercise visitorial powers
over foreign corporations, or interfere with the management of their
internal affairs. Such matters must be settled by the courts of the state
creating the corporation. This rule rests upon a broader and deeper
foundation than the mere want ofjurisdiction in the ordinary sense of that
word. It involves the extent of the authority of the state (from which its
courts derive all their powers) over foreign corporations.
Guilford v. W. Union Tel. Co., 61 N.W. 324, 325, 339-40 (Minn. 1894). Despite this
acknowledged limitation on the court's jurisdiction, however, it proceeded to order the
corporation's issuance of replacement stock certificates to an in-state shareholder, finding
that this would not interfere with internal management of corporate affairs. Id.; see also
Clark v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 14 App. D.C. 154 (1899)
[A] cts [authorizing local business by foreign insurance companies] do not
extend the jurisdiction of the courts of one State and authorize them to
reach over their territorial limits into the jurisdiction of another State,
and to bring into review and revision the corporate acts and internal
affairs of the local corporations of the latter State. Such a power, if
attempted to be exercised, would be futile and ridiculous. Indeed, neither
the legislatures of the States, nor the Congress of the United States, could
confer such power.
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a territorial monopoly over its local firms. Legislatures could
therefore extract rents from geographically captive businesses, both
in terms of fees and other exactions and also by reinforcing firms'
territorial limits through legal mandate. By requiring, for example,
that domestic corporations maintain local headquarters and do only
in-state business and that key managers reside in-state, a state
legislature was able to cement its local corporations' dependence on
its legislative grace.
In this context, the internal affairs doctrine merely augmented
the existing legal monopoly by assuring that each state's local
monopoly would not be interfered with by sister states. In effect,
the doctrine promoted market sharing among states with respect to
their legal monopolies over local businesses. Even with the rise of
interstate firms, as long as states expected or required that firms
maintain economic ties with their incorporating states, firms had
little choice about where to incorporate.
However, the merger movement and New Jersey's charter-selling
strategy broke the territorial ties between the firm and its incorporating state. State legislatures were generally in no position to
attempt to exclude or condition the entry of foreign corporations or
even tramp corporations with no economic ties to their incorporating
state. Under those conditions, firms could choose their state of
incorporation, and the deference to the incorporating state embodied
in the internal affairs doctrine now honored firm choice.
During and after the merger movement, in-state groups that
enjoyed the benefit of continuing relations with foreign corporations
likely had concentrated interests at stake and could readily organize
to assert those interests. For example, local customers--especially
industrial consumers-and suppliers, and local managers and
employees of foreign-incorporated firms would have large per capita
stakes in the continued in-state activities of foreign corporations.
Legislators as well would enjoy the political benefit of local economic
development and an increased tax base from these economic
activities. With these pressures and inducements to support local
interaction with foreign corporations, legislatures would have been
hard pressed to maintain laws generally excluding foreign corporations or significantly deterring their entry. Moreover, states'
territorial monopolies on corporate law appeared unsalvageable.
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Reluctance to demand conditions for entry probably precluded any
thought of regulating foreign corporations' internal affairs. With
substantive liberalization, corporation laws no longer had much
regulatory bite anyway. Therefore, there would have been little to
gain from revisiting the existing internal affairs doctrine to attempt
to impose local corporate rules on foreign corporations. 0 4
The selling of corporate charters was an innovation by political
entrepreneurs who saw opportunity in fortuitous circumstances.
These political entrepreneurs appreciated the public and private
revenue-generating potential for corporate chartering. James
Brooks Dill, a New York lawyer who lived in New Jersey during the
late 1880s, is generally credited with the idea of selling corporate
charters to raise state revenues. 0 5 After failing to convince New
York politicians to adopt his scheme, Dill went across the river to
New Jersey. 10' In addition to proposing liberalizing amendments to
New Jersey's corporation law and lobbying the governor for their
passage, Dill saw to it that both he and important politicians

104 The liberalizing trend in corporate law applied to corporate internal affairs as well.

Provisions less constraining to management were copied; provisions with the opposite bent
were rebuffed. Recall, for example, New Jersey's bid to facilitate corporate acquisitions by
shielding directors' business judgment concerning the value of property acquired for stock.
See supra note 99. This was a dramatic liberalization in the rules of internal corporate
management. New Jersey's liberalizing provision was quickly copied, even by New York. By
1903, six other states had adopted provisions giving conclusive effect to directors' judgment
on the valuation of property taken as payment for stock. The six states were Connecticut,
Delaware, Maine, New York, North Carolina, and West Virginia. MASSACHUSETIS REPORT,
supra note 88, at 181.
Legislators also pursued regulatory substitution strategies, creating new territoriallybased regulation for the benefit of local shareholders and other groups that had formerly
enjoyed some protection under restrictive corporation laws. For example, beginning with
Kansas in 1911, state legislatures enacted "blue sky" laws, state securities laws meant to
protect local investors from unscrupulous corporate promoters. LOUIS LOSS & EDWARD M.
COWETr, BLUE SKY LAW 8 & n.24 (1958). State securities commissions were established to
review the merits of offering before they could be made to local investors. Only securities that
received the blessing of the commission could be sold to the public, and the commission
enjoyed a broad scope of review. Grounds for prohibiting an offering included a finding that
any of the issuer's organizational documents or business plan contained any "unfair, unjust,
inequitable or oppressive" provision, or that the issuer "does not intend to do a fair and honest
business," or "does not promise a fair return on the stocks, bonds or other securities." Id.
Within two years of Kansas' enactment, twenty-three other states had followed suit. Id. at
10. Almost all these later enactments were patterned after the Kansas model.
105 Stoke, supra note 99, at 571.
10" See id. (describing New Jersey's general corporation law of 1849).
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personally profited from the chartermongering strategy. 10 7 Dill
founded a corporation services company' 0 8-The Corporation Trust
Company of New Jerseym-for which the clerk of chancery served as
an incorporator, and the governor and secretary of state served as
directors. The latter eventually became president of the company.10 9
The technological, economic, and legal changes that occurred in
the mid-nineteenth century changed relative prices in favor of
interstate firms transacting in interstate markets."0 Dill and the
New Jersey politicians he recruited successfully responded to the
demand for nonterritorial corporation law, and then economic
pressures precluded legislatures from excluding foreign corporations
or conditioning their entry."' Interstate firms naturally developed
constituencies in various states that stood to benefit from the firms'
doing business locally." 2 Legislators and interest groups in each
of foreign
state would have seen no point to opposing recognition
3
corporations and respect for foreign corporation law."

107

GRANDY, supra note 97, at 40.

"o A corporation services company handles the administrative work for corporate
formation and maintenance in good standing. It can provide suitable articles of incorporation
and file them with the secretary of state's office. It can provide an in-state address for a
firm's principal office and an agent for service of process. It can provide incorporators or
directors. The webpage for CT Corporation, a premier corporation services company, offers
a typical set of services. CT Corporation, Law Firm Customers,at http'/www.ctadvantage.
com/public/lawFirmCustomers.html#Staffing (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
109 GRANDY, supra note 97, at 40. His involvement "must have proven particularly useful
as the secretary of state's office regularly received inquiries about the law and referred them
to one of the corporation service companies." Id.
110 "The agent of [institutional] change is the individual entrepreneur responding to the
incentives embodied in the institutional framework. The sources of change are changing
relative prices or preferences." DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 83 (1990).

1 With the merger movement, dramatic horizontal consolidation and vertical integration
made interstate firms ubiquitous across important industries. Local employees now worked
for foreign corporations. Local customers and suppliers had important relations with foreign
corporations. Foreign corporations used local transportation and communication facilities.
They might offer capital, managerial expertise, or scale economies that could keep the local
plant in operation, when it would otherwise be shuttered. They might offer an interstate
distribution system for locally produced goods.
112 William J. Carney, The PoliticalEconomy of Competitionfor CorporateCharters, 26
J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 313 (1997); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Contract and
JurisdictionalFreedom, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 325, 333 (F.H.
Buckley ed., 1999).
113 Nonrecognition or attempts to apply local law to foreign corporations would have
driven those firms out of the jurisdiction, only to do business in more hospitable states.
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But this was neither planned nor inevitable. For our purposes,
what is absent from this story is also important. No state set out to
create or facilitate a national market for corporate charters.
Instead, the choice of law convention that eventually enabled this
regulatory market emerged earlier for unrelated reasons. At its
origin, no interested groups would or could have anticipated its
significance to the modern regulatory competition story." 4 The
doctrine was not created to enable regulatory competition, and if the
doctrine had not already existed, it is doubtful that widespread
coordination around such a choice-of-law convention could have been
achieved among states."'

Territorial application of local corporate law would typically have involved rules to protect
local investors or creditors, and exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction would likely have been
based on the presence of the firm's headquarters or predominance of firm assets, employees,
investors, or business activities in the prescribing jurisdiction. See supra note 64 and
accompanying text. Firms could have avoided unattractive corporate law by simply relocating
out of an unattractive jurisdiction or by otherwise avoiding those contacts that would trigger
host state regulation, while continuing to sell products into the unfriendly jurisdiction.
This relatively easy exit option meant that a state had little to gain and something to
lose-in terms of local tax base, business opportunities, employment, and other positive
spillovers-by attempting to impose local corporate law in the face of a firm's election of
foreign law. The reluctance of foreign corporations to do business in a recalcitrant state
might harm in-state interests wishing to do business with such firms. The threat of firms'
physical exit to avoid a state's undesirable corporate law forced states to accede to virtual
exit-avoidance of the unattractive local law without the need for physical exit. Continuing
to honor the long-standing convention of the internal affairs doctrine-albeit in this new
context of firm mobility-enabled just that.
States' other obvious alternative-reforming the unattractive aspects of their corporate
laws-has apparently also been pursued. Scholars have noted the substantial uniformity
across states' corporate law statutes. Black, supranote 44, at 588; Romano, supra note 6, at
235.
114 The internal affairs doctrine is also not neatly and uniformly applied by
the states.
Consistent with a decentralized evolutionary story for the internal affairs doctrine, a few
states that might be in a position to impose local corporate law on foreign corporations
without driving them out have attempted to do so. California in particular takes a relatively
aggressive position in imposing certain local corporate law rules on certain foreign
corporations. See supra note 64. New York has its own "outreach" statute as well. See supra
note 64. The behavior of California and New York is consistent with the interest group
explanation for the internal affairs doctrine. For states with large internal markets like
California and New York and many local corporations with local operations, in-state interests
may be less worried about the threat of firms' physical exit than smaller states like Delaware
and New Jersey. In-state interests would have been less enthusiastic about opposing such
outreach statutes.
...In the face of similar interjurisdictional economic pressures, for example, European
states have not voluntarily adopted an internal affairs approach to corporate choice of law.
Charny, supra note 7, at 424-25.
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IV. CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION:
TERRITORIALITY AND ITS PERSISTENCE

Moving from the domestic to the international context, no
mechanism like the internal affairs doctrine exists. It is also
unlikely to be replicated. National regulators and other important
interests in each nation have powerful incentives and significant
influence to perpetuate territorial securities regulation, especially
in the most important capital markets.116
A. THERE'S NO PLACE LIKE HOME

History matters and the history of the internal affairs doctrine
helps explain howjurisdictional competition over corporate charters
arose among U.S. states." 7 Corporate formation in the United
States historically carried connotations of sovereignty, so that the
law under which a corporation was created might enjoy some
respect and deference among states."' Later, dramatic consolidation in important industries, economic dislocation, and the emergence of large interstate conglomerates created interest group
alignments that made existing custom irreversible."' But unlike
corporate formation in the United States, issuance and trading of
corporate securities appear not to carry any historical ideological
association with sovereign powers nor any implication of comity
among nations. Instead, securities regulation smacks of consumer
protection. 120 One might expect that nations would be reluctant to

Even Delaware's ascendancy as the dominant purveyor of corporate charters to U.S.
public companies was largely serendipitous, turning in large measure on New Jersey
governor Woodrow Wilson's presidential ambitions. See NADERETAL., supra note 93, at 49-54
(describing lame duck Governor Wilson's initiative to reform New Jersey corporate law after
having been elected President and subsequent ascendancy of Delaware).
6 See infra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
117 See supra notes 81-94 and accompanying text.
118 See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
119 See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
" Among the express purposes of the Securities Act of 1933 is the goal of"prevent[ing]
frauds in the sale" of securities. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74, 74 (1933). The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 is meant, among other things, "to prevent inequitable and unfair
practices on... exchanges and markets." S. REP. No. 73-185, at 1 (1934) (conference report
on final bill).

562

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:525

defer to foreign law for the protection of their own consumers,
especially foreign law selected by the seller of the wares at issue.
Also, unlike the great trusts at the turn of the twentieth century,
whose size and economic strength enabled them to avoid doing
business in unfriendlyjurisdictions, issuers of securities--especially
those in the most developed capital markets-generally cannot
avoid their home country securities markets and home country
securities laws.' 2 '
Largely because an issuer's home country investors enjoy
informational advantages over other investors, an issuer's most
attractive capital market is typically its home country market.
Especially in the most important capital markets, issuers almost
invariably issue securities in the home market first.'2 2 Avoiding the
home jurisdiction is not a viable option. This may explain why,
among nations, securities regulation is basically territorial. Nations
regulate securities activity that occurs within their borders. They
need not offer their domestic issuers much choice because those
issuers typically cannot avoid their home jurisdictions. Because
issuers have no exit option, regulators enjoy a regulatory monopoly
as to their domestic issuers.
Why is exit from home country securities regulation so difficult?
By the time an issuer is considering selling securities to the public,
the issuer already has something of a track record. It has established itself to some extent, typically in one country-its home
country. It has headquarters and key operations, managers and
other employees, relationships, goodwill, and other assets, most or
all of which will be located in the same country. Even if these
critical elements are dispersed across countries, the issuer will
ordinarily have an identifiable center of gravity, a country with
which it identifies and is identified. At this stage, the issuer's
critical components will not readily transplant internationally
1 23
without significant loss of value.

121

See infra note 125 and accompanying text.

See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
"2 While the firm's founders could theoretically have factored in the future possibility of
issuing securities when they decided where to locate the firm and could therefore have
accounted for the relative hospitality ofvarious jurisdictions' securities laws, chances are that
more immediate factors dominated any consideration of securities law. Product markets,
'22
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Along with these established physical ties, the prospective issuer
will typically have developed expertise in navigating the business
and regulatory environment in its home jurisdiction by the time the
issuer considers securities activities that would trigger significant
regulation. This expertise is country-specific and, like the firm's
physical assets, not readily transferable across international
borders. A move across international borders would require the
firm to adapt to a new business culture, a new regulatory environment, a new tax structure, perhaps a new language. Many key
officers and employees would not wish to relocate. Immigration
issues with the target jurisdiction might impede ready relocation of
personnel. Trade barriers might make the original home market
less accessible to the relocated firm's products.
Because of the firm's physical location in the jurisdiction and its
past business activities, prospective investors in the jurisdiction are
likely to enjoy informational advantages over prospective investors
in other countries. The firm is a known quantity in its home
country. Its products and marketing, its employees, its relationships with customers and suppliers, and its dealings with local
government all provide information to local investors that may be
less accessible to investors elsewhere. Because of the informational
advantages local investors enjoy, they will generally be able to
outbid their foreign rivals for the firm's securities. So the firm's
costs of capital are likely to be lowest at home, at least in its initial
securities offerings.' 24 This explains why firms ordinarily issue

labor markets, availability of key inputs, and tax considerations, among other things, would
have been more critical to the early success of the venture, without which a consideration of
any securities offering would be premature.
124 The home bias puzzle, that international investors suboptimally overweight their
portfolios in favor of domestic stocks, is widely documented in the corporate finance
literature. Magnus Dahlquist et al., Corporate Governance, Investor Protection and the
Home Bias, 1 (June 2002) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
320222) (stating that home bias is "the least controversial stylized fact in international
finance"). See generally G. Andrew Karolyi & Rene M. Stulz, Are FinancialAssets Priced
Locally or Globally?, in 1B THE HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 975 (George M.
Constantinides et al. eds., 2003) (reviewing home bias literature); Karen K. Lewis, Trying to
Explain Home Bias in Equities and Consumption, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 571 (1999)
(reviewing home bias literature). For important discussions of the home bias, see generally
Ian Cooper & Evi Kaplanis, Home Bias in Equity Portfolios, Inflation Hedging, and
InternationalCapitalMarket Equilibrium,7 REV. FIN. STUD. 45 (1994) (testingwhether home
bias is caused by investors attempting to hedge inflation risk); Dahlquist et al., supra, at 1
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securities in their home markets first and why they generally

cannot avoid issuing in their home jurisdictions. 25 Moreover,
financial economists have shown that the price formation process for
firms cross-listed on foreign stock exchanges is dominated by
activity on the home country exchange, even when the foreign
126
exchange is the superior exchange in terms of depth and liquidity.

(noting U.S. investors' overallocation in domestic equities in 1997); Kenneth R. French &
James M. Poterba, Investor Diversificationand InternationalEquity Markets, 81 AM. ECON.
REV. 222, 222 (1991) (showing that U.S. equity investors allocate nearly 94% of their funds
to domestic securities even though U.S. equity market comprises less than 48% of world
equity market); Jun-Koo Kang & Rend M. Stulz, Why Is There a Home Bias?An Analysis of
Foreign Portfolio Equity Ownership in Japan, 46 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1997) (studying stock
ownership in Japanese firms); Linda L. Tesar & Ingrid M. Werner, Home Bias and High
Turnover, 14 J. INTL MONEY & FIN. 467 (1995) (finding strong evidence of home bias in
Canada, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States). A home bias within domestic
markets has also been demonstrated. See generally Joshua D. Coval & Tobias J. Moskowitz,
Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference in Domestic Portfolios, 54 J. FN. 2045 (1999)
(studying U.S. market); Harald Hau, Location Matters: An Examinationof Trading Profits,
56 J. FIN. 1959 (2001) (studying German market and effects of distance from Frankfurt).
Financial economists have proposed several different explanations for the home bias,
including the existence of information asymmetries as between foreign and domestic
investors. See Coval & Moskowitz, supra,at 2045-46 (discussing explanations for home bias).
125 See Merritt B. Fox, The PoliticalEconomy of Statutory Reach: U.S. DisclosureRules
in a Globalizing Market for Securities, 97 MICH. L. REV. 696, 770-71 (1998) ("Despite the
burden of compliance, avoiding the U.S. market traditionally has not made sense for U.S.
issuers since the United States is the residence of a large portion of their most likely potential
investors."); Romano, supra note 13, at 2397 ("Resort solely to foreign capital markets for
financing is not a viable option for publicly traded U.S. firms."). Under the EU's "passport"
system for securities listings and public offerings, a firm could choose a regulatory regime
other than that of its home state by making its initial offering in another member state. But
"[iun reality, very few issuers apparently choose to list outside of their home country given
that issuers often find the warmest reception for their securities in their home markets."
Howell E. Jackson & Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Completion in InternationalSecuritiesMarkets:
Evidence from Europe in 1999-Part1, 56 BUS. LAW. 653, 678-79 (2001).
For a discussion of the exceptional case of Israeli high-tech firms avoiding the Israeli
securities market, see Amir N. Licht, ManagerialOpportunism and Foreign Listing: Some
DirectEvidence, 22 U. PA. J. INTLEcoN. L. 325, 338 (2001) (noting attraction for Israeli firms
of relatively more lenient U.S. disclosure regime).
12 See Kenneth A. Froot & Emil Dabora, How Are Stock PricesAffected by the Location
of Trade?, 53 J. FIN. ECON. 189, 189 (1999) (showing that stock prices of "Siamese-twin"
companies do not move in lockstep, but that relative stock prices are highly correlated with
relative stock market indexes of countries in which twins' stocks trade most actively); Shmuel
Hauser et al., InternationalTransfer of PricingInformation Between Dually Listed Stocks,
21 J. FIN. RES. 139, 139 (1998) (analyzing dual-listed Israeli companies); Cheol S. Eun &
Sanjiv Sabherwal, Cross-BorderTrading and Price Discovery: Evidence from U.S.-Listed
CanadianStocks, 58 J. FIN. 549, 549 (2003) (finding that for most cross-listed Canadian firms,
Toronto Stock Exchange dominated price discovery, and that degree of U.S. contribution to
price discovery correlated with degree of competition for trades); JOACHIM GRAMMIG ET AL.,
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This is consistent with the notion that hometown investors enjoy
superior information about local firms.127
It is this hometown effect that guarantees the regulatory
monopolies that issuer choice proponents decry. Because firms have
historically been more or less captive to their home country
securities markets and cannot easily escape home country securities
laws, local interests with stakes in the volume of local securities
activity-stock exchanges, securities lawyers, accountants, underwriters, and brokerage firms-would not have felt threatened by the
possibility of firm exit. Regulators and other policymakers would
therefore not have felt much local pressure to accommodate issuers
in order to forestall their exit. While excessive regulation that
would dampen the amount of local securities activity was certainly
to be avoided, the extreme measure of allowing issuers to choose
their own regulation would have been unnecessary. Moreover,
unlike the genesis of the internal affairs doctrine, no shared
tradition or ideology exists among nations to give local deference to
foreign securities law, whether selected by the issuer or otherwise.
A policy to forsake territorial jurisdiction in deference to firm choice
would not have been considered.
By contrast, choosing a state of incorporation among U.S. states
is-and since the great merger movement, has been-a very
different enterprise. If a state attempted to impose local corporate
rules on foreign corporations with specified contacts in the state, 128
many firms would have flexibility to relocate or relinquish the
damning contacts in order to avoid inhospitable rules. 121 Unlike
international relocation, a firm relocating or restructuring across
state lines does not fear new tariff barriers or other serious local
PRICE DISCOVERY IN INTERNATIONAL EQUITY TRADING 20-21 (Universitd Catholique de

Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics, Working Paper No. 2001/28,
2001) (analyzing intraday quotes of three German blue chip firms during trading overlap
between Frankfurt and New York and finding price discovery occurs predominantly in
Frankfurt).
127 See Amir N. Licht, Legal Plug-Ins: Cultural Distance, Cross-Listing, and Corporate
GovernanceReform 22 BERKELEYJ. INTLL. 195,209 (2004) ("Investors not only buy securities
of firms which they know; they prefer securities of firms which they know better.").
128 See supra note 64.
129 Certainly for a firm's initial incorporation, while the firm may have already had some
nontrivial economic activity located primarily in one state, the business will generally be at
a much earlier stage in its development than a firm considering a public securities offering.
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protectionism. 130 Even for a relatively mature firm, physical
relocation from one state to another would not be nearly as traumatic or value-decreasing as an international move. The simple
moving of assets and employees would certainly be cheaper than
moving abroad. Adjustment costs would likely be far lower. The
regulatory environment would not likely be all that different in the
new state. The language would remain unchanged. The currency
would stay the same. The business culture and social environment
would not likely be too different as compared to an international
move.
Among U.S. states, then, relatively easy exit for firms searching
for desirable corporate law, along with the preexisting internal
affairs doctrine, pressured states to accommodate-both in terms of
substantive corporate law rules and choice of law. Not so for
securities law among nations. Firms' lack of international mobility
meant that national regulators could insist on territoriality in
securities regulation, 131 imposing national laws on all issuance and
trading of securities within their jurisdictions.
B. INTEREST GROUPS AND THE PERSISTENCE OF TERRITORIAL MONOPOLY

In this section, I explain the likely persistence and durability of
territoriality in important capital markets.'3 2 The operation of a
national securities regulatory regime, combined with the historical
difficulties of firms' physical exit from their home jurisdictions,
130
131

See supra notes 88-115 and accompanying text.
Moreover, the globalization of securities markets has made investors more mobile. See

Jackson & Pan, supra note 125, at 655-56 (discussing effect of cross-border secondary market
linkages). Investors interested in foreign securities are not limited solely to the choices
offered on their national exchanges. They may be able to transact in foreign markets fairly
easily. In addition, the explosion of institutional intermediaries has allowed investors to
obtain foreign exposure for their portfolios through indirect holdings via mutual funds and
pension funds. Given these various avenues for foreign securities investing, strict
territoriality in securities regulation may not come under the same domestic pressure as a
similar choice of law rule in the corporate law context.
"a For a discussion of minor moves toward cross-border regulatory cooperation, see
generally Frederick Tung, Passports, Private Choice, and Private Interests: Regulatory
Competitionand Coordinationin Corporate,Securities, and Bankruptcy Law, 3 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 369 (2002) (comparing direct competition and regulatory passport approaches to
international regulatory coordination).
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would not surprisingly produce important interest groups with

stakes in territorial regulation. Regulators and other interests have
adopted strategies and developed expertise in pursuit of their
private interests. They have invested in territoriality.
Continuing with the public choice assumptions of issuer choice
proponents, we must conclude that regulators, like all monopolists,
will wish to preserve their regulatory monopoly.'33 As well, they will
pursue a strategy of regulatory price discrimination in order to
augment the reach of their bureaucracies.'
Private actors within
each nation have also developed expertise and skill sets peculiarly
tailored to their local regulation. Lawyers, accountants, underwriters, stock exchanges, and securities firms, among others, have all
established organizations and practices premised on the continued
existence of territorial regulation. They will likely support regulatory price discrimination and the territorial jurisdiction on which it
depends.
I first discuss the role and influence of regulators in preserving
existing territorial monopolies, as well as their maximizing strategy
of regulatory price discrimination. I then address other interest
groups.
1. Regulators and Regulatory Price Discrimination. Given the
highly technical nature of securities regulation in developed capital
markets, regulators in these markets will likely play a crucial role
in any reform of international securities regulation. They are likely
to be the most critical interest group for purposes of any international choice of law coordination.' 35 Regulators in the largest and
deepest capital markets, of course, enjoy significant benefits from
the current system of territorial monopoly. They will be reluctant
to forsake these benefits.

.3 A move from the current mandatory territorial system to issuer choice would likely
result in a number of issuers figuratively fleeing from the local regulation offered by the
governments of major capital markets to lower cost regulatory regimes. The exit option
offered by issuer choice might be especially attractive for domestic firms in these countries,
which cannot avoid issuing in their home market and which are therefore bound to local
regulation under the current territorial system. This would allow domestic issuers to escape
from the overzealous regulation of their national regulators, effectively breaking existing
regulatory monopolies.
'3
See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
13 Tung, supra note 21, at 1411.
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With territorial securities regulation, regulators effectively serve
as gatekeepers to their national securities markets. Those desiring
to offer, sell, or trade securities within the regulator's jurisdiction
are required to comply with regulatory mandates. In essence,
regulators exact a price for access to their national markets. The
price is not so much paid in cash to the regulator-although some
fees may be charged. Instead, the price is charged largely in the
form of exaction of regulatory compliance-registration requirements, periodic reporting, and the like.13 6
Securities regulators typically enjoy no direct financial benefit
from promulgating regulations and exacting compliance. Any
government fees go directly to the national treasury, and regulators
have no specific stake in those fees. However, following our
assumption that maximizing regulators pursue bureaucratic
aggrandizement," 7 they may strive to extend both the reach and
complexity of their regulation. In this way, regulators increase their
prestige and influence, and possibly their budgets. In addition,
interest groups in the way
regulators may benefit important
138
structured.
is
law
securities
Like other monopolists, the regulatory monopolist will charge a
regulatory price above the competitive price. 3 9 That is, it will

" See Richard L. Revesz,RehabilitatingInterstateCompetition: Rethinking the "Race-tothe-Bottom"Rationalefor FederalEnvironmentalRegulation,67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210,1234-35
(1992) (analogizing costs of environmental regulatory compliance with "sale price of a
traditional good"); cf. Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1525
(1984) (giving examples of prices). Contrasting prices and sanctions as tools to effect legal
compliance, Bob Cooter has defined a price as a payment of money that is required in order
to do what is permitted. Id. at 1525.
'3' See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
'38 See Choi & Guzman, PortableReciprocity,supra note 15, at 923 (describing regulator's
incentive to offer popular regulatory regime in order to increase local volume of securities
activity).
" Issuer choice proponents argue that regulators pursue bureaucratic aggrandizement
by maximizing the number of firms and volume of transactions subject to their regulation.
Romano, supra note 1, at 7, quoting WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 38-41 (1971) ("[Rlegulators prefer to have within their
jurisdiction more rather than fewer regulated firms and transactions."); see also Choi &
Guzman, PortableReciprocity, supra note 15, at 923 ("[R]egulators themselves benefit when
many issuers and investors choose to be governed by their regulations. The regulators benefit
from the increased size and importance of their own agencies.").
Besides numbers, though, the regulator will also likely care about the nature of the
regulation it administers, preferring to administer complex and sophisticated regulation
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overregulate. 140 It will impose regulatory requirements more severe
than issuers and investors would prefer. Especially in the most
important capital markets, regulators will enjoy significant market
power. Without ready substitutes, domestic issuers in these
markets may have no alternative but to issue securities in their
home markets, paying the regulator's price in terms of regulatory
compliance."1

rather than rules that are trivial or dull. Administering trivial regulation would hardly
generate prestige and influence. Moreover, this assumption, rather than the simple breadthmaximizing assumption, more closely aligns with issuer choice proponents' general fear of
overregulation by regulatory monopolists. It is also consistent with Niskanen's view that
bureaucracies aim to maximize their budgets. NISKANEN, supra, at 38-41. Agencies
administering complex rules to many regulated entities are likely to command larger budgets
than those applying only simple rules to the same number of entities or transactions. All else
equal, the regulatory monopolist would rather charge a higher regulatory price than a lower
one.
140 The ability to charge an infinitely high price will be constrained not
only by market
forces-some would-be issuers may simply choose not to issue public securities-but also by
politics. Issuers' costs of political action-for example, resort to legislative relief from
overregulation by the bureaucracy-become relatively more attractive as regulatory pricing
increases. So both exit and voice will serve to constrain regulatory pricing. See generally
ALBERT O. HiRScHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1972).
141 The regulatory monopolist's price will be set just like the traditional monopolist's price.
In order to maximize its "profits," it will set its monopoly price such that marginal revenue
equals marginal cost. DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 90 (3d ed. 1999). In this situation, however, the currency is bureaucratic
prestige. We can think of bureaucratic "revenue" just like ordinary revenue. It will be the
product of price and quantity. In other words, bureaucratic revenue will equal the regulatory
price multiplied by the number of firms or transactions under regulation. Other things equal,
higher revenue will translate into greater prestige and bureaucratic aggrandizement for the
regulator.
On the other hand, bureaucratic "costs" must also be considered. Given fixed
resources, there is a limit to the number of firms the regulator will wish to regulate.
Bureaucratic aggrandizement increases with the number of firms under regulation only so
long as the regulator can make a credible show of regulating. An inability to effectively
regulate firms purportedly under regulation will damage the agency's prestige and influence.
That is, there will be a point of diminishing returns to the regulator. Assuming a budget
constraint, the regulator cannot hope to increase the number of firms under regulation
indefinitely. There is a limit. Each additional firm under regulation will stretch the
regulator's resources. Marginal bureaucratic revenue will equal marginal bureaucratic cost
when the agency is indifferent-in terms of its own bureaucratic aggrandizement-to the
addition of one more firm under regulation. Any marginal benefit in terms of prestige from
regulating another firm is exactly offset by the detriment caused by the agency's diminished
ability to appear competent in regulating its entire set of regulated entities.
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Moreover, national securities regulators may not be content with
their monopoly over domestic issuers. In pursuit of bureaucratic
aggrandizement, regulators may wish to entice foreign issuers to
issue and list their securities locally. But foreign issuers, less tied
to the local market than domestic issuers, may be price sensitive.
While major capital markets will hold some attraction for foreign
issuers, those issuers may be unwilling to pay the regulatory price
charged to domestic issuers for market access. Without the same
hometown attachment to the local market, foreign issuers naturally
have other ready alternatives to raise capital. Because of foreign
issuers' higher elasticity of demand for access to the local market,
the maximizing regulator should charge them a lower regulatory
price than that charged to domestic issuers.'4 2 The regulator will
price discriminate,"4 offering foreign issuers less stringent regulatory requirements than those applied to local issuers.'"
Securities regulation in the United States follows this pattern.
Foreign issuers'4 5 enjoy more relaxed requirements for registering
public offerings in the United States. Their disclosure obligations
142

See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 137 (1988) (describing

demand elasticity).
1'3 Identification of regulatory price discrimination as a plausible strategy for regulators
in price setting jurisdictions is important to the ensuing interest group analysis because it
more realistically describes the political and policy alternatives for the various interested
groups than have previous commentators. To the extent issuer choice advocates have
discussed the politics of issuer choice, they have tended to pose the policy alternatives in stark
contrast. Private choice reform is contrasted to the status quo of mandatory disclosure, which
is characterized as a monolithic endeavor by regulatory monopolists to force rules upon
recalcitrant issuers. Identification of the price discrimination strategy suggests that
regulators may be more responsive to market pressure and to pressure from interested
groups than the standard regulatory monopolist description implies. This responsiveness
tends to undermine not only claims concerning the inefficiency of the status quo but also
issuer choice advocates' implicit assertion that interested groups exist that would prefer
issuer choice.
14
Niskanen noted the possibility that certain bureaucracies would be able to price
discriminate among customers. NISKANEN, supra note 139, at 34. See generally CARLTON &
PERLOFF, supra note 141, at 287-96 (discussing price discrimination); TIROLE,supra note 142,
at 137 (discussing price discrimination).
14" SEC rules define those firms that qualify for special treatment as "foreign private
issuers." 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4(c) (2002). Any corporation incorporated or organized under the
laws of any foreign country qualifies as a foreign private issuer, unless both (a) more than
50% of its outstanding voting securities are held of record directly or indirectly by U.S.
residents; and (b) either (i) the majority of its executive officers or directors are U.S. citizens
or residents, (ii) over 50% of its assets are located in the United States, or (iii) its business is
administered principally in the United States. Id.
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concerning management compensation, material transactions, and
lines of business, for example, are less stringent than for domestic
issuers.146 Foreign issuers are exempt from many of the rules to
which domestic issuers are subject when listing shares on a national
securities exchange. 4 7 They are exempt from most of the proxy
rules.'48 Foreign issuers and their insiders are excused from the
reporting obligations and short-swing profit rules under section 16
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.149 Foreign issuers' periodic
disclosure obligations are less stringent than those applied to
domestic issuers. 50 Similarly, even under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
the most sweeping reform of U.S. securities regulation since its
original New Deal enactment,' 5 ' foreign issuers enjoy exemptions
from important requirements.' 5 2
146 Tung, supra note 21, at 1401-02. The SEC adopted three registration forms for use
only by foreign issuers-Forms F-1, F-2, and F-3-in extending the integrated disclosure
system. Adoption of Foreign Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6437,
26 SEC Docket 964 (Nov. 19, 1982).
147 These rules are promulgated by the SEC pursuant to its authority under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act). 15 U.S.C. § 78w (2000).
In general, even an issuer without publicly listed shares is required to register under

the Exchange Act and be subject to Exchange Act rules if the issuer's assets exceed $10
million, and it has a class ofequity security with at least 500 holders of record. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 781(g)(1) (2000) (describing registration requirement); 17 C.F.R. § 230.12g-1 (2002); 17
C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2002) (describing exemptions from registration). However, a foreign
private issuer without publicly listed shares is exempt from Exchange Act registration and
rules ifit has no class of equity with more than 300 U.S. resident holders or if it furnishes the
SEC the disclosure information provided in its home jurisdiction. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2
(2002).
148 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3 (2002) (setting out exemptions from proxy rules and
shortswing profit rules for foreign private issuers).
149 Id.
150 Tung, supra note 21, at 1402-03.

...Signing Statement of George W. Bush (July 30, 2002), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020730.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2004) (characterizing bill as "the most far-reaching reforms of American business practices since the time of
Franklin Delano Roosevelt").
152 For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act authorizes the SEC to promulgate
rules
requiring issuers to disclose on a "rapid and current basis" such additional information
concerning material changes as the SEC determines "is necessary or useful for the protection
of investors and in the public interest." 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(l) (1997 & Supp. 2004). As part
ofthis new rulemaking authority, the SEC required issuers making any public announcement
about past earnings performance to furnish a report to the SEC within five business days of
the public announcement. Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-47226, at 10, 2003 WL 16117 (Jan. 22, 2003). This requirement did not
apply to foreign issuers. See Dixie L. Johnson & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, FFHSJ Client
Memorandum: The Post-EnronCorporateGovernance Environment: Where Are We Now?,
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3
The other dominant market in the world, the United Kingdom,1
also appears to have followed a regulatory price discrimination
strategy as to foreign issuers.'54 The strategy seems especially
important for the London Stock Exchange (LSE), since the market
capitalization of overseas listed companies is nearly twice that of
U.K. listed companies, 55 and the LSE consistently has more foreign
listings in absolute terms than any other major exchange.' 56 Annual
listing fees are lower for overseas companies than for U.K.
issuers.' In its discretion, the UK Listing Authority (UKLA) may
accept nonconforming financial statements from overseas applicants
for listing. 5 ' Similarly, the UKLA may allow an overseas applicant

PLI Order No. BO-01NM 938 (Apr.-June 2003) (noting that new disclosures required in
revised Form 8-K inapplicable to foreign private issuers using Form 6-K). Similarly,
concurrent with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC considered and has since
adopted a proposal significantly expanding the number of items considered to be material
changes requiring disclosure under Form 8-K and requiring a filing within four business days
of the event. S.E.C. Release No. 34-49424 3 (Mar. 16, 2004). See also Gary M. Brown,
Reporting and Disclosure Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; What a Public
Company Should Know, PLI Order No. 3396 698 (Sept.-Dec. 2004) (describing new expanded
Form 8-K disclosure requirements). This expanded disclosure also does not affect foreign
issuers. Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-49424, at 3, 2004 WL 536851 (Mar. 16, 2004).
15 The United Kingdom is the third largest equity market in the world in terms of market
capitalization after the United States and Japan. HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION 18 (2002).
See Amir L. Licht, David'sDilemma: A Case Study ofSecurities Regulation in a Small
'"
Open Market, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 673, 704 (2001) (noting London's bifurcated
regulatory structure for foreign issuers); lain MacNeil & Alex Lau, InternationalCorporate
Regulation: ListingRules and Overseas Companies,50 INT'L&COMP. L.Q. 787,798-99 (2001)
(discussing relaxation of listing requirements for overseas companies).
155 See MacNeil & Lau, supra note 154, at 789 n.5 (noting that as of August 31, 2000,
capitalization of LSE-listed international companies was £3,831bn compared to £1,968bn for
domestic companies).
16 See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 153, at 19 (comparing foreign turnover as
percentage of average daily turnover among twelve largest stock markets); MacNeil & Lau,
supra note 154, at 791 (charting overseas listed companies as percentage of total listings in
six major exchanges).
157 See Financial Services Authority, Listing Fees-UnitedKingdom and International
Companies (effective from Apr. 16,2002), availableat http-//www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/listing
Jfees.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2004) (detailing UKIA listing fees schedule). Overseas
companies are those incorporated outside the United Kingdom.
15. Financial Services Authority, The Listing Rules, Rule 17.3, available at http://www.
fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/Ir-chapters4f (last updated June 9, 2004) [hereinafter Listing Rules].
Since May 1, 2000, the British Financial Services Authority (FSA) has served as the United
Kingdom's "competent authority" to determine issues suitable for listing on LSE. Financial
Services Authority, Note to Subscribers to the Listing Rules, available at httpJ/www.fsa.
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to omit certain information otherwise required in its listing
particulars, depending on the nature of the regulation to which the
applicant is subject in its home country. 159 Preemptive rights,
applicable to U.K. companies by virtue of the Companies Act 198510
as well as the Listing Rules,' 6 ' do not apply to overseas
companies.'62 Overseas companies engaging in a secondary listing
on the LSE enjoy relaxed reporting requirements in numerous
areas, 113 including those with respect to continuing obligations," 8
directors' continuing obligations,6 5 and disclosure of major transactions. 6 6

Consistent with their assumed pursuit of bureaucratic aggrandizement, regulators in the strongest securities markets appear to
pursue a strategy of regulatory price discrimination. These
regulators will defend the territorial monopolies on which this
strategy depends.
2. Other Interest Groups: Path Dependence and Increasing
Returns. Regulators' druthers are not the only ones that matter.
Legislators and executives influence the structure of securities law
gov.UK/pubs/ukla/soc.pdf (May 2000). LSE Listing Rules require that an applicant for listing
have filed or published audited financial statements going back at least three years, prepared
in accordance with U.K. GAAP, U.S. GAAP, or international accounting standards. Listing
Rules, supra, Rule 3.3.
19 Listing Rules, supra note 158, Rule 17.6.
160 Companies Act, 1985, c. b, §§ 89 & 95 (Eng.) (amended by Companies Act 1989). Under
section 95, U.K-listed companies may disapply the preemptive rights granted under section
89, but the Listing Rules and Investor Protection Committee guidelines require that any
company doing so must seek a "disapplication entitlement" from its shareholders. Listing
Rules, supranote 158, Rule 9.20; Investor Protection Committee, Guidelines on Pre-emption
(issued Oct. 21, 1987).
.61Listing Rules, supra note 158, Rule 9.18.
162 Id. Rule 17.8. This rule apparently "disapplies" the preemption provisions of the
Companies Act 1985 for overseas companies. MacNeil & Lau, supra note 155, at 802.
163 Listing Rules, supra note 158, Rule 17.14. One might suppose that from an investor
protection standpoint, relaxed listing requirements for an overseas company with a secondary
listing are justified since that company is already regulated by the exchange and the
jurisdiction of its primary listing. However, the Listing Rules contain no general requirement
that the UKLA ascertain the nature of the regulation in this primary jurisdiction or even
identify the jurisdiction or the primary exchange.
1'4 See id. ch. 9 (describing listed companies' continuing disclosure and notification
obligations).
16 See id. ch. 16 (describing listed companies' continuing notification obligations
concerning, inter alia, directors' identities, directors' interests in company securities, and
terms of employment).
16 See id. ch. 10 (describing notification requirements for major transactions).
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as well. Legislators and executives could act to modify or abandon
the current practice of territorially based prescriptive jurisdiction
for securities regulation. They would be unlikely to do so over the
objection of regulators, however, absent interest group support for
such a change. Given its technical complexity and low visibility to
the general public, international securities law is an area as to
which legislators and executives are unlikely to hold strong personal
preferences." 7 Instead, they will respond to the demands of interest
groups. Given regulators' significant informational and technical
advantages over legislators and executives, interest groups would
be required to both educate legislators and executives and spur
them to action.
Important interest groups, however, have invested in and
adapted to existing regulatory monopolies. They are likely to
support the territorial status quo and regulatory price discrimination, not issuer choice. The long-established territorial approach to
securities regulation could not help but have political effects within
each nation. Not only do interest groups shape policies, but policies
shape interest groups. And long-standing policies tend to
strengthen interest groups that support those policies while causing
opposing factions to wither. 6 8 Following the economic literature on

167 In addition, issuer choice is not an intrinsically attractive reform for politicians, who

are risk averse and have short time horizons. Issuer choice offers only uncertain political
payoffs. Even if all goes well, greater efficiency in the national securities market may be
difficult to achieve and will almost certainly be difficult to demonstrate in the short run. On
the downside, however, adjustment to a new equilibrium under issuer choice might cause
short-term market disruptions, which can only hurt politicians supporting issuer choice.
168 See Paul Pierson, When Effect Becomes Cause: PolicyFeedback and PoliticalChange,
45 WORLD POL. 595, 595 (1993), quoting E.E. SCHAI'PrCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND
THE TARIFF 288 (1935) (noting that "new policies created a new politics"). For an application
in the corporate law context, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 157 (1999)
(discussing rule-driven path dependence and role of favored interest groups in perpetuating
existing rules). Warren Schwartz and Alan Sykes offer a similar analysis of trade
liberalization. Warren F. Schwartz & Alan 0. Sykes, The Economic Structureof Renegotiation and DisputeResolution in the World Trade Organization,31 J. LEGAL STUD. S179, S195
(2002). They argue that free trade is hard to reverse because opposing interests dissipate
after markets are opened. Id. Local resources move out of industries being overcome by
foreign competition, so as time goes on, protectionist interests die out. Id. Likewise, free
trade beneficiaries probably enjoy increasing returns in the form of networks of new business
relations and alliances by virtue of easier access to imports. Id.
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increasing returns and path dependence, 69 scholars of political
economy and economic history have pointed out this self-perpetuating nature of institutions. Most prominently, Douglass North has
argued that institutions exhibit many of the same self-reinforcing
mechanisms that induce the path dependence observed in mainstream microeconomics.170 For present purposes, learning effects
effects are especially important in reinforcing the
and coordination
7
status quo.1 1
a. Learning Effects. Learning effects improve a product or
lower its costs the more widely the product is used. With national
securities regulation, learning effects accrue over time as more
issuers come under the national regulatory jurisdiction and various
actors become familiar with the nuances of the system. The private

'6

BRiANW. ARTHUR, INCREASINGRETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY 112

(1994). As Margaret Levi has explained:
Path dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that once a
country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very
high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain
institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice.
Perhaps the better metaphor is a tree, rather than a path. From the same
trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches. Although
it is possible to turn around or to clamber from one to the other-and
essential if the chosen branch dies-the branch on which a climber begins
is the one she tends to follow.
Margaret Levi, A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and
HistoricalAnalysis, in COMPARATIVE POLITICS: RATIONALITY, CULTURE, AND STRUCTURE 28
(Mark Irving Lichbach & Alan S. Zuckerman eds., 1997).
170 NORTH, supra note 110, at 94.
171 Other self-reinforcing mechanisms include high setup or fixed costs, which lead to
falling unit costs as output increases; and adaptive expectations, which reflect users' desire
to pick the "right"product in anticipation offuture coordination benefits as others do likewise.
Id. National securities regulatory systems exhibit each of these characteristics. They have
large setup costs. In the most important capital markets, securities regulation is not merely
a set of rules that issuers must follow. Securities regulation includes expert regulators,
judges, stock exchanges that are largely responsible for proposing and imposing listing
requirements on listed firms, and underwriters, lawyers, accountants, and other professional
advisers to issuers. In addition, adaptive expectations emerge as increased activity under a
national regulatory scheme signals the scheme's permanence.
In making the jump from products to institutions, North points out that the standard
economic analysis of competing product technologies is not directly about competing
technologies, but really about competition between organizationsthat embody the competing
technologies. Id. As such, that analysis ultimately deals with organizational decisionmaking,
similar to North's project of institutional analysis. See also Paul Pierson, IncreasingReturns,
Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 251, 255-56 (2000)
(discussing North's contribution to institutional analysis).
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actors who facilitate securities offerings and trading in established
capital markets make significant investments in developing
expertise related to their national regulatory systems. The availability of this expertise facilitates issuers' resort to national capital
markets and the required navigation through the national regulatory system.
Those paid to advise issuers concerning regulation-primarily
securities lawyers and accountants-will share similar incentives
with regulators and can be expected to support territoriality and
regulatory price discrimination.' 72 With their expertise in national
securities law, lawyers have significant undiversifiable human
capital investments that are more or less territorially bound. U.S.
lawyers' stock in trade, for example, is their ability to advise with
respect to U.S. law. They are expert at crafting disclosure documents for client firms subject to U.S. securities laws. Corporate and
plaintiffs' securities lawyers are skilled at litigating class actions
under the complex liability and procedural rules peculiar to the U.S.
regime of private enforcement. Accountants likewise possess
similar territorially bound expertise concerning financial disclosure
requirements under their national securities law. U.S. accountants
have developed expertise in producing and auditing the complex and
detailed financial statements required of issuers under U.S.
securities laws,' 73 while at the same time avoiding the possible
securities fraud liability that may follow an accounting misstep.7 4
Lawyers and accountants have significant incentives to defend the
regulatory price discrimination, and to oppose
status quo, including
5
issuer choice.

17

172 See Tung, supra note 21, at 1415 (explaining incentives to support territoriality and
price discrimination).
173 Regulation S-X describes the accounting rules applicable to SEC filings and the audited
financial statements required under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. 17 C.F.R.
§§ 210.1-01 to 210.12-29 (2002).
174

See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, § 9.6 (4th ed. 2002)

(describing SEC auditing and accounting requirements).
175 While law firms and accounting firms do diversify internationally, that diversification
would likely have little or no effect on local lawyers' desire to maintain the existing territorial
monopoly. See Tung, supra note 21, at 1417-18 (noting that because division of profits within
law firms and accounting firms depends heavily on partners' ability to generate profits,
individual lawyers and accountants will still wish to preserve value of their local expertise).
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Stock exchanges, underwriters, and securities firms in important
capital markets have somewhat different stakes. They could
conceivably be tempted to support issuer choice on the promise of an
increased volume of local securities activity. After all, these groups
thrive on volume, regardless of whose law may apply. However,
these groups also have large stakes in their current national
regulatory structure. The current practice of regulatory price
discrimination promises increased volume in the form of increasing
numbers of foreign issuers. These various organizations may also
benefit from existing informational advantages over other market
participants. Mandatory disclosure in the United States, for
example, is a boon to securities analysts, portfolio managers, and
other securities professionals, who enjoy a host of free information
about issuers that would otherwise be quite costly to assemble. For
analysts in particular, issuers' annual 10-K reports are "vital."' 6
These groups, no less than lawyers and accountants, have
developed expertise in navigating their existing local regulatory
regimes. A wholesale scrapping of the current regime might
increase local volume, but it would almost certainly also imperil the
value of the expertise these groups have developed under their local
regimes. A switch to issuer choice might invite competition, as
expertise under now-displaced territorial regimes might be less
attractive to issuers and investors. On the other hand, regulatory
price discrimination can promise increased volume without
requiring exchanges and securities firms to forsake their local
expertise. The NYSE, one outfit sure to benefit from an increase in
the volume of securities sold and traded in the United States, has
been a consistent advocate for the relaxation of disclosure requirements and accounting rules for foreign issuers, 7 ' a position that
exemplifies regulatory price discrimination. The NYSE has never
voiced opposition to territorial regulation or advocated for issuer
choice.

116 See SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37
(1981), citing HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., REPORT
OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE

COMMISSION 62 (Comm. Print 1977) (reporting 77.8% of sell-side and 91.3% of buy-side
analysts indicated Form 10-K was vital to them).
177 Tung, supra note 21, at 1420, 1425.
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Finally, issuers may have some political influence over the course
of securities regulation. As with the other groups described above,
issuers will enjoy learning effects in their current territorial
regimes.
Conceptually, they should oppose regulatory price
discrimination, which enables their foreign rivals to pay lower
regulatory "prices," but issuers seem not to have come together to
voice any opposition. 7 ' One might expect them to support issuer
choice, which would free them to choose their own regulation.
However, at least in the United States, it appears that issuers
support harmonized regulation, which is exactly the opposite
direction from issuer choice. 7 9 The prospect of short-term switching
costs may explain this lack of interest in issuer choice and support
for harmonization. 8 0 Incremental harmonization preserves existing
learning effects for issuers, while also evening out regulatory costs
with foreign rivals.
b. CoordinationEffects. Securities offerings and trading in
established capital markets depend on a thick institutional environment. Coordination effects may therefore be especially important
for generating increasing returns and reinforcing the status quo.
Coordination effects confer benefits to existing users in a system as
new users adopt the system.' 8 ' Issuers and investors are the users
of securities markets and securities laws. And the private interests
discussed above-the lawyers and accountants, the exchanges and
underwriters and securities firms-offer services that are complementary to securities markets and to each other. The size and
importance of established securities markets are likely to increase
over time, and the influence of these private interests will correspondingly grow.
Each issuer benefits from the existence of other issuers with
securities trading in a market because more issuers attract more
investors. A symmetrical analysis applies for investors. As more
178

See id. at 1425 (describing lack of opposition to regulatory price discrimination).

179 See John C. Coates IV, Privatevs. PoliticalChoice ofSecurities Regulation:A Political
Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 531,538-39 (2001) (describing corporate preference
for centralization and harmonization); see also Tung, supra note 21, at 1422 (describing
issuers' incentives regarding issuer choice, regulatory price discrimination, and harmonization).
180 See Tung, supra note 21, at 1423 (describing problem of short-term switching costs).
'8' NORTH, supra note 110, at 94.
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and more issuers sell and list their securities in established
markets, the markets draw more and more investors. Drawing
more investors in turn makes the markets more attractive to
existing and subsequent issuers and, in turn, to existing and
subsequent investors.
Private interests with stakes in the system will benefit from this
growth as demand for their professional services increases. This
increased demand will draw more resources to these service
enterprises. It will also likely generate increasing economies in the
provision of these services.' 82 In addition, the complex institutional
environment for securities regulation may generate increasing
returns at a macro level among the complementary public institutions and private organizations that effect securities regulation and
securities activity in established markets.
In the United States, for example, securities regulation relies not
only on legislation, but on an array of public and private actors to
promulgate rules, police compliance ex ante, and impose penalties
for violations ex post. The SEC is the central institution with
expertise developed over many decades. The SEC has authority
over civil enforcement actions, while criminal matters are referred
to the Department of Justice. 8 a In addition, the SEC's ex ante
oversight is crucial. The detailed guidance that results from the
interaction of SEC staffwith private securities lawyers through rule
proposals and the public comment process, SEC releases, no-action
letters, and more informal contacts has created not only a sophisticated and relatively determinate body of regulation, but also a
knowledgeable cadre of private advisers and regulatory staff.1"
Stock exchanges, the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD), and other self-regulatory organizations also play important
roles by making and enforcing rules with respect to their

l82 Increasing economies in the provision of securities law are also likely. In the context
of product competition, Paul David has referred to this phenomenon as "system scale
economies." See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 332,
335 (1985) (describing decreasing cost conditions as typewriting system converged to

QWERTY keyboards).
is

See HAZEN, supra note 174, § 16.218].

184 See generally id. § 1.012] (describing formal and informal interaction between SEC and

private securities bar).
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members.1 8 5 Stock exchanges also impose listing requirements on
186
their listed companies and are responsible for their enforcement.
Private actions, some expressly provided by statute and others
implied by courts, 1 7 also provide enforcement punch. These private
actions are inextricably tied to the courts and the rules of procedure
regarding class actions. Courts therefore matter a great deal.
Complementing this mosaic of regulatory institutions is a corps of
professional advisers with expertise in navigating issuers through
this system. The lawyers understand the system. The accountants
understand the system. The underwriters do as well.
Actors across these various institutions and organizations have
developed coordinated approaches to enabling securities activities
and effecting securities laws. Well-worn practices already exist
among regulatory and enforcement entities, among regulators and
issuers and their professional advisers, and between regulators and
stock exchanges. The pieces all fit together, more or less. The
interaction over time among these various institutions and organizations has generated significant coordination effects, and growth in
important capital markets will further enhance coordination
benefits.
Given this well-developed expertise and coordination, peculiarly
tailored for the existing institutional context, private actors benefit
from the continuing existence of regulatory monopoly and regulatory
price discrimination. Growth in important capital market countries
is likely to lead securities regulation even further down the
territorial path. As private interests prosper under territoriality,
they will have stronger incentives and more resources to defend
territoriality in the political arena. Besides being well financed and
well organized, members of these private groups have both undiver-

185

Other self-regulatory organizations include the Public Company Accounting Oversight

Board, formed in 2002 as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to supervise public auditors and
oversee standard setting for auditing, and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, which
sets rules of conduct for municipal securities brokers and dealers.
188 See supra notes 147-66 and accompanying text.
181 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2) (2000) (granting private rights of action for false
registration statements and fraud in sale of securities); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
431-32 (1964) (recognizing implied private right of action for proxy fraud); Kardon v. Nat'l
Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (recognizing implied private right of action
for securities fraud under 10(b) of Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated there under).
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sified human capital investments and high per capita stakes in
territoriality and regulatory price discrimination.'8 8 They are likely
to be quite effective in supporting this status quo.
Because of the large and long-standing investment that regulators and other interested groups have in their national regulatory
regimes in important capital markets, territoriality and regulatory
price discrimination are likely to persist. The U.S. corporate charter
competition story and the emergence of the internal affairs doctrine
among U.S. states offer no countervailing prospects. Choice of law
rules respecting private choice in international securities regulation
are unlikely.
V. THE GLOBAL MARKET FOR SECURITIES LAW

The foregoing discussion highlights the difficult choice of law
cooperation that would be necessary for an international issuer
choice system to emerge. Choice of law cooperation, however, is only
the first serious obstacle. Even if domestic political entrenchment
could be overcome such that important jurisdictions were willing to
forfeit their existing territorial monopolies in favor of direct
competition, there is still the question of whether and how nations
might actively compete to offer desirable securities regulation. In
the remainder of the Article, I consider other impediments to direct
competition. Even assuming that nations could get past the
problem of choice of law coordination, several other problems would
plague an international issuer choice arrangement that are not
addressed by the dominant U.S. corporate law regulatory competition story. Most importantly, there is likely to be a dearth of
nations with both sufficient incentive and sufficient capacity to
compete over securities law, an issue I address in this Part.'8 9 In
addition, enforcement of an issuer-chosen foreign regime would be
messy. However law-giving and law-enforcing institutions were
combined, the promulgating state would likely have only imprecise

"s See generally Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. &
ECON. 211 (1976) (advancing overall theory of private groups' influence over regulations);
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971)
(explaining private groups' demand for favorable regulations).
'89 See infra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
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control over implementation of its law in foreign nations. This
would lead to legal indeterminacy that would impede competition.
I discuss enforcement issues in Part VI. 9 0
Given these impediments, as well as the costs of opting out of
home country law, issuers might not be willing to do so. They might
just stay home. A switch to issuer choice would necessarily have to
start where territorial regulation left off. So in its inception,
competition over securities law would involve enticing issuers,
primarily from established capital market countries, to abandon
their home country regulatory regime in favor of a less familiar
foreign regime. But if competition is weak and application of foreign
law is indeterminate, even given the choice, issuers might not be
willing to forsake home country law. Issuers understand their home
country regime the best, as do their most likely investors. Issuers
also enjoy political influence in their home country that they are
unlikely to enjoy abroad, so they may be able to influence local
regulation to their liking. Moreover, home country investors-an
issuer's most likely investors-might impose a heavy discount on
the securities of local issuers opting out of home country securities
law. Investors' bias for their home country issuers may include a
bias for home country law as well. Part VII elaborates on these
predictions. 19'
A. THE DEARTH OF COMPETITORS

The brief for welfare-enhancing corporate charter competition
among U.S. states turns crucially on specific political and institutional factors, but the context for international competition over
securities law is quite different. National securities regulators have
different political opportunities and face different institutional
constraints than U.S. state legislators. The structure of the
hypothetical global market for securities law would also look very
different from the U.S. corporate charter market. Given the
structure of the market and the institutional constraints facing
regulators, it is difficult to imagine many nations with both
See infra notes 318-29 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 330-44 and accompanying text.

190
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sufficient incentives and sufficient capacity to compete internationally over securities law.
Established capital market countries would enjoy first-mover
advantages, which can be critical in knowledge industries,' 9 2
including law. But these wealthy nations would have difficulty
demonstrating a credible commitment to maintaining responsive
regulation for their issuers-a key factor in explaining Delaware's
success in U.S. corporate charter competition. 9 3 The established
capital market countries have public budgets that are too large to be
able to show fiscal dependence on regulatory revenues.' 9 4 Moreover,
given the relatively paltry amounts at stake in a global market for
securities regulation, even smaller countries would run into similar
credible commitment problems. 9 5 The smallest countries have
public budgets that might be small enough for regulatory revenues
to matter, but these countries would have other problems. These
smallest countries lack the expertise and administrative capacity to
offer competitive securities law. Their smaller economies might
make it difficult for them to shoulder the costs of new entry or
increased investment in an unfamiliar market, especially given the
possibility of entry-deterring strategies by their larger competitors.
Long-run competitors would be hard to find. Without long-run
competitors, a global market for securities law would be thin and
unsuccessful. This unattractive market for law would not entice
issuers to opt out of their home country law. It would fail to
generate competitive pressure on regulators. Below, I first explain
the importance of credible commitment in the global market for
securities law before considering various potential competitor
nations.

192

See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE

NETWORK ECONOMY
information goods).
193 See infra notes
See infra notes
'9
'9" See infra notes

19-51 (1998) (discussing first-mover advantages and pricing of
196-201 and accompanying text.
211-21 and accompanying text.
271-82 and accompanying text.
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B. THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMITMENT

A crucial aspect of the Delaware success story relates to Delaware's unique ability to demonstrate a credible commitment to its
domestic corporations regarding the continuing quality of Delaware
corporate law. The "law as a product" simile recognizes the
relational aspect of the corporate charter. The corporate charter is
not a good quickly consumed, but instead represents a relational
contract between a corporation and its state of incorporation. A
corporation expects to rely on the law of its state of incorporation
indefinitely.'9 6 A successful seller of corporate charters, like
Delaware, must therefore demonstrate a credible commitment to
prospective subscribers that it will forego postcontractual opportunism. Rather than altering corporate law rules to take advantage of
captive corporations, the state will instead have to demonstrate its
ongoing fidelity to its domestic corporations' changing needs,
striving to offer and to maintain efficient law that maximizes firm
values.
As earlier described, the U.S. charter competition story explains
competition among U.S. states as being largely motivated by states'
pursuit of chartering revenues. 97 According to Romano, Delaware's
success in the charter market turns in large measure on its relative
dearth of alternative revenue sources and its resulting dependence
on chartering revenues. This fiscal dependence signals Delaware's
commitment to be responsive to the needs of its incorporated firms.
Because of the significance of chartering revenues to Delaware's
state budget, Delaware has much to lose by failing to be
responsive. 9 ' Its fiscal vulnerability is ironically also a source of its
strength in the charter market. Delaware is effectively "a hostage
to its success." 199
Delaware has also made specific investments in developing its
specialized chancery court and a sophisticated and extensive body
of corporate case law. These function-specific assets are said to
19' While some corporations may later reincorporate in a different state, few corporations
contemplate such a move at the time of initial incorporation.
197 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
'"
ROMANO, supra note 43, at 37-38.
199 Id.
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provide further evidence of Delaware's commitment to offering
optimal law.2"' Because of the chancery court's specialized corporate
law function, the chancery court has no value to Delaware in any
other context. Likewise, case law precedents are only valuable if
Delaware continues to attract significant corporate law adoptions.
As with Delaware's fiscal dependence on chartering revenues, these
specific investments serve as a hostage to Delaware corporations
Delaware's credible commitment to maintain optimal
that enables
201
law.
Issuer choice proponents do not directly address the question of
nations' credible commitment in selling securities regulation. Given
the obvious parallels in the relational aspects of corporate and
securities law, however, consideration seems warranted. Commitment devices may be even more crucial in international competition
over securities regulation. In general, the necessity for commitment
mechanisms depends on whether exit costs are high or low. If exit
costs are low-i.e., if corporations can reincorporate at low cost, if
issuers can switch regulatory regimes at low cost-then subscribers
can easily unsubscribe. This threat of easy exit may mean that no
additional commitment device is needed. The threat of exit is itself
sufficient to curb supplier opportunism. But firms' switching costs
are likely to be at least as high in international securities regulation
as with U.S. corporate law. Corporate law is fairly uniform across
U.S. states, so in the face of opportunistic corporate law "reform" by
one state, or a state's mere inattention to firms' changing needs,
firms incorporated there may easily find a suitable substitute.
Reincorporation might entail some administrative and filing costs,
but it is doubtful that those costs would be a serious deterrent for
publicly traded companies. 0 2
Switching from one nation's securities regulatory regime to
another, however, may be less straightforward. Securities laws
across nations are much less similar than are corporate law regimes
across U.S. states. Switching securities law may therefore entail a
Id. at 40.
Id. at 39-40; see also Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: UsingHostagesto
SupportExchange, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 519, 519 (1983) (asserting that hostages are often used
to create credible commitments).
2 See Black, supra note 44, at 586-87 (arguing that reincorporation costs are low).
200
201
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more drastic set of changes for a firm than reincorporation from one
U.S. state to another. This discontinuity across regimes may make
it more difficult for firms to switch.2 "3 Firms would have to gain
familiarity with the laws and administrative practices of another
country. This may not be an easy task. Although firms can simply
purchase professional advice on the relative merits of alternative
regimes, much like a U.S. firm might do when it reincorporates,
integrating a new securities regulatory regime into the firm's
existing legal and operational arrangements may be messy. New or
different reporting requirements, for example, may have operational
consequences.2 "4 The fit between the new securities regime and the
firm's existing culture or legal commitments may also be
awkward.20 5 Because of issuers' high switching costs, it would be
'2o Choi and Guzman have suggested that small nations may design regimes that are only
"incrementally different" from larger countries' regimes "in clear and easy to understand
ways." Choi & Guzman, Portable Reciprocity, supra note 15, at 934. This strategy, the
analysis goes, would improve smaller countries' chances of being successful sellers in the
international market for securities law, since it would reduce issuers' and investors' costs of
learning about the new regime. Id. Choi and Guzman offer the example of a small country
copying the U.S. regime minus insider trading prohibitions. Id.
This approach is not likely to create a comprehensive regime that is only
"incrementally different" from the U.S. regime because the U.S. regime and those of other
major capital markets consist of more than simple rules on paper. These regimes include
expert administrative agencies and complex institutional relationships among government
institutions, self-regulating organizations, and private firms and their professional advisers.
See supra notes 145-66 and accompanying text. Without the ability to duplicate these other
aspects of the regulatory infrastructure, not to mention such intangibles as legal culture, a
small country's knock off will not likely resemble the original very much.
o For example, German accounting rules allow far more leeway for firms to manage their
earnings reports than do U.S. rules. Daimler-Benz felt the sting of U.S. reporting
requirements when it decided to list its shares on the NYSE in 1993. Daimler's shares had
been listed only in Germany before 1993. Reporting under U.S. securities laws and U.S.
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) made transparent Daimler's practice under
the more liberal German accounting rules of smoothing out earnings from year-to-year by
hiding earnings as reserves in the more profitable years and then drawing on those reserves
in less profitable years to boost earnings. The contrasting results of these accounting rules
was made clear in the very first year of Daimler's U.S. listing, when it reported a $354 million
profit under German accounting standards, but a loss of $1 billion under U.S. GAAP. James
D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. SecuritiesMarkets, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200, 1203 (1999).
The permission or prohibition of this sort of flexible earnings management may affect
operational decisions.
'2 For example, post-Enron reform in the United States relies heavily on an expanded
role for independent directors to improve corporate accountability. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.S.
§§ 78f, 78j-1 (2004) (requiring, under Sarbanes-Oxley Act, that all audit committee members
be independent directors); NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.01 (requiring that all
listed companies' boards include majority of independent directors); id. §§ 303A.04-.06
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critical for countries to solve the commitment problem in order to be
competitive in an international market for securities law.
C. ESTABLISHED CAPITAL MARKET COUNTRIES

In an issuer choice world, established capital market countries
would enjoy enormous first-mover advantages in terms of selling
securities law. U.S. securities regulation alone currently applies to
about half the world's stock market capitalization. 6 Adding Japan,
the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Euronext countries,20 7 these
few countries account for and regulate 75% of the world's stock
market capitalization. 0 8 Besides an installed base of issuers and
investors, established markets also enjoy established securities
regulation, mature regulatory agencies, sophisticated exchanges,
and expert securities professionals to advise issuers. It appears that
these nations start with crucial advantages in a global competition
to sell securities law.
However, these first movers may not have sufficient incentive to
compete to offer efficient securities regulation. Their wealth and

(requiring, under Sarbanes-Oxley Act, that each list company have nominating-corporate
governance committee, compensation committee, and audit committee composed entirely of
independent directors). However, as Amir Licht has noted, independent directors may be less
useful in this regard in East Asia because of the cultural norm of conformity. Licht, supra
note 127, at 224.
206 SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 153, at 3.
207 Euronext was formed in 2000 with the merger of the Paris, Brussels, and Amsterdam
exchanges. Euronext, History, at httpJ/www.euronext.comleditorial/wide/0,4615,1732_4427
342,00.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2004). At the beginning of 2002, Euronext also acquired
Portugal's main exchange, the Bolsa de Valores de Lisboa e Porto, as well as the London
International Financial Futures and Options Exchange. Id.
208 At the end of 2002, domestic market capitalization for these major markets were as
follows (in trillions of U.S. dollars):
United States
$11.0
Japan
2.1
United Kingdom
1.8
Euronext
1.5
Germany
.69
TOTAL
$17.09
World market capitalization at the end of 2002 was approximately USD $22.8 trillion. WORLD
FEDERATION OF EXCHANGES (FIBV), MARKET CAPITALIZATION OF SHARES OF DOMESTIC

COMPANIES, tbl. 1.3B (Apr. 25, 2003), http'//www.world-exchanges.orgpublications/TA1302.
pdf [hereinafter FIBV tbl. 1.3B]).

588

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:525

economic diversification mean that, unlike Delaware with its
corporate chartering business, their governments and economies do
not depend on success in the market for securities law. Without this
dependence, these first movers may be unable to demonstrate a
commitment to maintaining desirable regulation. Even if national
regulators might wish to offer popular regulation in order to expand
their regulatory purview, their pursuit of this end may be constrained by legislatures' indifference or even opposition.
1. Regulators' Constraints. In the issuer choice world, vigorous
competition over securities regulation is assumed to be driven by
regulators' pursuit of their own bureaucratic aggrandizement.2 "9
Their drive to maximize the number of firms and the volume of
transactions under their regulatory supervision will spur them to
offer efficient law. Even granting this assumption, however, there
is a step missing. Issuer choice proponents implicitly assume that
nations could agree to radical choice of law reform to enable issuer
choice and that all else would remain the same. In particular,
regulators would continue to dominate securities regulatory policy.
Were this so, regulators' posited pursuit of bureaucratic aggrandizement might be sufficient to achieve some measure of competition.
But all else is not likely to remain the same. Regulators' latitude to
pursue their own agendas is likely to be constricted in this parallel
universe of issuer choice. Legislatures will likely matter.
The first half of this Article explained regulators' dominant role
in setting policy on international securities regulation and their
opposition to choice of law reform allowing issuer choice.210
However, in this Part, I assume-counterfactually and against all
odds-that choice of law coordination could be achieved. But if it
could happen, presumably it would happen only over regulators'
strenuous objection. In this alternative universe, it is unlikely that
regulators would dominate securities regulatory policy in the way
they now do. Given the massive switch in the basic rules of
prescriptive jurisdiction for national securities law, it is far more
likely that legislatures will have gotten involved and made their
influence felt in order to effect this fundamental change. Therefore,

20
210

See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 135-66 and accompanying text.
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the simple assumption of regulators' pursuit of bureaucratic
prestige must be supplemented in order to be able to predict
vigorous competition over securities law. The behavior and
influence of legislatures must be considered. Why would legislatures care to compete or allow agencies to do so? And how would
legislatures demonstrate a credible commitment to staying competitive?
2. Victims of Prosperity. Legislatures in prosperous countries
have no strong revenue incentives to support efforts by regulators
to offer popular securities law under issuer choice. Regulators may
be able to show some strong interest in maximizing subscriptions to
their rules, but their ability to demonstrate commitment is limited.
Any commitment will always be subject to legislative fiat, and the
legislatures will not likely be able to demonstrate a credible
commitment at all. Legislatures lack the specific interest in
bureaucratic aggrandizement that is assumed to drive regulators.
Instead, legislators will have broader interests in mind.
Adopting the revenue maximization goal that purports to explain
Delaware's success suggests that only nations with relatively small
budgets would be in a strong position to demonstrate a convincing
commitment to supply and maintain optimal securities law. Only
those nations that could show significant dependence on subscriber
revenues from their securities law would be able to give issuers
sufficient assurance of their intent to maintain desirable law and to
disavow opportunism.2 1'
While Delaware may be a hostage to its own success, 212 prosperous nations are victims of their own prosperity. Prosperous nations
simply do not have sufficient dependence on their existing and
prospective securities law revenues to offer a credible commitment.

211

This focus on Delaware is not untoward. While Delaware is nominally only one of

many competitors for corporate charters among U.S. states, scholars on all sides of the debate
seem to agree that the market for corporate charters is in reality a series of distinct bilateral
markets in which each state competes with Delaware to retain its home corporations. See
supra note 47. Ninety-seven percent of all public companies are incorporated either in their
home state or in Delaware. Daines, supra note 47, at 1562. So Delaware is the competition.
Moreover, many of the features that help explain Delaware's success in this competition also
apply to New Jersey at the end of the nineteenth century, when it was the dominant exporter
of corporate charters among U.S. states. GRANDY, supra note 115, at 79-80.
212 See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, their existing investments in securities regulation and
related institutions are probably not large enough relative to their
enormous economies to make these institutions credible hostages.
In fiscal year 2002, for example, the SEC collected fees of around $1
billion,213 not a trifling sum but still only 0.05% of the $2 trillion
national budget." 4 Loss of SEC revenues to the U.S. Treasury
would not even cause a ripple in the overall budget. Likewise in the
United Kingdom, the FSA took in £208.8 million in fees in fiscal
year 2002-03.215 This amounted to a mere 0.05% of the roughly £400
billion in U.K. government revenues that fiscal year.2"6
And while the United States can boast of significant specific
investments in its securities laws-an expert agency, case law, rules
and forms, regulatory conventions memorialized in SEC releases
and no-action letters-these specific assets would not seem to be
useful as hostages without the fiscal dependence central to explaining Delaware's success.217
It is very unlikely that lawmakers in prosperous nations would

be willing to sufficiently augment investment in their regulatory
institutions in order to demonstrate commitment to and dependence
on the sale of securities law. With large, strong, and diversified

213 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SEC 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 179.
214 CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2003, United States, httpJ/www.cia.gov/cialdownload2003.

htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2004) [hereinafter WORLD FACTBOOK 2003]. By contrast, over the
thirty-year period from 1960 to 1990, incorporation fees in Delaware on average accounted
for over 15% of the state's total tax revenues. ROMANO, supra note 43, at 6. Today,
Delaware's dependence on incorporation fees is even greater. These fees account for more
than 20% of state revenues. Daines, supra note 47, at 1566 (citing figures from Kahan &
Kamar, supra note 47).
215 2002/03 FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, FSA ANN. REP. 2002/03 115 (2003). These

numbers overstate the significance of U.K. securities regulation as a proportion of overall
government revenues since the FSA regulates all financial services in the United Kingdom,
not only securities markets. The FSA regulates insurance companies, deposit taking
institutions, and investment businesses, and it is also responsible for educating consumers
about financial services. Inside the FSA- What the FSA Is All About, at http://www.fsa.gov.
uk/mediacentre/what-thefsais-al-abut.html (last modified July 28, 2003).
216 H.M. TREASURY, BUDGET REPORT 2003: BUILDING A BRITAIN OF ECONOMIC STRENGTH
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 253 (2003).

217 The extent of hostage regulatory assets in the United Kingdom is less clear given that
the formal FSA regime is relatively new. See Eflis Ferran, Examining the United Kingdom's
Experience in Adopting the Single FinancialRegulator Model, 28 BROOK. J.INTL L. 257, 27376 (2003) (describing FSA's gradual, informal, ad hoc assimilation of other existing regulatory
agencies beginning in 1997).
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economies, it would be futile for those lawmakers to attempt to
demonstrate dependence on regulation-related revenues. In a
related context-proposed national corporate chartering in the
United States-Romano has noted this same problem: "Given the
sheer size of the federal budget, there would be no revenue incentive
to constrain the national government from behaving opportunistically by, for instance, installing high franchise fees without
delivering laws that corporations prefer."21 8
Issuers and investors might readily believe that a regulatory
agency would be responsive to their needs as a matter of the
agency's own survival and its pursuit of bureaucratic aggrandizement.2 1 s But the agency might not be able to convince issuers and
investors that the legislature cares about the agency's survival or its
ability to sell securities law. Given the right corporate scandal,
legislators might easily respond to public pressure to enhance
investor protection, rather than simply acquiesce to regulators'
pursuit of maximum adoptions for bureaucratic aggrandizement.2 2 °
For example, legislatures may mandate higher disclosure or tinker
with corporate governance rules.
In a prosperous nation, legislatures will have credible commitment problems, and regulators will have insufficient influence over
their legislatures to assure efficient securities law. The whole
issuer choice program aims to diminish the power of regulators by
dismantling their territorial monopolies. Having lost the critical
fight to preserve its territorial jurisdiction, such an agency would
seem to have only very weak influence with its legislature.2 21 And
218
219

ROMANO, supra note 43, at 48.
Unlike legislators or other national policymakers, the regulator may not see any direct

financial benefit from maximizing subscriber revenues. Whatever fees are collected will likely
go into the national treasury to be doled out by national legislators without regard to the
wishes of regulators. Certainly this will be true in the United States. Regulators will view
themselves as merely contributing to a common pool of revenues, the ultimate distribution
of which will be out of regulators' control and as to which they are likely to have almost no
say. In these contexts, regulators are much more likely to pursue their own bureaucratic
goals and not national revenue maximization.
220 See infra notes 237-52 and accompanying text.
221 The same goes for the lawyers, accountants, and other interest groups who benefit
from regulatory monopoly, regulatory price discrimination, and increased securities activity
under their domestic regime. Their interests would generally align with regulators' desire
to maximize adoptions of their local system in an issuer choice world. There is some doubt,
however, that these groups, having lost the fight over choice of law, would retain sufficient
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if issuer choice advocates are correct that previously overregulated
issuers would figuratively flee to less restrictive jurisdictions once
given a choice of regulatory regime, the influence and prestige of
former regulatory monopolists would be diminished even further.
3. Private Interests and Political Equilibrium. If revenue
incentives could not drive legislatures in prosperous countries to
pursue and maintain programs for popular securities law or enable
them to demonstrate a credible commitment to such programs,
perhaps private interests could play a remedial role in these
regards. Groups with financial stakes in their national securities
industry might be able to persuade legislators to support regulators
in selling securities regulation. These interests probably stand to
benefit from issuers' adoption of their local regulatory regime on the
theory that issuers adopting a given country's regulation are likely
to issue and list their securities in that jurisdiction as well.222 All
other things equal, a jurisdiction with popular law will likely enjoy
a higher volume of securities activity than one without. And these
private interests benefit from increased volume. 3 The profits at
stake for these groups may be significant. 2" It might be worth their
while, therefore, to lobby legislatures to pursue--or at least to
permit-regulation that would attract local securities activity.
The influence of private interests, however, may not be sufficient
to guarantee regulation that would be consistently responsive to
issuers' desires. Credible commitment problems may therefore
persist. While private interests will generally favor rules that
issuers are likely to want to adopt, the preferences of these various
influence over the legislature to offer a credible commitment to continued responsiveness to
issuers' and investors' needs.
222 Investors in the issuer-selected jurisdiction will be familiar with the regulatory regime
and will likely be receptive to the issuer's securities. Choi & Guzman, PortableReciprocity,
supra note 15, at 923.
"'
See supra notes 167-88 and accompanying text.
'2'
If the U.S. experience is any guide, revenues from advisory and other services could
run into the billions. In 1999, the then-Big 5 accounting firms collectively audited about
three-quarters of all U.S. public registrants. PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD PANEL ON AUDIT
EFFECTIVENESS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 181-82 (Aug. 31, 2000). These accounting
firms collected approximately $9.5 billion that year for accounting and auditing services. Id.
This measure is concededly rough. In addition, it reflects private revenues based on
regulatory monopoly. With competition over law, presumably costs of compliance would
factor into any issuer's choice-of-law decision. One would therefore expect downward
competitive pressure on private revenues.
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interest groups will not be uniform. Stock exchanges, for example,
may be pure volume players-they may care only about the volume
of local securities issuance and trading. Lawyers and accountants,
by contrast, might wish for more complicated rules and requirements within their respective areas of expertise. The optimal level
of regulation for generating legal and accounting fees is likely to be
higher than for simply maximizing volume. More complex regulation would increase expected fee revenues, even if it might drive
some issuers to other jurisdictions with less costly regulation.
Lawyers and accountants would be willing to sacrifice some amount
of local securities activity in pursuit of higher aggregate fees.2 25
The actual contours of regulation would turn on the political
equilibrium among these groups, along with regulators' input. But
this competitive equilibrium would not necessarily be consistent or
stable. Small perturbations in the composition of the legislature or
regulatory body or other important offices may affect the relative
influence of various interest groups and the course of regulation.2 2 6
Even more significant for the instability of any given political
equilibrium is the presence of other interest groups with the
potential to influence regulation in particular issue areas. The
prosperous countries with developed securities markets are liberal
democracies that enjoy diversified economies. This environment
generally spawns a plethora of well-organized, well-financed
interest groups ready to mobilize to address issues of particular
concern. Labor unions, for instance, may have no stake in the
general contours of securities law, but they may mobilize to address
specific concerns. In the United States, following the massive fraudrelated losses sustained by company pension plans from the collapse
225

See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-GroupTheory of

Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 503-04 (1987) (describing divergence of
interests between Delaware bar and other interest groups interested in maximizing state
revenues).
In the United States for example, a switch of the majority party in the Senate or the
House of Representatives results in a change in committee chairs. Committee chairs may be
extremely influential in affecting the course of legislation, and with respect to securities
regulation, Democratic chairs are likely to support increased regulation, while Republican
chairs tend to disfavor it. In addition, the President appoints commissioners to the SEC. 15
U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2000). A new President has significant power to change the direction of the
Commission through this appointment power. Commissioners serve five-year terms, with one
seat on the Commission becoming vacant each year. Id.
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of Enron and others, unions have become visible advocates not only
for reform of pension plan rules but also for corporate governance
reform through federal securities law.22 v The AFL-CIO has
petitioned the SEC to change the proxy rules to allow shareholder
nominees for boards of directors.22 s Unions have been extremely
active with shareholder resolutions, peppering issuers with reform
proposals to be considered by shareholders at issuers' annual
meetings.229 Proposals offer fundamental reform on auditor
independence and director accountability and curbs on executive
pay.2"' In 2002, following Enron's demise, unions were responsible
for 40% of all shareholder proposals,23 ' far more than any other
institutional investor.232 This represented a marked increase from
unions' past activities as shareholder proponents.2 3 Unions have
also been strong backers of newly enacted SEC rules requiring
mutual funds to disclose their proxy voting practices and voting
records.234
Related to this abundance of effective interest groups, the general
public in prosperous countries may also affect the course of securities regulation. While securities law is not a subject widely followed
by the general public, and most people do not stay informed about
227 Union Movement Launches "No More Enrons" Campaign, at http://www.aflcio.org/

corporateamerica/enron/ns02272002.cfn (last visited Oct. 26, 2004) (outlining AFL-CIO's
campaign to reform corporate governance).
m Phyllis Plitch & Lynn Cowan, Investors, Stirred up by Scandals, Rally for Corporate
Democracy, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2003, at 2003 WL-WSJ 3973639; Gary Weiss et al., Revenge
ofthe Investor: Angry ShareholdersAre InvestigatingBrokerageFraud,Waging Proxy Fights,
and Agitating for Securities Reform, Bus. WIJ, Dec. 16, 2002, at 116. Existing SEC rules
allow issuers to exclude shareholder nominees from company proxy materials.
17 C.F.R.§§ 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2002). However, the SEC has been considering a controversial
proposal to allow large shareholders to nominate director candidates under certain
circumstances. Deborah Solomon & Michael Schroeder, Back Offi Businesses Go Toe to Toe
with SEC: Lawyers and Lobbyists Criticize Agency ProposalsAbout Options, Proxies, Hedge
and Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2004, at Cl; Arden Dale, Marsh & McLennan Faces
Criticism: Pension FundsSeek Change on PutnamParent'sBoard,PendingSEC Proxy Rule,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2003, at Dl.
229 Weiss et al., supra note 228, at 116.
m3 Amy Borrus & Paula Dwyer, Getting the Boss to Behave: Big Laborhas Led the Charge
for Corporate-GovernanceReform, Bus. WK, July 15, 2002, at 110.
23' Weiss, supra note 228, at 116.
232

Id.

Borrus & Dwyer, supra note 230, at 110.
Julie Earle, SEC RulingDeals Blow to Mutual Funds;Proxy Voting Records Will Have
to Be Disclosed, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2004, at 15.
23

'4
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it or have strong opinions on it, a momentous scandal or other
cataclysmic event may place securities regulation on the "public
agenda."23 Then securities regulation becomes front-page news.
Citizens may be affected as shareholders or employees. Citizens and
the popular media may agitate for change in the face of the latest
crisis. They may closely monitor the actions of policymakers. In
this context, public pressure may overcome the influence of even
well-organized and well-financed interest groups. Reform in the
direction of popular sentiment may win the day. This reform is
most likely to involve stronger investor protection. It is not likely
to track issuer preferences, efficiency, or a securities volumemaximizing strategy.3 6
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act offers only the most recent example of
regulatory reform driven by the public agenda. Public outrage at
public company management began with accounting scandals, 7 but
has since widened to include high profile insider trading,2 "' exces-

2 See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture,PublicInterest,and
the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 191-92 (1990) (discussing
importance of"public agenda" in reducing political slack, which otherwise enables regulators
to favor private interests).
Those not specially affected by regulatory information do not ordinarily
invest in acquiring it. However, at any given time in any given polity,
there is a small set of issues that has become the object of intense public
attention. These issues are very widely attended to. They are covered in
virtually every issue of every printed news medium, and are reported on
constantly by the broadcast media. These issues pervade the information
atmosphere .... Let us call the set of these issues the "public agenda."
Id.
More generally, to the extent that the desires of the general public regarding securities
law diverge from efficiency-a not unlikely condition-then policymakers in an issuer choice
world would depend on political slack to accomplish their volume-maximizing strategy. See
id. at 192 (explaining slack-reducing effect and consequences of putting issue on public
agenda).
237 See, e.g., John R. Emshwiller et al., Enron Slashes Profits Since 1997 by 20%, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 9, 2001, at A3 (describing Enron accounting fraud); Jared Sandberg & Susan
Pulliam, WorldCom Revision Tops $7 Billion, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2002, at A3 (describing
WorldCom's overstated profits); Report of Investigation by the Special Investigation
Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp., Feb. 1, 2002, http'//news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport (Feb. 1, 2002) (reporting on Enron accounting fraud).
"
See, e.g., Constance L. Hays, Judge Declines to Dismiss 2 Charges in Stewart Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,2003, at C3 (discussing charges against Martha Stewart); SEC Sues Two
Other Waksals in ImClone Case, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2003, at C3 (discussing insider trading
cases involving Waksal & Stewart).
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sive executive compensation,3

9

fraud by brokerage

firms

24 0

and

24

improper trading of mutual funds. ' With its fundamental
corporate governance reforms,24 2 the Act undoubtedly raises
compliance costs for public firms. One estimate suggests the largest
firms will spend an average of $4.7 million in out-of-pocket costs in
the first year of compliance just to implement required internal
Other increased cost estimates range from $1 to 3
controls. 2
million, depending on the size of the firm. 2 " Some U.S. companies

have responded by delisting and going private.24

Foreign issuers

have also been deterred from coming to the United States. Shortly
after passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Porsche AG of Germany
and Benfield Group Ltd., a British insurance concern, abandoned
plans to list their securities in the United States, citing specific
concerns about the Act.2 46 Daiwa Securities and Fuji Photo Film of
Japan also delayed listing their securities in the United States
because of the unsettled regulatory environment.24 7
In the United Kingdom, the current regulatory structure emerged
from scandal-ridden circumstances as well. The FSA was created

9 Richard Grasso was forced to resign as the head of the NYSE after his $187.5 million
retirement package was publicly disclosed. Prominent members of the board of directors soon
followed with their resignations. Laurie P. Cohen et al., NYSE's Reed Scraps Report, Plans
New One: A Top-to-Bottom Examination Is Set of Exchange's Governance; Lead Director
McCall Resigns, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2003, at Cl.
0 Weiss et al., supra note 228, at 116.
, Laura Johannes et al., FraudCharges Widen Scope of ScandalFacingMutual Funds,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2003, at C1.
242 See supra note 152.

Deborah Solomon & Cassell Bryan-Low, CompaniesComplainAbout Cost of CorporateGovernanceRules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2004, at Al.
2' A (Going)PrivateMatter: To Be a Public Company, or Not to Be?, ECONOMIST, Mar.
22, 2003, at 58.
' In 2002, sixty-six U.S. public companies delisted and went private, up from thirty-five
in 1999. Id. Going private takes the company out of the regulatory purview of the Exchange
Act, as well as relieving the company from having to comply with stock exchange listing rules.
See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (2000) (describing Exchange Act registration requirement). Among
other things, periodic reporting obligations and newly-minted federal corporate governance
rules no longer apply.
' Craig Karmin & Kevin J. Delaney, SEC's Exemption Gets Some Praise,WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 13, 2003, at C16. Even the SEC's subsequent exemption of foreign issuers from most of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's corporate governance provisions has not satisfied some foreign
issuers. Id.
24 Craig Karmin, Foreign Firms Lose Urge to Sell Stock in U.S., WALL ST. J., July 24,
2003, at Cl.
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to be the super regulator for all financial services in the United
Kingdom, including not only securities and futures trading, but also
deposit-taking institutions, insurance firms, and investment
businesses.248 The FSA was formed on the heels of several high
profile financial scandals, including Robert Maxwell's multimillion
dollar misappropriation of his company's pension funds and a major
scandal involving the mis-selling of pension investment products.24 9
Both episodes were traced to regulatory failures under a system
largely dependent on self-regulating organizations.250 As under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States, regulated entities under
the relatively new FSA have expressed fears of higher regulatory
costs,251 a fear that even the FSA has acknowledged.252
In prosperous countries with established securities markets,
then, the political equilibrium for securities law is subject to
disruption from several sources. Even the groups that depend on
active securities markets for their livelihood have somewhat
differing stakes in the structure of regulation. They will not always
agree on the straightforward volume-maximizing strategy that
purportedly results in responsive and efficient regulation. Other
interest groups in prosperous countries may also emerge to affect
particular issue areas in ways that may be difficult to predict ex
ante. Even the general public may weigh in on those relatively rare
occasions when securities regulation makes it to the public agenda.
Contrast this with Delaware's political economy. Most of
Delaware's chartering revenues come from large corporations
located out-of-state.253 Because these corporations' headquarters,
operations, assets, and employees are in other states, interest
groups that might otherwise affect the development of corporate law
have no purchase in Delaware. 254

2'

Labor, environmental, and

See supra note 215.

249 Ferran, supra note 217, at 267-68.
250 Id. at 268.
251 DAVID LASCELLES, WAKING UPTO THE FSA How THE CITY VIEWS ITS NEW REGULATOR

17-18 (2001); Ferran, supra note 217, at 287.
2
See Howard Davies, N2 Plus 3, Speech at the Worshipful Company of Chartered

Secretaries& AdministratorsAnnual Lecture, at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/speeches/sp93.
html (Mar. 5, 2002) (acknowledging perception that regulatory costs are rising).
m Macey & Miller, supra note 225, at 490.
2Z4 id.
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community interests focus their energies and influence on the
jurisdictions in which firms operate, and not on the state of
incorporation. 255 And to Delaware's general public, chartering
revenues are an unqualified boon with few if any countervailing
costs.
Without a strong revenue incentive to unite legislators and drive
them to back popular and responsive securities law, prosperous
countries will have difficulty demonstrating a credible commitment
to maintaining efficient and responsive securities regulation. The
existence of multiple domestic interest groups that may affect
securities regulation highlights the inability ofpolicymakers to bond
themselves to offering responsive rules. The same economics that
render a prosperous country unable to demonstrate a commitment
to maintaining optimal securities law also suggest why legislatures
in those countries would be disinclined to pursue regulatory
revenues at all.
D. CAPACITY VS. COMMITMENT: PROBLEMS FOR SMALLER NATIONS

If the foregoing observations are correct, then smaller, economically less diversified nations would seem in some respects best
positioned to be able to compete in an issuer choice world. Their
economic conditions would seem to give them strong incentives to
pursue regulatory revenues. These conditions would also enable
them to show dependence on regulatory revenues and to convince
issuers of their commitment to a program of efficient and responsive
regulation.
On the other hand, the very smallest nations may have no ability
to offer any credible regulatory infrastructure. If existing securities
laws in the dominant international capital markets-the United
States and United Kingdom-are even close to optimal,2 56 small
countries without many alternative sources of revenue may be

Id.
' See John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and
Stock Market Competitionon InternationalCorporateGovernance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757,
1767 (2002) (asserting that foreign issuers cross-list on U.S. exchanges in order to bond
themselves to higher U.S. disclosure standards and stricter enforcement, thereby improving
market valuation).
2M
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severely disadvantaged. They may not be able or willing to offer the
sophisticated regulation that predominates in international markets
and is familiar to the world's international investors.2 5 7 Especially
for those countries without existing securities markets, developing
the requisite legal and administrative capacity from scratch and
maintaining and financing it may be too risky and daunting a
project.258
Perhaps nations with relatively small government budgets and
relatively large stock markets would be our best bet. Small budgets
enable credible commitment. Large stock markets suggest the
existence of important regulatory infrastructure, which makes the
government's active pursuit of regulatory revenues less risky.25 9

" See Jackson & Pan, supra note 125, at 686-87 (describing market-driven demand for
high disclosure in pan-European offerings).
Romano, supra note 1, at 518; Howell E. Jackson, The Selective Incorporation of
Foreign Legal Systems to Promote Nepal as an International Financial Services Center (Sept.
25, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?
abstract-id= 146600).
Suppose, on the other hand, that U.S.-U.K. style regulation is not optimal for many
issuers, but that a much less elaborate approach is. Some issuers might desire the relatively
simple, nonintrusive rules and procedures that such countries may be capable of supplying.
This approach might not require the intricate and expensive regulatory apparatus relied upon
in the dominant capital markets. Romano has argued that even though smaller states may
not be able to capture scale economies in terms of government enforcement efforts, they could
still rely on private enforcement, much the same way the SEC relies on private enforcement
to supplement its own regulatory efforts. Romano, supra note 1, at 518. "A need for a
minimum state size for enforcement purposes is therefore not likely to create a substantial
barrier to the effectiveness of regulatory competition in the securities law context." Id.
Even assuming simple rules without ex ante regulation were desirable for some
issuers, a nation intending to compete in an international market for securities law would
still need a dependable court system and capable lawyers and other securities professionals.
Bernard S. Black, The Legal and InstitutionalPreconditionsfor Strong Securities Markets,
48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 816 (2001). Some legal infrastructure and legal, financial, and
accounting expertise would still be required. A small country without a stock market is
unlikely to possess these features, and creating these institutional preconditions would not
be simple or quick. Even relying on private arbitration as the primary enforcement device
would require participation of skilled lawyers and the possible coercive sanction of a court.
It is perhaps possible that this coercive sanction could be provided via the issuer's submission
to the adjudicative jurisdiction of some other nation with a strong court system. However,
relying on another nation's enforcement apparatus might impair the prescribing nation's
ability to control the contours of its securities law product. Incentive problems may also
plague the performance of any rented courts. See infra notes 318-24 and accompanying text.
Finally, even if simple rules with private enforcement were attractive to some issuers
and investors, that sort of regulation might easily be duplicated among competitors, so that
nations might have some difficulty profiting in that market segment.
" Some absolute minimum stock-market size is probably necessary to assure sufficient
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Below, I first discuss the difficulties that smaller nations would face
in trying to develop regulatory infrastructure. I then consider
whether countries exist that may offer the right combination of
characteristics to suggest their likely success in the global market
for securities regulation. Finally, I note that even if such nations
exist, they may have trouble overcoming the strategic behavior of
their more established rivals.
1. Regulatory InfrastructureInvestments. A viable regulatory
product would likely include some nontrivial level of ex ante
regulatory oversight. This would require a professional bureaucracy
with some amount of administrative capacity, as well as courts and
private advisers."' For example, U.S. securities regulation relies on
a whole host of public institutions and private organizations-the
SEC, the Department of Justice, stock exchanges, lawyers, accountants, underwriters, analysts, brokers and dealers-to make and
enforce rules and to advise issuers and investors. Other established
capital markets as well rely on professional regulators, sophisticated
stock exchanges, and expert private advisers to make their systems
work.2 6 ' To be internationally competitive, a small nation would
have to be willing to invest in the development and ongoing
refinement of its regulatory system.
How many small states will divert resources to pursuing
uncertain payoffs in a competitive market for securities regulation?
Their very lack of diversification, which would theoretically enable
their credible commitment to maintaining optimal securities law,
would seem to make the proposed investment in regulatory
competition especially risky. Less prosperous countries, especially
those without existing securities markets, may be unable or
unwilling to make hostage investments with uncertain financial and
political payoffs.
Moreover, even if such a strategy made sense for a nation as a
whole, collective action and free-riding problems would hinder
individual lawmakers who might be interested in pursuing regula-

economies of scale to enable the jurisdiction to support the necessary institutional
arrangements for competitive regulation.
See supra notes 208-17 and accompanying text.
28' See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text (describing U.K. system).
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tory revenues.262 Even if lawmakers believed that the pursuit of
such revenues would be fruitful for their nation and that specific
investments were justified, each individual lawmaker would be
dissuaded from initiating such a program because of her inability to
capture all the gains from the endeavor. Assuming that revenues
would accrue to the state treasury without any special earmarking,
lawmakers as a group might benefit from the larger budget, but it
is unlikely that those responsible for initiating the program could
exclude others from this general benefit. Unless individual
lawmakers foresaw particular gains to themselves from pursuing a
program of devising and selling securities regulation, none would
initiate or participate in such a project,2 63 especially if alternative
avenues exist for advancing their own individual political
interests. 4
Even in Delaware, while the chancery court may serve a hostage
function today, it was not intentionally created to serve that
function. 2 ' To the extent it does, this is a matter of historical
accident. Apparently, no other U.S. state has been able to replicate
this hostage strategy, which may suggest that political or economic
obstacles exist that prevent governments from intentionally
undertaking such hostage investments. 2 " Delaware may be
especially suited to overcoming legislative collective action and free
rider problems; its legislature is among the smallest in the United
States.2 6 ' Each legislator is therefore likely to be able to anticipate

' The extent of these problems depends of course on the form of government involved.
More authoritarian regimes would not encounter these problems that are familiar to
democratic systems.
263 On legislators' weak incentives to innovate, see Ian Ayres, JudgingClose Corporations
in the Age of Statutes, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 365, 373 (1992); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking
and Reelection: Does FederalismPromote Innovation?,9 J. LEG. STUD. 593, 598-99 (1980).
264 Cf Donald C. Langevoort, DeconstructingSection 11: Public Offering Liability in a
Continuous DisclosureEnvironment, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 50 (2000) (questioning
whether individual states would have sufficient incentive to invest in startup system of
securities regulation and enforcement).
265 See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in
Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1995) (describing history of chancery
court as court of equity).
266 Kahan & Kamar, supra note 47, at 733-34.
26 Larry Ribstein, Delaware,Lawyers, and ContractualChoice of Law, 19 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 999, 1009 (1994). Delaware's bicameral general assembly consists of forty-one representatives and twenty-one senators. 143d Delaware General Assembly, at httpJ/www.legis.state.
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and garner individual benefit from the enhanced revenues and
larger state budget from successful sales of Delaware corporate
law.2 8' Individual legislators can also more easily monitor each
other's efforts than in larger bodies. Free riding is therefore likely
to be less of a problem than in a larger body.269
By contrast, in order to compete internationally over securities
law, lawmakers in small countries would have to overcome incentive
and commitment problems, as well as the collective action costs
across the legislative and regulatory process. In addition, the public
and private institutions required for internationally competitive
securities law are far more elaborate and specialized than those
necessary for corporate law in the United States, making investments in securities law all the more risky.
Having highlighted the difficulty for smaller nations of actively
engaging in regulatory competition over securities law, I now
consider in detail the promise of certain plausible competitors-nations with small government budgets and respectable stock
markets" ° For a given country, a critical mass of domestic issuers

de.us/Legislature.nsfYOpendatabase (last visited Nov. 11, 2004).
2'

See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE

THEORY OF GROUPS 53-57 (1965) (discussing relation between group size and ability to
accomplish collective action).
2
One might instead view lawyers as the primary interest group motivating changes in
corporate law, as opposed to legislators themselves. Macey & Miller, supra note 225, at 473;
Ribstein, supra note 267, at 1009. In that case, a small legislature may be less responsive
than a large one. With a large legislature, competition among legislators may lower the price
of influence for interest groups, making it cheaper to obtain changes in the law. While
transaction costs of obtaining the required majority to pass legislation may also rise as the
size of the legislature increases, the downward price pressure from competition may
dominate. William F. Shughart II & Robert D. Tollison, Corporate Chartering: An
Explorationin the Economics of Legal Change, 23 ECON. INQ. 585, 592, 595 (1985).
The lawyer-centered view is problematic, however. It does not explain the existing
revenue benefits to the state's coffers. If lawyers' maximand is the amount of legal work
generated by firms' adoption of Delaware corporate law, lawyers would presumably rather
the state give away charters for free. But as discussed, Delaware garners a nontrivial share
of its state budget in the form of charter fees. See supra note 253.
270 TABLE 1 contains relevant data for all forty-seven nations represented by stock
exchanges in the World Federation of Exchanges (FIBV), which forms the basis for this
sample. See TABLE 1,infra p. 607. FIBV exchanges comprise over 97% of world stock market
capitalization, and membership requirements suggest that these are the world's more
sophisticated exchanges. See World Federation of Exchanges, Members, httpJ/www.worldexchanges.org/WFE/home.asp?action=document&menu=2&nav=ie (last visited Nov. 11, 2004)
(stating membership requirements for FIBV).
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may matter most, since only those issuers are likely to be regulated
primarily by their home country laws. Most export industries in
sophisticated products begin as domestic industries; producers
emerge to service the local market first and then expand into foreign
markets. A strong domestic demand for securities law may be a
necessary precondition for a nation to go global with its regulatory
product. Countries without existing local demand would likely have
difficulty initiating a program for internationally competitive
securities law.
When these criteria are applied to the various nations, not many
show promise to be serious competitors. Under plausible assumptions concerning the size of the global market for securities law, only
for countries with very small budgets would prospective regulatory
revenues be sufficient to enable those countries to demonstrate
dependence on and a credible commitment to the pursuit of such
revenues. But these countries may still lack appropriate infrastructure.
2. Credible Commitment and World Market Share. Even outside
of the established capital market countries, nations may still have
difficulty demonstrating a credible international commitment to
maintaining efficient securities law. The size of the international
market for securities regulation may simply be too small for many
nations to show fiscal dependence on prospective regulatory
revenues. Relative to the size of national budgets, the revenues
available from selling securities law may simply be insignificant.
Some back-of-the-envelope calculations will illustrate. From
1998 to 2002, the SEC garnered, on average, about $1.8 billion in
fees.2 7 ' That number can be extrapolated to get a ballpark estimate
for the size of the world market for securities law. Given that the
United States accounts for nearly half the world's market capitalization,27 2 doubling the SEC's regulatory revenues gives a rough
estimate for the size of the world market of $3.6 billion per year.27 3
Of course, this estimate is quite rough, and one might quarrel with

21 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, supra note 213.
212 ScOtr & WELLONS, supra note 153, at 3.
27' Subsequent figures and comparisons are given in U.S. dollars (USD).
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the precision of this extrapolation on several fronts." 4 Despite its
crudeness, however, this estimate will suffice for present purposes.
If anything, this estimate is likely to be high. As the biggest and
most influential regulatory monopolist, the SEC's market power
presumably extends to its fee structure as well. Competition would
likely erode this market power and lower fees worldwide." 5
One way of thinking about a nation's prospects for success in the
market is to consider the revenues it might hope to garner from
selling securities law. Consider, in particular, prospective revenues
relative to (a) the nation's public budget and (b) the size of the world
market for securities law. A given nation's hoped-for revenue
stream would have to be large enough to be worth pursuing. That
is, the project would have to be worth the nation's while. And like
the issue of credible commitment, this will depend on the project's
prospective value relative to the nation's public budget. Higher
revenues relative to national budget are better, of course, both in
terms of giving a nation sufficient incentive to undertake the project
and in terms of improving the nation's ability to demonstrate fiscal
dependence. But the higher are the hoped-for revenues, the larger
is the world market share that a nation would have to achieve. How
big a world market share could a smaller nation expect to garner in
the short term, especially given that any global issuer choice regime
would start with established capital market countries dominating
the market for securities law?
When we look at the budgets of nations with stock markets and
compare their existing government revenues with their potential
revenues from entering the global market for securities law, one
aspect of the numbers that stands out is that USD $3.6 billion is not
a very large pie. Even a very small nation would have to hope to
garner a fairly large market share in order both to make entry
worth the nation's while and to show dependence sufficient to
demonstrate a credible commitment. The small size of the market
cuts out all but the smallest nations. Even nations like New
274 This extrapolation assumes a linear relationship between market capitalization and

regulatory revenues. It assumes that revenues garnered by the SEC are representative of
the behavior of issuers and national regulators worldwide.
275 In any event, the estimate is likely to be within an order of magnitude of the right
number. Even doubling the estimate does not much change the ensuing analysis.
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Zealand, Singapore, and Hong Kong have government budgets that
dwarf the world market for securities law.27 6 Tiny Singapore, an
island nation with 4.6 million inhabitants and aspirations to be an
international financial center, has annual government revenues
approaching USD $28 billion.27 7 Even if Singapore captured halfthe
world market, the assumed revenue stream of USD $1.8 billion
would amount to only 6.5% of Singapore's annual government
revenues, a percentage that is probably too small to demonstrate
fiscal dependence and a credible commitment.2 78
Assume that regulatory revenues would have to comprise 10% of
a nation's public revenues in order for that nation to be able to
demonstrate a credible commitment to responsive securities law.
FIGURE 1279 shows the world market share that various nations
would have to hope for in order to achieve regulatory revenues that
would meet this 10% threshold. 2 0 The most conspicuous feature of
the chart is the few countries represented. Only the seventeen
nations indicated have annual government revenues small enough
that something less than 100% of the world market could comprise
28
at least 10% of their national revenues! '

276 See TABLE 1, supra p. 607.
277 THE WoRLD FACTBOOK 2003,

supra note 214, Singapore.
Remember by comparison that Delaware's charter revenues account for over 20% of
its state budget, and historically the figure has averaged over 15%. See supra note 214.
279 See FIGURE 1, infra p. 606.
m This 10% threshold is fairly conservative given the Delaware comparison.
281 APPENDIX 1 contains a similar chart illustrating nations' world market share
requirement at a 5% national revenue threshold. In general, the required world market
share (RWMS) depends on the size of each country's national revenues (NATREV) and the
target percentage of national revenues deemed sufficient to demonstrate credible commitment
(COMPCT). More particularly:
RWMS = (COMPCT * NATREV)/3.6,
where NATREV is denominated in billions of USD.
278
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FIGURE 1: Required World Market Share for 10% Fiscal Dependence
2000 Data
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A look at the countries represented in FIGURE 1 shows further
cause for pessimism that many nations could demonstrate a credible
commitment for international securities law. At one end of the
spectrum, South Africa would need to be confident of garnering
almost 89% of the world market in order to meet the 10% national
revenue threshold. Such high confidence would be both unlikely and
foolhardy. TABLE 1282 shows just how insignificant is the world
market for securities law relative to national revenues. For the
overwhelming majority of countries, the world market would have
to be many times larger in order to attract their serious attention

m8 TABLE 1, infra p. 607.
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and to enable them to demonstrate fiscal dependence on regulatory
revenues.
TABLE 1

National Revenues, National Market Capitalization, and Required

World Market Share for 10% Fiscal Dependence
COUNTRY

000,000,00 of U.S. $
NATIONAL
NATIONALa
MARKET
REVENUES
CAPITALIZATION b

SHARE OF WORLD
MARKET FOR
SECURITIES LAW
FOR 10% FISCAL
DEPENDENCE
1.7%

Bermuda
Malta
Sri Lanka

0.6
1.5
3.0

2.2
4.0
1.1

Luxembourg
Slovenia
Peru
Philippines

4.4
8.1
8.9
10.2

34.0
3.1
9.7
25.3

12.3%
22.5%
24.8%
28.3%

Hungary

13.0

10.3

36.1%

Chile
Malaysia
New Zealand
Thailand
China, Hong Kong
Ireland
Indonesia
Singapore
South Africa
Finland
Israel
Taiwan
Argentina
India
Portugal
Poland
Greece
Turkey
Austria
Iran
Denmark
Switzerland
Norway
Australia
Brazil

16.0
16.4
16.7
21.0
22.9
25.7
26.0
27.9
32.0
36.1
40.0
42.7
44.0
44.3
48.6
51.6
53.9
54.5
56.3
60.0
61.1
71.6
71.7
86.8
100.6

60.4
113.2
18.2
29.2
623.4
81.9
26.8
155.1
131.3
293.6
65.3
247.6
45.8

44.4%
45.6%
46.4%
58.3%
63.6%
71.4%
72.2%
77.5%
88.9%
100.3%
111.1%
118.7%
122.2%
123.1%
135.0%
143.4%
149.6%
151.4%
156.4%
166.8%
169.6%
198.9%
199.2%
241.1%
279.4%

-

60.7
31.4
107.5
69.7
29.9
5.9
111.8
792.3
65.8
372.8
226.2

4.2%
8.3%

608
Spain
Belgium
Korea
Mexico
Sweden
Netherlands
China, Mainland
Canada
France
Japan
Italy
United Kingdom
Germany
United States**

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
105.0
113.4
118.1
125.0
133.0
158.0
161.8
178.6
210.0
463.0
488.0
555.2
586.5
2,109.7

504.2
182.5
148.4
125.2
328.3
640.5
770.1
1,446.6
3,193.9
768.4
2,612.2
1,270.2
15,214.6

[Vol. 39:525
291.7%
315.1%
328.1%
347.2%
369.4%
438.9%
449.4%
496.1%
583.3%
1286.1%
1355.6%
1542.2%
1629.1%
5860.3%

Year 2000 data except for Taiwan (2001).
** U.S. market capitalization includes Amex, Chicago, Nasdaq, and NYSE.
a Source: CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK; IMF International Financial Statistics
Yearbook.
b Source: World Federation of Exchanges.

At the other end of the spectrum, FIGURE 1 shows that for the
smallest countries like Bermuda, Malta, and Sri Lanka, only a
modest world market share would be needed to induce their interest
in competing and to enable them to demonstrate credible commitment. However, these countries may be too small to provide a
securities regulatory infrastructure that would appeal to international investors.
3. Size Does Matter. Size may matter along several fronts. Small
annual revenues mean few resources to devote to securities
regulation and regulatory infrastructure. A small stock market-in
terms of number and market value of domestic issuers-likely
means an informal, undeveloped, unsophisticated regulatory
system.2 8 3 Several countries are considered below along these
dimensions.
Bermuda is the country in the sample with the smallest government revenues, USD $610 million in 2000.284 Capturing even a

' As earlier noted, domestic issuers may matter most in this regard because, as with
most sophisticated products, successful exports are typically preceded by successful domestic
production and consumption.
TmE WoRLD FACTBOOK 2003, supra note 214, Bermuda.
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small share of the world market would mean a great deal to
Bermuda's budget. So in an issuer-choice world, Bermuda might
have incentive to embark on a program of active competition for
issuers. Demonstrating fiscal dependence on regulatory revenues
and a credible commitment to such a regulatory program would also
be feasible. Moreover, Bermuda enjoys some reputation as a safe
haven for certain types of financial activity driven by U.S. and other
overseas companies. For example, it is the third largest insurance
and reinsurance market in the world after New York and London." 5
Perhaps Bermuda is endowed with the right combination of
smallness and financial sophistication to be able to sell securities
law globally?
Unfortunately, with respect to securities law, Bermuda suffers
deficiencies typical of small countries. Its government budget is
simply too small to enable it to devote resources to providing
sophisticated world-class regulation. The Bermuda Monetary
Authority (BMA) is charged with supervising the Bermuda Stock
Exchange (BSX).286 In 2000, the BMA's total operating expenses
were just under USD $5 million.28 7 And supervision of the BSX is
only one of BMA's multiple and varied tasks. It regulates all
financial institutions in Bermuda, including not just the stock
exchange, but banks, deposit companies, trust companies, investment companies, and collective investment schemes.28 8 The BMA
also manages Bermuda's exchange controls and regulates foreign
currency transactions.28 9 It issues and redeems notes and coins.29 °
Needless to say, current resources devoted to regulation of the
securities market in Bermuda are not great. The demand for
sophisticated regulation is also not great. Bermuda's stock market
Shawn Wells, Offshore InsuranceProducts,SF36 ALI-ABA 577,579-80 (Oct. 19,2000).
286 2000 BERM. MONETARY AUTHORITY, REP. AND AccTs. 47 (2001), available at http:l/
www.bma.bm/bmawww.nsf/WebPages/Notices?OpenDocument.
287 Id. at 62. In 2003, the latest year for which data is available. BMA's operating
expenses were just under USD $10 million. 2003 BERM MONETARY AUTHORITY, REP. AND
ACCTS. 61 (2004). By comparison, operating expenses for Hong Kong's Securities and Futures
Commission were roughly USD $47.7 million in 2003, and its focus is squarely on securities
market regulation. 2002-2003 SEC. AND FUTURES COMMISSION ANN. REP. 79.
288 BERM. MONETARY AUTHORITY, Role of the BMA, at http://www.bma.bm/bmawww.nsf/
WebPages/Role?OpenDocument/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2004).
'8

289 Id.
2N Id.
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is minuscule in terms of its domestic issuers. In 2000, domestic
issuers listed on the BSX numbered only twenty-two, with an
aggregate market value of only USD $2.2 billion.29 '
Malta, the next smallest country on our list, 29 2 offers a similar
story. An island nation of 400,000 people,2 9 3 Malta's government
revenues for 2000 totaled USD $1.5 billion.2 9 4 In 2000, the Malta
Stock Exchange listed fourteen domestic issuers valued at USD $4
billion. 29 5 The entire operating expenses for the exchange in 2000,
which included its costs of self-regulation, totaled less than 750,000
Maltese lira, or about USD $2 million.29 This small operating
budget seems appropriate for such a small exchange. At the same
time, though, it is difficult to imagine this tiny operation serving as
the foundation for world class securities regulation.
As we move through the list to countries with larger government
revenues, TABLE 1 shows that they generally also have larger stock
markets. The latter makes them more viable as potential international suppliers of securities regulation, though their larger budgets
also make them less likely to be able to show credible commitment
and less motivated to pursue regulatory revenues in the first place.

Singapore's domestic market capitalization in 2000, by contrast, was over USD $155
billion. FIBV tbl. 1.1, 1.3B, supra note 208. The aggregate USD volume of trading on the
BSX appears quite high. It typically exceeds the volume oftrading on the national exchanges
in Sweden or Australia, for example. In 2002, total trading volume on the BSX was almost
291

USD $414 billion. WORLD FEDERATION OF EXCHANGES (FIBV), TOTAL VALUE OF SHARE

TRADING, thl. 1.4B (Apr. 25, 2003), http://www.world-exchanges.org/publications/TA1402.pdf
[hereinafter FIBV tbl. 1.4B]. For the same period, trading volume on the Stockholm Stock
Exchange was roughly USD $280 billion, and for the Australian Stock Exchange, trading
volume was approximately USD $295 billion. Id. However, the high BSX volume is
deceptive, consisting almost exclusively of trading in the shares of a relative handful of
foreign companies cross-listed in Bermuda. In 2002, trading volume in domestic companies,
of which there were twenty-two, amounted to less than two-tenths of 1%of total BSX trading.
WORLD FEDERATION OF EXCHANGES (FIBV), NUMBER OF COMPANIES WITH SHARES LISTED, tbl.
1.1 (Apr. 25, 2003), http://www.world-exchanges.org/publicationsfA102.pdf [hereinafter
FIBV tbl. 1.1]. BSX foreign company listings totaled thirty-two that same year. Id.
TABLE 1, supra p. 607.
293 WORLD FACTBOOK 2003, supra note 214, Malta.
294 Id.
292

295 FIBV tbl. 1.1, supra note 291; FIBV tbl. 1.3B, supra note 208.
2
Before October 2002, the Malta Stock Exchange was self-regulating. 2002 MALTA
STOCK EXCHANGE, ANN. REP. 11 (2003), available at http://www.borzamalta.com.mt/
annualreports/ar2002.pdf. The Financial Markets Act, which took effect on October 1, 2002,
placed most of the regulatory authority over the stock exchange in the hands of the Malta
Financial Services Authority (MFSA). Id.
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Luxembourg may offer an optimal combination of small budget and
healthy stock market. The Luxembourg Exchange had fifty-four
listed domestic issuers in 2000, with a combined market value of
USD $34 billion, significantly higher than Malta or Bermuda. 9 7 In
298
addition, Luxembourg's government revenues of USD $4.4 billion
are small enough that it would only need a 12.3% world market
share in order to have its regulatory revenues equal 10% of overall
revenues. 29 9 Data on the operating budget for its securities
regulatory authority would be useful in refining this assessment,
but unfortunately, consistent with Luxembourg's fabled reputation
for financial secrecy, annual reports for Luxembourg's financial
authority, la Commission du Surveillance du Secteur Financier
(CSSF), include no budget data, and none were readily available
otherwise. °°
As we move through TABLE 1,301 no other country seems to show
much promise. National revenues get much larger very quickly,30 2
so that hopeful competitors would have to be quite confident of
garnering a fairly large world market share in short order. 0 3
Ultimately, there may be few if any nations with the right characteristics to be successful long-term competitors. The global market
for securities regulation may be so small that only the smallest
nations could demonstrate dependence on regulatory revenues. But
not many of these nations appear willing and able to invest in
world-class regulatory infrastructure. FIGURE 2304 illustrates this
dearth of competitors. It locates countries based on their 2000
297 FIBV tbl. 1.1, supra note 291; FIBV tbl. 1.3B, supra note 208. The Luxembourg
Exchange also listed 216 foreign issuers in 2000, but the total value of foreign shares traded
in 2000 was very small, less than 1% of the value of domestic shares traded. FIBV tbl. 1.4,
supra note 291; FIBV tbl. 1.4B, supra note 291.
9 See TABLE 1, supra p. 607.
29

Id.

300 See, e.g., COMMISSION DE SURVEILLANCE DU SECTEUR FINANCIER, 2003 ANNUALREPORT,

at http://www.cssf.lu/fr/publications/presentation-docs.html?theme-num=20&cat-num=7
(omitting budget data).
301 TABLE 1, supra p. 607.
02 Consider the Philippines, for example, no financial powerhouse. Only three spots
higher on the list than Luxembourg in terms of national revenue, the Philippines' national
revenues more than double those of Luxembourg. TABLE 1, supra p. 607.
" This is so even assuming a larger world market and that a smaller percentage fiscal
dependence would be sufficient to demonstrate commitment. See infra APPENDIX I.
304 FIGURE 2, infra p. 612.
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government revenues 3°5 and the USD value of their domestic stock
markets,3 1 taking the ten FIBV nations with the smallest government revenues. The most promising candidates, those with small
revenues and large stock markets, appear toward the upper lefthand quadrant of the space. Notice the dearth of countries.
Luxembourg seems the most promising. Consider as well the
possibility that some absolute minimum size of domestic stock
market may be required in order to assure sufficient economies of
scale to enable the jurisdiction to support the necessary institutional
arrangements for competitive regulation. Even drawing that line at
USD $15 billion in market capitalization eliminates most of our
candidates.
FIGURE

2: National Revenues v. National Market Cap
(Ten Smallest FIBV Natioans--2000 Data)

120.0Malaysia
113.2)
. (16.4,

w 10~0.0 ---------------

o 80 0

-- - - - - - -

6 0.0

.

- -----

---

- - ---

...

- --- --

. . . . .. ..

.. ..
. .. .. ..-. -.----.. .. ..--........
--.
-------------.-.
------.
4 0 .0 -.
Luxemburg

a*

Chile
(6.0. 60.4)

--------.
.... ....s o 6 .4

:

(4.4,34.0)

Philppines
(10.2.
25.3):

Z

.. .......... . .. ...... ... .. .. ..... . ..
.. ... . ..-

20.0 -- -Malt
emda
0.6,.22)

0.0
0.0

2.0

,
4.0

......

... .. .. •

a
Sri Lan2)Savenia
(3.0,1.1)

(8.1;3.1)

6.0

8.0

Per
(8.9,9.7)

:1.

10.0

12.0

National Revenue (billions of US $)

386

--- -

- --- ---- -

- ..

...........
--------------

-

- ----

-------------

-

........

.....

See TABLE 1, supra p. 607.

FIBV tbl. 1.3B, supra note 208.

.... ...

.

Hungary

14.0

16.0

18.0

613

LOST IN TRANSLATION

2005]

FIGURE 3 takes the next ten smallest nations by government
revenues. 30 7 Notice that national revenues and national market cap
are significantly larger for these ten nations than for the smallest
ten reflected in FIGURE 2.308 Only if one believes either that the size
of the world market is much larger than USD $3.6 billion or that
some percentage much smaller than 10% of total government
revenues is sufficient to demonstrate a credible commitment, or
both, may these larger nations be viable candidates.

FIGURE 3: National Revenues v. National Market Cap
(llth-20th Smallest FIBV Nations-.2000 Data)
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4. Rivals' StrategicBehavior. Even assuming some among these
smaller nations would have both sufficient capacity and sufficient
incentives to compete in an issuer choice world, they would still
have to be able to make money doing it. These smaller nations
would have to be able to charge issuers enough to make a profit.
307 FIGURE 3, infra p. 613.
3' FIGURE 2, supra p. 612.
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The fact that Delaware can do this with corporate law in the United
States tells us nothing about the viability of the analogous strategy
in international competition over securities regulation. Delaware
was lucky when New Jersey voluntarily bowed out of its
frontrunning position in the chartermongering game in 1913.309 At
the time, Delaware was already poised to take over New Jersey's
first-mover advantage. Delaware had adopted New Jersey's general
incorporation statute essentially verbatim in 1899.310 The next year,
a Delaware court declared that the legislature must have intended
that its courts follow New Jersey precedents in interpreting the
statute. 1
No similar first-mover advantage would accrue to upstart nations
in a global market for securities law. Regulators in established
capital markets like the United States and United Kingdom might
deter entry or additional investment by competitors through a
variety of pricing strategies.3 1 2 Without changing the content of any
substantive rules, established capital market regulators might
simply offer their securities laws for free. Given that the SEC, for
example, has no direct economic stake in any government revenues
generated by securities filing fees, fines, and the like,3 13 and given
that the cost to the U.S. government as a whole of offering securities
law is negligible, 31 4 revenue generation may not be a priority. In
addition, the same powerful interests that currently benefit from
U.S. regulatory monopoly might, in an issuer choice world, oppose
any attempts to exact high fees from issuers, since that might
dissuade issuers from retaining U.S. rules that benefit existing
interests. In effect, the United States and other important capital

309 See GRANDY, supranote 97, at 80-82 (describing Governor Wilson's lame duck advocacy
of Seven Sisters legislation effectively removing New Jersey from charter competition game).
310 Id. at 80.
311. Wilmington City Ry. v. People's Ry., 47 A. 245, 254 (Del. Ch. 1900).
31'
Though regulators in established capital markets may have difficulty demonstrating
a credible commitment to efficient and responsive securities regulation, see supra notes 20655 and accompanying text, they may still be able to frustrate the efforts of upstart
competitors.
313

See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 202.3A (2002) (directing electronic filers to remit fees to U.S.

Treasury lockbox depository).
314 See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SEC 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 180 (showing
appropriations ranging from approximately $320 million in FY 1998 to $515 million in FY
2002).

2005]

LOST IN TRANSLATION

615

markets might be willing to give away their securities regulation for
free in order to help cross-sell other products, like legal, underwriting, and accounting services, in order to benefit important constituents.3 15 Regulators' revenue incentives are likely to be weak. They
may instead prefer to maximize their market share, which both
augments their bureaucratic heft and benefits important constituents who may provide political support.
Or established capital markets might make only marginal
changes in their substantive rules to discourage upstarts. Like the
lead yacht in a regatta,3 1 major capital markets may simply do
enough to stay in the lead and drive out competitors. Upstart
competitors would have to offer securities law sufficiently superior
to those of established capital market countries that issuers would
not only be willing to switch securities law but would be willing to
pay out-of-pocket for it as well. The margin of superiority would
have to be large enough to both (a) allow the upstart to charge a
high enough fee to issuers to make the project profitable in the long
run,31 7 and (b) leave adopting issuers with a net benefit after having

"' Cf Macey & Miller, supra note 225, at 494 (identifying Delaware corporate bar as
important interest group, which legislature favors with legal rules that increase lawyers' fee
revenues).
"' Using a yachting metaphor, Ian Ayres illustrates the possibility of supply side
inefficiencies in the context of U.S. charter competition, which may likely also apply to
international competition over securities regulation. In the game between the lead yacht and
a trailing yacht, even if the lead yacht takes an efficient tack, a trailing yacht may not.
Instead, figuring that it cannot catch the lead yacht simply by mimicking its tack, the trailing
yacht may choose another direction in the hope of gaining on the leader if the wind shifts.
In response, the lead yacht may "cover"-mimic the trailing yacht's tack. This might not be
the most efficient course, but it may best protect the leading yacht's lead. If the wind shifts,
both yachts would be similarly affected. Ian Ayres, Supply Side Inefficiencies and Competitive
Federalism, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION 239, 246

(William Bratton et al. eds., 1996).
Delaware may behave this way with regard to corporate law innovations, and there is
some historical evidence of this approach. In international securities regulatory competition
as well, a leading jurisdiction in the competition may have insufficient incentive to innovate
efficiently. Switching costs may be high, so that a leader will be able to maintain its lead
merely by covering other countries' innovations. This cover strategy, in turn, may discourage
trailing jurisdictions from innovating in the first place.
"' In the short run, a country might be willing to pursue market-share pricing-that is,
pricing with a goal of capturing market share. However, to the extent this strategy requires
pricing below marginal cost, the small and relatively poor nation that is assumed to be the
most likely competitor in terms of incentives is unlikely to have sufficient resources to sustain
such pricing for long. Moreover, the prospect of having to undertake such a costly and risky
strategy would likely deter a nation from pursuing the investment in the first place.
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paid such a fee. These conditions suggest that regulators in
established capital market countries might easily frustrate upstarts
through strategic modification of their laws and fee structures.
Given the potential new investment costs facing an upstart,
which are likely to be substantial, and the possibility that the
dominant nations might respond to competition with competitive
adjustments to their own regulations, upstarts would seem to face
fairly daunting prospects.
VI. ENFORCEMENT
In addition to the dearth of competitors in an issuer choice world,
enforcement across international borders would be messy. Nations'
regulatory exports might therefore present issuers with excessive
indeterminacy, a problem with no parallel in U.S. corporate law.
This indeterminacy would tend to blunt competition.
A. MIX AND MATCH TRANSNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT

Scholars disagree as to whether privately chosen securities law
should be enforced by the courts and other institutions of the
issuer's chosen regime or those of the issuer's home country. 318 In
either case, enforcement problems are likely to hinder direct
competition in ways that do not affect U.S. corporate charter
competition.
Regime-selected regulators and institutions may be best situated
to enforce, since they will generally be experts on the nuances of the
legal rules to be applied. 31 9 In addition, centralizing litigation and
other enforcement activity in this way enables consistent development of the regime-selected law, as compared to other approaches
that involve interpretation by various nations' courts or
regulators.3 2 ° Because issuers from different countries may choose
the same nation's regulation, relying on the courts or other enforce-

See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
Romano, supra note 1, at 407; see also Choi & Guzman, PortableReciprocity, supra
note 15, at 931 (recommending regime jurisdiction as default rule).
320 Tung, supra note 21, at 1428.
318
319
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ment institutions in each issuer's home country to enforce the
regime-selected law might result in a mishmash of varying precedents, all attempting to interpret one nation's laws. Finally, the
benefits of regulatory competition are maximized when the legislative, interpretive, and enforcement functions come under the same
sovereign. When authority over outcomes is split between the rule
givers of one state and the interpretive and enforcement organs of
another, the rule-giving state is impeded in its ability to respond to
consumer demand. It cannot guarantee that its regulatory product
will be sufficiently nuanced to display all the features consumers
want.32 '
Moreover, regime-selected institutions have one other significant
factor recommending them. Enforcement must be seen as an
integral aspect to the product itself, and if nations are meant to be
competing suppliers in an international market for regulatory
products, then only the supplier has the right incentives to "service"
the product properly. Other countries' institutions-regulators in
the issuer's home country, for example-may not have sufficient
incentive or sufficient administrative capacity to enforce the regimeselected rules faithfully. As competitors in the international market
for securities law, they may even have incentive to do just the
opposite. Other countries' enforcers may have incentive to sabotage
competitors' products by tinkering with enforcement. It is not
difficult to imagine situations, for example, in which home country
enforcers may be able to favor local interests in particular cases,
while at the same time creating confusion over application of
another state's rules. Such an enforcement strategy would serve to
discourage local firms from choosing nonlocal rules, advantaging the
local regulatory product in the local market.
On the other hand, the issuer's wrongful acts or conduct to be
regulated, which would form the basis for any government enforcement action or private suit, are most likely to occur in the issuer's
home country. In terms of supervising or investigating such
conduct, local institutions in the home country are likely to be more

321

Romano, supranote 1, at 407 and n.46; see also Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces

Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law Market, 36 McGILL L.J. 130 (1991)
(discussing lack of charter competition among Canadian provinces).
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effective given their familiarity with local business practices.3 2 2
Being "on the ground" may give home country regulators a natural
advantage over their foreign counterparts. Enforcing judgments
would also be easier because of the presence of the issuer's assets.
The home country may therefore be the most convenient venue for
regulating conduct, gathering evidence, and realizing on the firm's
assets.323 It may ultimately be easier for home country regulators
to master the various substantive laws they must enforce under
issuer choice than it would be for foreign regulators to operate in the
local legal environment.3 2 4
Enforcement by regime-selected regulators and institutions may
also be expensive. Especially for regulatory regimes that rely on
significant ex ante regulatory oversight, like the U.S. and U.K.
systems, the regular interaction that routinely occurs between
regulators and issuers might be difficult or costly to replicate for
issuers with no preexisting connection to the selected regulatory
jurisdiction.
So regime-selected regulators and institutions will have operational difficulties implementing their rules in foreign lands, and
local regulators may lack the legal expertise in local issuers' chosen
regulatory regimes-and may lack appropriate incentives-to be
able to render appropriate outcomes. Because of these difficulties,
issuers may have trouble predicting the content of foreign securities
laws and the consequences of selecting any one. Regulators will
enjoy only incomplete control over the contours of their regulatory
products, and their ability to respond to consumer feedback,
especially complaints about indeterminacy, will be correspondingly
blunted.
B. ENFORCEMENT OF CORPORATE LAW IN THE U.S. BY CONTRAST

As for U.S. states and corporate charter competition, states to
some extent face a similar bifurcation as between lawmaking and

322
"'

Tung, supra note 21, at 1428.
Steven Walt, Introduction: Privatizationand Its Prospects,41 VA. J. INY'L L. 517, 527

(2001); Choi & Guzman, PortableReciprocity, supra note 15, at 928.
32 Walt, supra note 323, at 527.
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enforcement. However, this does not create the same problems that
would plague issuer choice.
Corporate law in the United States is enforced primarily through
private actions in state and federal courts. Case law therefore forms
a crucial element in the corporate law product each state offers.
Because jurisdiction and venue rules do not require that corporate
law disputes be brought in the courts of the state of incorporation,
a given state relies to some extent on federal courts and the courts
of other states in interpreting and enforcing its corporate law.
Given this structure, one might suppose that states would face
similar problems of incomplete control in enforcing their rules as
described above for issuer choice. Especially if states were truly
competitors over corporate law, each state might worry that other
states' courts might attempt to sabotage the first state's corporate
law product with muddled opinions interpreting the first state's
corporate law. However, this seems not to be an issue among states.
No trend has appeared to suggest that out-of-state interpretations
of local corporate law have been more often objectionable or wrong
than decisions by local courts.
To the U.S. lawyer, this is not surprising. Given that corporate
law exhibits substantial uniformity across states, 325 and given a
common national language and business culture, big or frequent
mistakes in interpreting other states' corporate law seem unlikely,
certainly much less likely than for the kind of cross-border enforcement of national securities laws that issuer choice would require.
The possibility ofjudicial sabotage of out-of-state corporate law also
seems farfetched. Asking or expecting judges to misapply corporate
laws of other states in an effort to increase the relative attractiveness of local law would be unseemly, and judges would generally
resist any such recruitment efforts. In addition, unlike regulators
charged with promulgating and enforcing securities law, judges in
the United States are generalists. Besides Delaware, no other state
maintains a specialized court to hear corporate law cases.326 For
most judges, corporate law cases form only a small part of their

325 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
326

Kahan & Kamar, supra note 47, at 708.
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caseloads.32 7 Judges would therefore not tend to feel any special
institutional commitment to selling local corporate law, 28 especially
not by compromising their own professional judgment in interpreting out-of-state corporate law.3 2 s
VII. STAYING HoME
With all of the foregoing hurdles to direct competition, the choices
facing issuers in an issuer choice world seem not particularly
appealing. Given the choice, would issuers opt out of home country
securities law in favor of other law?33 Switching from the existing
practice of territorial regulation to issuer choice, the early competition over securities law would primarily involve enticing issuers-mainly from established capital market countries-to opt out
of an established and familiar regulatory regime in favor of a less
regulatory structure. Issuers
familiar and perhaps less seasoned
33 1
might not be willing to opt out.

Even in the handful of states that have established specialized business courts,
corporate cases comprise only a small part of a judge's caseload. Id. at 710. Commercial and
contract disputes predominate, and not corporate cases. Id. at 712.
328 In Delaware, judges embrace an institutional commitment to improving Delaware
corporate law. See Andrew G.T. Moore, II, State Competition: Panel Response, 8 CARDOZO
L.REV. 779,782 (1987) (quoting Justice Moore ofDelaware Supreme Court, "Ithink Delaware
corporate law will continue to evolve in order to meet the needs of corporate America. The
Delaware courts feel strongly that this is our responsibility.").
32 Even if state court judges were willing to sabotage out-of-state corporate law in a bid
to make local charters more attractive, they would seem to have little to gain from the
attempt. Disrespecting a firm's chosen corporate law in this way would have the same effect
as attempting to mandate local corporate law territorially. Far from making local law more
attractive, disregard for firm choice of corporate law in either form would more likely drive
businesses to locate elsewhere or otherwise avoid those in-state contacts that would trigger
these courts' jurisdiction.
330 An issuer choice proponent might parry this inquiry with a "chicken soup" defense.
Offering issuers a choice might (or might not) help, but it can't hurt. Cf Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 87
VA. L. REV. 111,149-50 (2001) (making similar argument for their proposal for federal choiceenhancing intervention to enable shareholders to opt out of manager-selected takeover
defenses). However, as the discussion in the text suggests, a drastic change in choice of law
would likely generate all sorts of risk and uncertainty for issuers and investors, even if not
one issuer ultimately opts out of its home country securities regime. Risk and uncertainty,
of course, are not free.
331 For firms making their initial offerings, home country law is likely to be attractive for
reasons similar to those discussed in the text.
327
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The foregoing discussion has shown that issuers are not likely to
have many attractive foreign regimes from which to choose. The
structure of the market for securities law does not seem conducive
to producing competitive alternatives for issuers, and enforcement
problems would also serve to dull competition. In this Part, I point
out the relative attraction of home country law and some costs to
issuers of opting out. Choosing foreign law effectively forsakes a
whole host of home country institutional and organizational
complementarities with home country securities law. Choosing
foreign law forsakes valuable learning and coordination effects
derived from well-worn institutional practices among government
and private actors operating under territorial monopoly. The
unproven technology of a foreign regulation matched to other local
legal institutions would be unpredictable and might cause investors
to impose a heavy discount on the securities of any issuer opting out
of home country law. Investors' bias for their home country issuers
likely includes a bias for home country law as well.3 32 No similar
problems afflict U.S. corporate charter competition.
A. INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEMENTARITIES AND MISMATCHES

Issuers would encounter numerous costs in attempting to switch
from home country securities regulation to that of a foreign
jurisdiction. Under long-standing territorial regulation, it should
not be surprising that other laws and institutions in each nation
have developed in a complementary fashion with its securities
regulation. Besides the letter of the law itself, securities trading
and regulation may depend on complex interactions among various
regulatory and enforcement entities, among regulators and issuers
and their professional advisers, and among regulators and stock
exchanges and other self-regulating organizations. Well-worn
institutional practices already exist. Besides enforcement, discussed
in Part VI,3" these institutional practices include ex ante supervision and guidance for issuers, listing standards and practices, and

See supra notes 117-31 and accompanying text (discussing investors' home bias).
m See supra notes 318-29 and accompanying text.

332

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

622

[Vol. 39:525

regulation of brokers and dealers, among other things.3 34 The pieces
all fit together, more or less. All the players understand the system.
They know what to expect.
As North has noted, this matrix of complementary institutions
and organizations generates "massive increasing returns."335 The
interaction over time of various regulatory institutions with each
other and with private advisers has generated significant learning
effects and coordination effects.336 In addition, as regulation is more
widely applied and the network of complementary organizations
grows, the system becomes more streamlined. These learning and
coordination effects would be forsaken by any local issuer opting out
of home country regulation in favor of foreign law. Home country
institutions and organizations would have to start from scratch with
new foreign law.
Transplanting another nation's securities law into existing
institutional arrangements would be messy and unpredictable.
Agreements among nations for issuer choice would likely only be
able to address the most basic issues. The remaining issues would
have to be worked out over time-and basically from
scratch-through painstaking regulatory tussles over the many
novel questions that issuer choice would generate. To list just a few
examples from the United States-many of which would also arise
in other established capital markets-how would self-regulatory
organizations in the local market operate under a foreign law?
Would there be different answers depending on the foreign regime
selected? How would stock exchange listing requirements dovetail
with foreign law? 337 To what extent would local laws against fraud

be displaced by foreign law? What about private enforcement
mechanisms? 38
Would those follow local law or foreign regimeselected rules?

334

See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.

3.1 NORTH, supra note 110, at 95.
336 See supra notes 171-88 and accompanying text.

Exchange listing requirements, while approved by the SEC under current law, have
their origin in each stock exchange. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (2002).
'
The experience of the EU is also instructive. In attempting to craft a mechanism to
enable European-wide retail public offerings, the Council promulgated the Public Offers
Directive. Jackson & Pan, supra note 125, at 662. This was meant to create a "regulatory
passport" system, allowing issuers to make public offerings of securities throughout the EU
17
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By opting out of home country law, an issuer effectively forsakes
a tried and true technology for a novel one. With the unavoidable
institutional mixing and matching that issuer choice entails, the
learning in each home country starts from zero. Much of the
learning is not likely to be transferable across the various foreign
regulatory regimes from which a local issuer might choose. Because
each foreign regime is likely to exhibit its own quirks and features,
many of the lessons learned in the home country from matching an
issuer-selected foreign securities regime to other home country
institutions may be unique to that foreign regime. For example,
when one Japanese issuer chooses Bahamian securities law to
govern its securities activities and another chooses German law, the
problems of integrating Bahamian securities law into the web of
other Japanese legal and regulatory institutions are likely to be
different from the problems that arise from integrating German law.
Learning and coordination effects in each home country might
accrue only slowly and episodically. 33 9 Periodic bilateral or multilateral renegotiation of international issuer choice agreements might
also be required.
Under home country securities law matched to other home
country institutions, these issues go away. Their easy disappearance makes it easy to overlook the massive learning and
interorganizational coordination that have already accrued through
past experience in each nation with its territorial securities
regulation.3 4 ° Without the legal certainty that comes from prior
learning, investors in important capital markets would likely apply

relying only on their home country offering documents. However, the requirement of host
country regulatory approval has hampered the usefulness of the Public Offers Directive. It
has had virtually no impact on public offerings within the EU. Id. at 680. On regulatory
passports generally, see Tung, supra note 132.
33 Choi and Guzman suggest that a nation could facilitate switching by offering
regulation only "incrementally different in clear and easy to understand ways" from an
established regime, so that only a little new learning must be done for an issuer to switch.
Choi & Guzman, Portable Reciprocity, supra note 15, at 934. This suggestion, however,
ignores the labyrinthine institutional context in which securities regulation operates in
established capital markets.
" For example, the volumes of SEC releases and no-action letters attest to the devil-inthe-details nature of securities regulation in the United States, the demand for certainty by
issuers and investors, and the "learn by doing" that has responded to this demand.
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a heavy discount to the securities of issuers who abandon their
home country regulation in favor of foreign law. 4 '
Not only are issuers and investors already familiar with home
country regulation, but they are likely to enjoy political influence at
home that they may not enjoy abroad. They may be in a position to
take political action at home to influence regulation to their liking.
As with investors' general home country bias, both issuers and
investors also enjoy better information about the direction of
political and regulatory winds in their home jurisdiction than in
other jurisdictions. Especially if regulators in important capital
markets develop a practice and reputation for strategically matching other nations' innovations,342 issuers might as well stay home.
Established regulators may drive out upstarts through this
matching strategy.34
With corporate law in the United States, by comparison, no
similar institutional problems exist. Not only are corporate laws
fairly similar across jurisdictions, but courts and court rules are as
well.
B. AGENCY ISSUES

Related to the learning and coordination effects, agency issues
might cause firms to stay at home as well. Not only are issuers
familiar with their home country regulatory landscape, but their
lawyers are as well. For the same reason that home country
lawyers would likely oppose local recognition of foreign securities
law, in an issuer choice world lawyers may attempt to steer their
clients to home country law. Choosing local law enables the firm's
local lawyers to maximize their fees from issuers. An issuer's choice
Even if the market's unpredictability discount were only a short-term phenomenon,
as issuers, regulators, and others worked out the implications of mix-and-match regulation
someone would have to go first. Some issuer would have to be the guinea pig. It may be that
few issuers would be willing to suffer these higher capital costs.
342 See supra notes 309-17 and accompanying text.
' Those same established regulators might not be too successful at poaching issuers from
other established capital market countries, however, because of their inability to demonstrate
commitment to a program of responsive regulation. See supranotes 206-21 and accompanying text.
41
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of foreign law, however, would likely force its home country lawyers
to share fees with foreign lawyers. Introducing the need for foreign
lawyers might also enable those foreign lawyers to grab other types
of the issuer's legal work at the expense of the home country
lawyers. 3 4
VIII. CONCLUSION
"Law as a product" provides a powerful conception favoring
regulatory competition. And corporate charter competition among
U.S. states offers a plausible success story. It is the darling of
regulatory competition advocates, who rely on this story as a basis
for advocating for the extension of private choice to other areas
outside of corporate law. Whether this seeming success story can be
replicated in other contexts, however, is unclear.
Application of the model to international securities regulation
seems quite natural at first blush. Given the close affinity of
securities regulation with corporate law and their significant
overlap, it might be expected that competitive mechanisms that
work in one context would be applicable to the other. I have argued,
however, that the analogy does not hold. The general affinity
between these two areas of law tells us little about whether
regulatory competition in U.S. corporate law portends anything for
Important differences in
international securities regulation.
political economy as between U.S. states in a federal system and
independent nations in an anarchic global context make the charter
competition model inapposite.
The choice of law rule respecting private choice that emerged
among U.S. states for corporate law-the internal affairs doctrine-is unlikely to be replicated among nations for securities
regulation. The historical and political conditions in the two
contexts are quite different. Without such a rule, issuer choice is
not possible. Even assuming this choice of law problem could be

'
Similar agency issues may explain some observed home-state bias in U.S. firms'
incorporation choices. Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 47, at 397; Daines, supra note 47, at
1584.
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overcome, U.S. states' presumed incentives and capacities to
compete over corporate law may not translate well into the context
of international securities regulation. In this latter context, active
competitors may be hard to find. For established capital market
countries, regulatory revenues may be too small to enable such
countries to demonstrate the fiscal dependence that is critical for
credible commitment. All but the smallest nations would have
difficulty showing fiscal dependence. The smallest nations, on the
other hand, are unlikely to have sufficient legal and regulatory
infrastructure to be able to offer sophisticated, internationally
competitive securities law. With these constraints, there would
likely be a dearth of serious competitors in a global market for
securities law. Cross-border enforcement problems would also likely
impede competition. The transnational mix-and-match of legal
institutions required to enforce issuer-selected foreign law is
unlikely to generate predictable rules responsive to the needs of
issuers and investors.
The various impediments to direct competition suggest that
issuers would not have appealing choices in an issuer choice world.
The predictability of home country regulation and the stronger
political influence issuers enjoy at home may cause them to stay
home, even given an exit option.
Competitive federalism operates best in a federalist system. No
such system exists internationally. Whether a system could emerge
to facilitate stable international competition over securities law is
unclear. What is clear, however, is that U.S. corporate charter
competition is not the right model.
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APPENDIX I

FIGURE 4 and TABLE 2 show the prospects for competition,
assuming that a nation's credible commitment to responsive
securities law could be demonstrated when regulatory revenues
comprise 5% of a nation's public revenues.
FIGURE 4: Required World Market Share for 5%Fiscal Dependence
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TABLE 2
National Revenues, National Market Capitalization, and Required
World Market Share for 5% Fiscal Dependence

COUNTRY

Bermuda
Malta
Sri Lanka
Luxembourg
Slovenia
Peru
Philippines
Hungary
Chile
Malaysia
New Zealand
Thailand
China, Hong Kong
Ireland
Indonesia
Singapore
South Africa
Finland
Israel
Taiwan
Argentina
India
Portugal
Poland
Greece
Turkey
Austria
Iran
Denmark
Switzerland
Norway
Australia
Brazil
Spain
Belgium
Korea

000,000 000 of U.S. $
NATIONAL
NATIONAL
MARKET
REVENUES a
CAPITALIZATIONb

0.6
1.5

3.0
4.4
8.1
8.9
10.2
13.0
16.0
16.4
16.7
21.0
22.9
25.7
26.0
27.9
32.0
36.1
40.0
42.7
44.0
44.3
48.6
51.6
53.9
54.5
56.3
60.0
61.1
71.6
71.7
86.8
100.6
105.0
113.4
118.1

2.2
4.0
1.1
34.0
3.1
9.7
25.3
10.3
60.4
113.2
18.2
29.2
623.4
81.9
26.8
155.1
131.3
293.6
65.3
247.6
45.8
60.7
31.4
107.5
69.7
29.9
5.9
111.8
792.3
65.8
372.8
226.2
504.2
182.5
148.4

SHARE OF WORLD
MARKET FOR
SECURTIES LAW
FOR 5% FIsCAL
I DEPENDENCE
0.8%
2.1%
4.2%
6.2%
11.2%
12.4%
14.2%
18.1%
22.2%
22.8%
23.2%
29.2%
31.8%
35.7%
36.1%
38.8%
44.5%
50.1%
55.6%
59.4%
61.1%
61.5%
67.5%
71.7%
74.8%
75.7%
78.2%
83.4%
84.8%
99.4%
99.6%
120.6%
139.7%
145.8%
157.6%
164.0%

20051
Mexico
Sweden
Netherlands
China, Mainland
Canada
France
Japan
Italy
United Kingdom
Germany
United States**

629

LOST IN TRANSLATION
125.0
133.0
158.0
161.8
178.6
210.0
463.0
488.0
555.2
586.5
2,109.7

125.2
328.3
640.5
-

770.1
1,446.6
3,193.9
768.4
2,612.2
1,270.2
15,214.6

173.6%
184.7%
219.4%
224.7%
248.1%
291.7%
643.1%
677.8%
771.1%
814.6%
2930.2%

Year 2000 data except for Taiwan (2001).
** U.S. market capitalization includes Amex, Chicago, Nasdaq, and NYSE.
a Source: CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK; IMF International Financial Statistics
Yearbook.
b Source: World Federation of Exchanges.

